Essays in applied econometrics. by Huse, Cristian
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Essays in Applied Econometrics
Cristian Huse
A thesis submitted to the Department of Economics 
of the London School of Economics and Political Science 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
London, October 2008
UMI Number: U615279
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615279
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

Contents
1 How D o  Incum bents R eact to  Entry: E vidence from D ifferentiated  P rod u ct M ar­
kets 16
1.1 In troduction ......................................................................................................................................  16
1.2 The Brazilian Domestic Airline M ark e t.....................................................................................  17
1.2.1 Industry O v erv iew .............................................................................................................  17
1.2.2 The Entry Pattern  of G o l ................................................................................................  18
1.3 How Incumbents React to  E n t r y ...............................................................................................  20
1.3.1 Preemptive and Post-Entry R e a c tio n s .........................................................................  20
1.3.2 Product Differentiation and Asymmetric Responses................................................... 21
1.3.3 Further Particulars and D ata A v a ilab ility ................................................................... 22
1.4 The D a t a .......................................................................................................................................... 22
1.5 Empirical S tr a te g y .........................................................................................................................  23
1.6 Estimation Results and A n a ly s is ...............................................................................................  28
1.6.1 Incumbents Do React Preemptively Using P r ic e s ...................................................... 28
1.6.2 Product Differentiation Might Soften Price R e sp o n se s ............................................  31
1.6.3 Price Responses Are Not C o s t-D riv e n .........................................................................  32
1.6.4 Excess C ap ac ity ? .................................................................................................................  33
1.6.5 Network Adjustment and Product R ep o sitio n in g ...................................................... 34
1.7 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 34
l.A  Appendix: Variable D escrip tio n ................................................................................................... 36
l.B Appendix: Endogeneity Is su e s ...................................................................................................... 40
Contents 2
l.B .l Id en tifica tio n ..................................................................................................................... 40
l.B .2 D ata Sources and Construction of In s tru m e n ts .......................................................  44
1.B.3 Estimation Strategy and R e s u l t s .................................................................................  46
R eferences................................................................................................................................................... 51
R eferences 51
2 Term Structure M odelling w ith  O bservable S tate Variables 56
2.1 In troduction .....................................................................................................................................  56
2.2 Yield Curve E s t im a t io n ..............................................................................................................  59
2.2.1 Static M e th o d s .................................................................................................................. 59
2.2.2 Nelson-Siegel and B e y o n d ..............................................................................................  61
2.3 Term Structure M odelling ...........................................................................................................  62
2.3.1 A Model with State V ariab les........................................................................................ 63
2.3.2 Im plem entation.................................................................................................................. 65
2.4 Finite-Sample P e rfo rm a n c e ........................................................................................................  67
2.5 A p p lic a tio n .....................................................................................................................................  6 8
2.5.1 The D a t a ...........................................................................................................................  6 8
2.5.2 On The Economic Determinants of the Yield Curve .............................................  71
2.5.3 In-Sample A nalysis...........................................................................................................  72
2.5.4 Incorporating Economic R e la t io n s ..............................................................................  74
2.5.5 Out-of-Sample A n a ly s is .................................................................................................. 77
2.A Appendix A: Covariance Matrix D e r iv a tio n ............................................................................  81
2.B Appendix B: Robustness Check Using the CRSP D a t a ......................................................... 83
2.B.1 The D a t a ...........................................................................................................................  84
2.B.2 In-Sample A nalysis...........................................................................................................  8 6
2.B.3 Out-of-Sample A n a ly s is .................................................................................................. 91
References................................................................................................................................................... 98
R eferences 98
3 E stim ating T he ‘C oordinated Effects’ o f M ergers 105
3.1 In troduction .....................................................................................................................................  105
3.2 The Network Server I n d u s t r y .....................................................................................................  108
3.2.1 Network Servers ..............................................................................................................  108
Contents 3
3.2.2 Consolidation in the Network Server In d u s try .............................................................  109
3.2.3 The HP-Compaq M erger...................................................................................................  I l l
3.3 Evaluating the Incentives to C o llu d e .........................................................................................  112
3.3.1 Qualitative Analysis of Coordinated Effects in the HP-Compaq M erger..............  112
3.3.2 The Benchmark M odel......................................................................................................  115
3.3.3 Extensions .......................................................................................................................... 119
3.4 D a t a ................................................................................................................................................... 123
3.5 Model Im plem entation ................................................................................................................... 124
3.5.1 Demand E s tim a t io n .......................................................................................................... 125
3.5.2 Identification S tra te g y ......................................................................................................  127
3.5.3 Estimating Discount Factors.............................................................................................. 128
3.6 R esu lts ...............................................................................................................................................  130
3.6.1 Demand E s tim a t io n .......................................................................................................... 130
3.6.2 Discount F a c to rs ................................................................................................................  132
3.6.3 Evaluating the Incentives to C o llu d e ............................................................................  134
References...................................................................................................................................................  166
R eferences 166
List of Tables
1.1 Operational Information of the Main Airlines in the Brazilian Domestic Market -  2002 36
1.2 Evolution of Gol’s Actual Presence in the S am p le .................................................................  36
1.3 Baseline Specification Results: Price and Demand Responses ............................................ 37
1.4 Preemptive Specification Results: Price and Demand R esponses.......................................  38
1.5 PU Specification Results: Price and Demand R e sp o n se s ....................................................  39
1.6 PUD Specification Results: Price and Demand Responses -  Distance V ariab le .............  40
1.7 PUD Specification Results: Price and Demand Responses -  Distance-Metric Variables 41
1.8 PUD Specification Results: Price Responses -  Cost C on tro ls .............................................. 42
1.9 Incumbents’ Response in Aircraft Utilization and Number of F l ig h t s ..............................  43
1.10 Incumbents’ Response in the Share of Seats Supplied -  W eekdays....................................  44
1.11 Incumbents’ Response in the Share of Seats Supplied -  W eekends....................................  45
1.12 Tests of Exogeneity and Overidentifying R estric tio n s ...........................................................  48
1.13 PUD Specification Results: IV Estimation of Price Responses -  Distance Variable and 
Cost C o n tro ls ...................................................................................................................................  49
1.14 IV Estimation of Responses in Aircraft U ti l iz a t io n ..............................................................  50
2.1 Simulation Results for Single-Variable Factor Specification.................................................  6 8
2.2 Simulation Results for Single-Variable Factor Specification cont’d ....................................  69
2.3 Simulation Results for Single-Variable Factor Specification cont’d d .................................  69
2.4 Macroeconomic Variables by G ro u p ............................................................................................ 81
2.5 Macroeconomic Variables Driving Term Structure F a c to r s .................................................  81
List of Tables 5
2.6 Preliminary Results for Single-Variable Specifications...........................................................  82
2.7 Further Results for Single-Variable Factor Specifications..................................................... 83
2.8 Results for Best Single-Variable Factor S p ec ifica tio n ...........................................................  83
2.9 Results for Multi-Variable Factor Specifications.....................................................................  84
2.10 Results for Multi-Variable Factor Specification .....................................................................  84
2.11 Specifications Nested within the Interest Rate Feedback R u l e ........................................... 84
2.12 Param eter Estimates for Forward-Looking Interest Rate R u l e ........................................... 85
2.13 Param eter Estimates for Backward-Looking Interest Rate R u l e ........................................ 85
2.14 NBER-Dated Recessions C o n sid e red ......................................................................................... 8 6
2.15 Overall Accuracy of Alternative Specifications - Recessions 1 - 3 ......................................... 87
2.16 Overall Accuracy of Alternative Specifications - Recessions 4 - 5 ......................................... 8 8
2.17 Maturity-Disaggregated Accuracy - Recessions 1 and 2 ........................................................  89
2.18 Maturity-Disaggregated Accuracy - Recessions 3 and 4 ........................................................  90
2.19 Maturity-Disaggregated Accuracy - Recession 5 .....................................................................  91
2.20 Basic Statistics of Y ie ld s ................................................................................................................ 91
2.21 Results for Alternative Single-Variable Factor Specifications.............................................  92
2.22 Results for Alternative Multi-Variable Factor Specifications.............................................  93
2.23 Results for Alternative Multi-Variable Factor Specifications cont’d ................................  94
2.24 Goodness-of-Fit of Alternative M o d e ls .....................................................................................  94
2.25 Average MAEs P eriod -by-P eriod ...............................................................................................  95
2.26 MAEs of Alternative Specifications............................................................................................  96
2.27 MAEs of Alternative Specifications cont’d ...............................................................................  97
3.1 Market Shares in the World Server M ark e t...............................................................................  109
3.2 Key Events in the Network Server Industry 1996-2002 ........................................................  110
3.3 Results for Alternative Demand Specifications for the 0-4 Price Segment -  World M arket 133
3.4 Discount Factors for Firms in the Server In d u s try ..................................................................  134
3.5 Price-Cost Margins by Firm and Geographical M a r k e t ........................................................  136
3.6 Model-Implied Average Percentual Price Changes Following HP-Compaq Merger . . . 137
3.7 Pre- and Post-Merger Static Profits -  0-4 Price S eg m e n t..................................................... 138
3.8 Pre- and Post-Merger Static Profits -  4-10 Price S e g m e n t .................................................  139
3.9 Pre- and Post-Merger Value Functions -  0-4 Price S e g m e n t ..............................................  152
3.10 Pre- and Post-Merger Value Functions -  4-10 Price Segm ent..............................................  153
3.11 Pre- and Post-Merger Critical Discount Factors -  0-4 and 4-10 Price Segments . . . .  154
List of Tables 6
3.12 Multimarket Value F u n c tio n s ....................................................................................................  155
3.13 M ultimarket Critical Discount F a c to r s ....................................................................................  156
3.14 Multimarket Value Functions and Critical Discount Factors -  Aggregation Across Re­
gions and Price S e g m e n ts ............................................................................................................  157
3.15 Competitive Fringe Model Value Functions -  0-4 and 4-10 Price S egm en ts ...................... 158
3.16 Competitive Fringe Model Critical Discount Factors -  0-4 and 4-10 Price Segments . . 159
3.17 Multimarket Value Functions and Critical Discount Factors in the Competitive Fringe 
Model -  0-4 and 4-10 Price Segm ents......................................................................................... 160
3.18 Multimarket Value Functions and Critical Discount Factors in the Competitive Fringe 
Model -  Aggregated Across Price Segments and R eg io n s......................................................  161
3.19 Value Functions for the Compaq-HP-IBM C a r t e l .................................................................. 162
3.20 Value Functions for the Compaq-HP-Dell Cartel .................................................................. 163
3.21 Side Payments to Sustain Uniform Critical Discount Factors Across F irm s .....................  164
3.22 Rejections of the Null Hypothesis of Equality Between Model-Implied and CAPM Betas 
Against the Two-Sided A lte rn a tiv e ............................................................................................  165
Abstract
This thesis is divided in three essays.
The first essay examines the reactions by incumbent airlines to the threat and actual entry of the 
low-cost carrier Gol in the Brazilian domestic air transport market. By estimating the reactions in 
prices, quantities and supply variables, it investigates the plausibility of theories of entry deterrence 
and accommodation.
The second essay proposes and implements a parsimonious three-factor model of the term  structure 
whose dynamics is driven uniquely by observable state variables. The method allows comparing alter­
native views on the way state variables -  macroeconomic variables, in particular - influence the yield 
curve dynamics, avoids curse of dimensionality problems commonly appearing in traditional models, 
and provides more reliable inference by using both the cross-sectional and the time series dimension 
of the data. I conduct in- and out-of-sample studies using a comprehensive set of US data. I show 
tha t even a parsimonious model where the level, slope and curvature factors of the term  structure are 
driven by, respectively, measures of inflation, monetary policy and economic activity consistently out­
performs the (latent-variable) benchmark model out-of-sample, when considering the five NBER-dated 
recessions of the last three decades.
In the third essay I empirically evaluate the incentives to tacitly collude in differentiated product 
markets. Tacit collusion plays an im portant role in merger policy: competition agencies sometimes 
block mergers on the grounds tha t they will generate ‘coordinated effects’, an increased likelihood 
of collusion. I thus propose an approach to  coordinated effects merger simulation in markets where 
multi-product firms operate in differentiated product markets. To the best of my knowledge, this is the 
first full empirical implementation of a coordinated effects merger simulation model in a differentiated 
product market. I use the model to study the network server market and, specifically, examine the effect
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of the merger between HP and Compaq on their and their rivals’ collective incentives and ability to 
sustain tacit collusion. The results suggest tha t the incentives to collude in the network server market 
are substantial, but actively decreased following the merger between HP and Compaq. In addition 
to exploring the incentives for collusion on one market I also examine the impact of (i) multi-market 
contact on firms’ incentive and ability to sustain tacit coordination and (ii) a competitive fringe of 
smaller players who co-exist with a subset of the larger players in an industry who tacitly collude. 
By taking the economic theory of tacit collusion seriously in an empirical example, I show tha t the 
intuition many economists have for the effect of mergers on the incentives to tacitly collude is actually 
wrong.
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Introduction
This thesis proposes empirical strategies to answer three empirically motivated questions.
The first essay investigates the reactions by incumbents to the threat of entry and to actual entry of 
a new competitor. I estimate the response in prices, quantities, and a number of supply variables for a 
panel of routes disaggregated at the airline-route level. Besides examining the existence of preemptive 
responses, I investigate whether I can detect entry deterrence and accommodation by the incumbents 
using information on aircraft utilization, number of flights and measures of flight schedule, accounting 
for the asymmetry in responses arising due to product differentiation, and controlling for time-varying 
unobservables at both the market and the carrier level. The results show evidence of preemptive 
behaviour by the incumbents in the form of fare cuts. The incumbents do respond to both potential 
and actual entry, and the former is at least as im portant as the latter. Following the entry of Gol, 
the incumbents do not however sustain these responses, suggesting accommodation. There is also 
evidence of network adjustments in the form of a rescheduling of flights, in what can be interpreted 
as an attem pt by the incumbents to avoid head-to-head competition with the entrant by redesigning 
the flight schedules.
The second essay proposes and implements a parsimonious three-factor model of the term  structure 
whose dynamics is driven uniquely by observable state variables. The motivation behind the paper 
is that latent variables are well-suited when one is mostly concerned about fitting models to data, 
but they lack an economic interpretation which is of interest when, for instance, conducting policy 
experiments. Following this reasoning, the model can be thought of as ‘Sims-structural’, since despite 
not being based on optimizing agents, it allows conducting policy experiments.
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The method I propose in Chapter 2 allows comparing alternative views on the way state variables 
(macroeconomic variables in the paper) influence the yield curve dynamics. Moreover, it is parsimo­
nious, avoiding curse of dimensionality issues commonly arising in traditional models. Finally, it is 
in a position to provide more reliable inference by using both the cross-sectional and the time series 
dimension of the data. In the empirical implementation of the method, I conduct in- and out-of-sample 
studies using a comprehensive set of US data. There I show that even a parsimonious model where the 
level, slope and curvature factors of the term structure are driven by, respectively, measures of infla­
tion, monetary policy and economic activity consistently outperforms the (latent-variable) benchmark 
model out-of-sample, when considering the five NBER-dated recessions of the last three decades.
The third essay empirically evaluate the incentives to tacitly collude in differentiated product mar­
kets. The idea I follow is to estimate the incentive-compatibility constraint for collusion vis-d,-vis 
defection for each firm in a given market within a repeated game where firms act strategically on 
prices. The questions I address are whether there are incentives to collude prior to a merger and 
whether these incentives change as a result of a merger, given the repeated interaction between a 
smaller number of players. I show in the paper tha t the intuition many economists have for the effect 
of mergers on the incentives to tacitly collude is actually wrong, since they do not necessarily increase 
with less players.
Following Friedman (1971), I consider the feasibility of sustaining a candidate collusive equilibrium 
using ‘grim’ strategies. To examine the incentives to collude using grim strategies, one needs to consider 
the returns achieved by each firm in the three pricing scenarios -  ‘Collusion’, ‘Nash equilibrium pricing’ 
and ‘Defection’. Fundamental ingredients for this computation are a demand model to compute profits 
of the stage game, an asset pricing model to estimate the discount factor of the firms, and an algorithm 
to compute the value functions of the firms in each of the above scenarios. In addition to exploring the 
incentives for collusion in one market I also examine the impact of (i) multi-market contact on firms’ 
incentive and ability to sustain tacit coordination and (ii) a competitive fringe of smaller players who 
co-exist with a subset of the larger players in an industry who tacitly collude. I apply the techniques 
using data from the market for network servers prior to the merger between Compaq and Hewlett- 
Packard. I find on the incentives for firms in the server industry to tacitly collude. The results suggest 
tha t the incentives to collude in the network server market are substantial, but actively decreased 
following the merger between HP and Compaq.
How Do Incumbents React to Entry: Evidence from 
Differentiated Product Markets
1.1 Introduction
This paper investigates how incumbents respond to the threat of entry of a new competitor. To do 
so, I estimate the reactions to route entry of a low-cost carrier (LCC) in the Brazilian domestic air 
transport market.
The Brazilian domestic air transport market is not only interesting due to the dimensions of the 
country and its emergence in economic terms, resulting in increased demand for air transport, but also 
for providing a case study of a low-cost carrier which entered the market following its liberalization 
after a number of failed attem pts to take on the big players in the industry before its establishment. In 
fact, in 2008, seven years after entering the Brazilian market with six aircraft, Gol Airlines commands 
some 45% of the market, with close to $3bn in net revenues in 2007 and over $3bn in market value. 1 
The industry has also been closely watched by the antitrust authorities given a number of mergers, 
acquisitions and associations (such as code-sharing agreements) between players.
To estimate the reactions to Gol’s entry, I estimate the response in prices, quantities, and a number 
of supply variables for a panel of routes disaggregated at the airline-route level. Besides examining 
the existence of preemptive responses, I investigate whether I can find evidence of entry deterrence 
or accommodation using information on aircraft utilization, number of flights and measures of flight 
schedule, accounting for the asymmetry in responses arising due to product differentiation, and con­
trolling for time-varying unobservables at both the market and the carrier level.
1See http ://w w w .voegol.com .br/ir/ for Gol’s annual reports and other institutional information.
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Based on the entry pattern  of Gol Airlines, I define a route as being threatened by Gol whenever it 
is not flying the route but operating within an area of influence of tha t route (namely of the endpoint 
airports). This relates to an extensive literature on airline competition, in particular tha t related to 
the debate of airport presence vs route presence as sources of competitive advantage and market power 
(see, for instance, Borenstein, 1989, and Evans and Kessides, 1993 for the opposing views). In contrast 
with most of the papers on the airline industry, which tend to focus on what happens after entry (as 
Berry, 1990, 1992), I follow the more recent literature and concentrate on what happens prior to entry 
(as Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008).
By using an empirical framework to estimate preemptive actions I can also test for entry deterrence 
and accommodation. In particular, I focus on the plausibility of limit pricing in the spirit of Milgrom 
and Roberts (1982) and excess capacity a la Dixit (1980).
The results show evidence of preemptive behaviour by the incumbents in the form of fare cuts. The 
incumbents do respond to both potential and actual entry, and the former is at least as im portant 
as the latter. Following the entry of Gol, the incumbents do not sustain these responses, suggesting 
accommodation. There is also evidence of a repositioning or rescheduling of flights, as the share of 
weekday peak time flights increase at the expense of the share of weekday off-peak time flights, in 
what can be interpreted as an attem pt to avoid head-to-head competition with the entrant.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Brazilian domestic air transport market. 
Section 3 discusses what the literature tells us about how incumbents respond to entry and to which 
extent we can take the implications of the models to data. The Brazilian dataset collected by DAC 
used in this study is discussed in Section 4, whereas the empirical strategy is presented in Section 5. 
Section 6  presents the results and the final section concludes.
1.2 The Brazilian Domestic Airline Market
1.2.1 Industry Overview
The process of liberalization of the Brazilian domestic air transport market initiated in the early 
1990s had a crucial role in attracting newcomers to the industry. As opposed to the early entrants, 
which lacked the financial resources and the infrastructure to succeed in the market, and eventually 
went burst, Gol Airlines, whose operations started in January 2001, was part of one of the biggest 
Brazilian transportation groups (Grupo Aurea) . 2 Moreover, Gol’s internal organization tried to adapt
2Grupo Aurea was at that tim e the biggest Mercedes-Benz bus customer in Latin America and one of the biggest worldwide. 
(Evangelho, 2002)
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to the Brazilian context some key aspects of the internal organization of Southwest Airlines, a low-cost 
carrier operating in the US.
By early 2001, the process of liberalization of the market, supervised by the Department of Civil 
Aviation (DAC) was in a stage where, in stark contrast with the thirty  or so years of strict control over 
key variables, airlines had substantial freedom to operate, in the sense tha t fares and flight frequencies 
were almost entirely liberalized. In particular, by tha t time airlines were free to enter and exit markets 
as quick as allowed by technical regulations, so tha t it would take no longer than one month for a firm 
to have a proposed new flight authorized by the regulator. As a result, the market grew steadily over 
time, reaching 60mn and 83mn travellers in 2003 and 2005, respectively.
The new regulatory framework made it easier for both newcomers and incumbents to adjust their 
whole network in response to changing market conditions. In such a setting, entry threats may arise 
and might have significant -  even if short-lived -  impact on fares.
This very process which attracted  Gol Airlines, the player I focus in this paper, saw the incumbent 
airlines in a fragile financial situation and having to  struggle against a competitor with deep pockets 
but, more importantly, with a business strategy unknown to them, since Gol was the first scheduled 
LCC in Latin America.
Table 1 compares some characteristics of Gol to those of the main incumbents (VARIG, TAM and 
VASP), for year 2002. Although its yields (price normalized by passenger and kilometers, the price 
measure used in the industry) were some 30% lower than those of the incumbents, the load factors 
(fraction of seats sold) were on average at least 1 0 % higher which, coupled with costs estimated to  be 
some 40% lower than those of the competitors, resulted in Gol being the only profitable airline among 
the major ones.
1.2.2 The Entry Pattern of Gol
In contrast with a number of well-known LCCs such as Ryanair and Southwest, which operate using 
the point-to-point transit model, Gol follows most of the major carriers in the use of a hub-and-spoke 
network of routes. Whereas the former essentially means tha t an aircraft will fly between airports A 
and B without any connecting flights and the endpoint airports, the latter results in a more complex 
network structure, usually compared to  a chariot wheel, in which all traffic moves between the (pe­
ripheral) spokes and the (central) hub. The main benefits of the hub-and-spoke over the poin-to-point 
model are the fewer number of routes needed to connect all airports and the easiness with which new 
spokes can be added to the network. On the other hand, route scheduling is more complicated for the
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carrier, and the model is less flexible, needing a substantial amount of time to be redesigned. Moreover, 
delays can affect the whole network, as often experienced by the common airline traveller.
When coupled with the characteristics of the Brazilian market, a vast country whose population 
is concentrated along the Atlantic coast, especially in the Southeastern region, the pattern  of entry 
followed by Gol differs substantially from the pattern of pointwise entry of most LCCs, being more 
closely related to  tha t of W al-Mart.3 In practice, this means that, starting from its main hub in Sao 
Paulo (the economic powerhouse of the country), Gol’s operation would radiate from the inside out, 
first towards Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte, respectively second and th ird  cities of the country, 
also located in the Southeastern region, and would then quickly expand through three main corridors.
The first corridor goes Southwards until Porto Alegre, the second goes towards the Northeast (in­
cluding cities such as Salvador, Recife and Fortaleza), whereas the third corridor goes towards Brasilia, 
the country’s capital (and, at a later stage, from there towards the “inner-North” , including Manaus, 
the capital of the Amazon state). As a result, the choice of routes starting from an airport Gol entered 
was rather straightforward: one from the hub outwards, and another from outwards toward the hub, 
with a number of connections in between in both cases. This feature explains why whenever it entered 
an airport, Gol immediately started flying “all” routes.
Another aspect of Gol’s entry pattern tha t resembles tha t of Wal-Mart is tha t Gol did not jump 
to far-off locations to later fill-in the area in-between. Before flying from Sao Paulo towards Porto 
Alegre, the state capital located furthest to the South, for instance, Gol would first start flying to the 
capitals located in between, Curitiba and Florianopolis. After the routes along the main corridor were 
established, it was time to consider entering medium-sized cities relatively close to the corridor.
The economic justification the literature gives for this entry pattern  are economies of density .4 An 
economy of density is a type of economy of scale, which arises when an airline increases the frequency 
of flights on a given route structure/region instead of expanding the route network. Economies of 
density can be potentially enjoyed through channels such as management (it is easier for upper-level 
management to oversee a set of locations if they are closer together), marketing and advertising, but 
especially maintenance in the case of Gol: given tha t its aircraft operate for more than 12 hours on 
a daily basis, maintenance needs to be done overnight in a number of different locations, so having a 
dense route network minimizes the number of maintenance centres.
3 See Holmes (2008) for a thorough description and detailed analysis of the entry patterns of Wal-Mart.
4 See, for instance, Caves, Christensen, and Tretheway (1984).
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1.3 How Incumbents React to Entry
1.3.1 Preemptive and Post-Entry Reactions
Most of the empirical literature focuses at the strategic behavior of incumbents after entry occurs .5 
Exceptions to this line of research are Morrison (2001) and Goolsbee and Syverson (2008). While the 
former investigates the impact on prices of actual, adjacent and potential route presence, the later 
focuses on how far back prior to entry do incumbents react, following airport presence of the newcomer 
in the two endpoints (airports) of a route.
Studies of the effects of (potential and actual) entry on the strategic behaviour of incumbents go 
back at least to the work of Bain (1956). Although there is some evidence documenting the existence 
of preemptive price-cutting by incumbent airlines (Windle and Dresner, 1999; Morrison 2001), there 
is no agreement about the underlying reasoning leading to it. Since there is limited information in the 
DAC dataset I use, I describe alternative theories and try  to provide suggestive pieces of evidence that 
favour some of the theories in the sequel.
On the one hand, Dixit (1979, 1980) puts forth the idea tha t incumbents may invest in excess 
capacity in order to make entry less attractive. In our setting, this would mean tha t incumbents add 
either bigger aircraft or increase the number of flights in a given route prior to entry of the incumbent in 
order to make it less attractive. On the other hand, Kreps and Wilson (1982) argue tha t incumbents 
might use a limit pricing strategy, according to which pre-entry prices are set so as to discourage 
potential entrants (in particular, prices generating zero profits for the entrant). A particular way to 
react in capacity in the airline market is by rearranging the network, so tha t the incumbent can offer 
more flights leaving at specific times.
Alternative preemptive stories that depend on the micro-level content of a dataset include switching 
costs, as in Klemperer (1987) and long-term contracting, as in Aghion and Bolton (1987). Although 
all of them are extremely interesting avenues of research, they would require micro-level information 
about the ticket (price, fare class etc) and about both who bought the ticket and the purpose of the 
trip (frequent-flyer membership, business or leisure trip, company discounts etc), which unfortunately 
is unavailable in most cases.
5See, for instance, Reiss and Spiller (1989), Borenstein (1989, 1991, 1992), Berry (1990, 1992), Evans and Kessides (1993) and 
Peteraf and Reed (1994).
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1.3.2 Product Differentiation and Asymmetric Responses
“Product differentiation is pervasive in markets. It is at the heart of structural em­
piricism and it smoothes jagged behavior that causes paradoxical outcomes in several 
theoretical models.” , Anderson (2008)
When compared to the product offered by the major airlines, the LCC product is quite differen­
tiated, in the sense th a t it is a ‘no-frills’ product: buying a ticket from a LCC might mean using 
airports far from city centres, having fewer flights to choose from, arriving and departing at times not 
necessarily the most convenient (as associated costs such as airport fares tend to be lower at these 
times), sometimes having to pay extra charges for dispatched luggage, not having the convenience of 
in-flight service and very often having to struggle with little legroom and seats tha t will not recline. 
Typical examples of airlines operating in the low-cost segment are Ryanair (in Europe) and Southwest 
(in the US).
Although not all of these factors might bite for short-haul flights, they become more and more im­
portant as the flight distance increases. In other words, product differentiation increases as a function 
of flight distance, as it becomes increasingly difficult to cope with, for instance, little legroom, no 
in-flight service, and to carry only hand-luggage as flight lenght increases. An immediate consequence 
of this fact is that incumbents’ responses to entry might also differ according to product differentia­
tion, so tha t they tend to soften in routes where the LCC product is more distant (in the space of 
characteristics, see Lancaster, 1966) from the product offered by major airlines.
In the Brazilian market, the main sources of product differentiation (besides flight distance) are 
flight frequency and flight scheduling. This happens because Gol’s in-flight service and general cabin 
comfort have always been comparable to those offered by the incumbents. Besides not having to pay 
for in-flight drinks or snacks, there were no extra charges to baggage handling. W hat is more, most 
Brazilian cities have only one airport; those with more than one airport do not usually have flights 
leaving for the same airport. For instance, in the case of Rio de Janeiro, the Santos Dumont airport, 
located in the city centre, operates only scheduled flights to Sao Paulo or regional and unscheduled 
flights to smaller cities, which are too small to be included in the DAC dataset.
It then follows that, in a market where the business travellers are estimated to command some 70% 
of the market (Evangelho, 2002) flight distance (which increases the contrast between full-service and 
low-cost carriers), flight frequency and flight schedules are the main sources of differentiation of the 
LCC product. I thus investigate to which extent product differentiation softens the reactions from 
incumbents using these variables. More precisely, I investigate whether a product more distant from
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the incumbents’ one in the space of characteristics will result in softer reactions by the incumbents ie. 
I allow price responses to be asymmetric.
1.3.3 Farther Particulars and Data Availability
Price information is quite transparent in the Brazilian market, since these can be learned from the 
companies’ websites for at least the last eight years. The number of tickets sold (ie. realized demand) 
and the number of seats supplied by the airlines is however sensitive information — although both are 
known by the authorities, only ticket sales are usually made available to researchers; instead of the 
number of seats supplied, authorities usually make available information on average aircraft size and 
the fraction of seats offered in different periods (weekdays vs weekends, peak-time vs off-peak-time). 
Although airline quality is not exactly observable, it is quite stable over time and can be controlled for 
with the use of fixed-effects, as discussed in Section 1.5. Product differentiation in other dimensions 
(for instance, baggage allowance or extra costs for dispatching baggage, use of different airports etc) 
is non-existent in the Brazilian market during the sample period.
As a result, one can study price reactions in a quite detailed way, whereas the study of quantity 
reactions is more limited — I thus resort to the study of proxies to quantity reactions taking the forms 
of (i) aircraft size; (ii) (an estimate of) number of flights; (iii) market shares.
1.4 The Data
The dataset used in this study was collected and made available by the then Brazilian regulator, the 
Department of Civil Aviation (DAC). Information of the panel of routes comes from the report entitled 
“Average Yield of Monitored Airport Pairs” . D ata is observed at the monthly frequency and consists 
of airline-specific data for up to 94 origin-destination pairs from September 2001 to March 2004.
The dataset is aggregated at the city-pair level, meaning to say th a t a flight going from A to B is 
different from one going from B to A, something usual in air transport datasets and studies. As a result, 
we have observations over 31 months and up to four airlines operating in each city-pair. According to 
the DAC report, this amounts to 98% of the passenger-weighted kilometers flown within the sample 
period, not including small regional and/or non-scheduled airlines operating in the Brazilian market. 
Following the expansion of the market in the period, the dataset begins reporting Gol operating in 51 
routes serving 11 cities to reach 76 routes serving 25 cities in the final period.
The variables I observe include, for every route (origin-destination pair), the average yield (which is 
deflated by the Brazilian’s Bureau of Statistics [IBGE] CPI) and number of tickets sold; the identity
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of the incumbents flying a route; the timing of the entry of Gol; a dummy variable indicating a code­
share agreement between the incumbents TAM and VARIG; the share of non-stop seats during peak 
time of the i-th incumbent on the od-th city-pair at month t; the share of non-stop seats linking 
central airports of the i-th incumbent on the od-th city-pair at month t; the share peak and off-peak 
time flights operating on weekdays and weekends for the i-th incumbent on the od-th city-pair at 
month t; average aircraft size; the average operating costs. The Appendix contains detailed variable 
descriptions.
Actual entries of the LCC are concentrated in the first half of the dataset. This will constrain the 
use of lagged variables for lags above four in the empirical exercise, since the first entry of Gol in the 
data  occurs at period four, but I show evidence that this does not impact the final results.
Using the geographic coordinates of each airport, I also compute the distance between all airports in 
the sample. Following these calculations, I obtain tha t twelve of the airports have at least one airport 
located less than 250km away, twenty two airports have at least one airport located less than 500km 
away, and twenty four airports have at least one airport located less than  1 ,0 0 0 km away (approximately 
155, 310 and 620 miles, respectively). These variables will be used when investigating the threat of 
entry using alternative definitions of the neighbourhood (area of influence) of a route.
As opposed to the US Department of Transport (DOT) DB1A files, the dataset I use is not a 10% 
random sample of all domestic tickets in a given quarter. On the low side, this means tha t there is no 
detail such as in a micro-level dataset with detailed information on, say, fares, just average fares. On 
the other hand, the DAC dataset has monthly observations, thus supplying more detailed information 
in the time series aspect than its US counterpart. Information tha t would be useful to take a number of 
theoretical models to data but which the DAC dataset lacks include fare class, whether the passenger 
is a frequent flyer, the place of residence, the purpose of the trip .6
1.5 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy I follow can be cast as a version of an event-study, since I investigate an event 
of interest looking at what happened prior to it, during its occurrence and after it had occurred. In 
what follows I propose four main specifications to study the reactions to entry of Gol, which I then 
take to data. The first — or Baseline — specification only allows for responses of the incumbents to 
Gol’s entry after Gol has actually entered a route.
6 The best one can get are estim ates from the DAC that the business traveller segment is responsible for 70% of the tickets issued 
in the country, as reported in Evangelho, 2002.
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The second specification — which I refer to as the P  specification — allows for preemptive responses 
whenever a route is under threat. More precisely, whenever the LCC is operating within a neighbour­
hood (or area of influence, to be defined below) of one of the endpoints of a route, but not a t the 
route itself, this route is considered to be under threat. To estimate this effect, I consider alternative 
measures of neighbourhood and take all of them to data. This generalizes the approaches of Berry 
(1992), Windle and Dresner (1999), Morrison (2001), Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) and others since, 
instead of focusing on competition at the airport (and then route) level, I am considering competition 
prior to airport entry.
The third specification — which I refer to as the PU  specification — builds on the P specification 
but differs from it by controlling for time-varying market unobservables. By doing so, it accounts for 
time-varying variables such as income changes in a given market, national advertising and changes in 
the cost structure of a given market.
Finally, I account for product differentiation as a determinant of reactions to entry in what I refer 
to as the PU D  specification. This specification accounts for the fact tha t product differentiation can 
soften reactions to entry in a significant way, thus allowing these reactions to be asymmetric.
Baseline Specification (B )
I define y i r j  as be the outcome of interest, such as the logarithm of either prices or quantities for 
incumbent i flying route r at time t. The baseline specification is given by
K
Vir,t  =  7 t r  +  p T L C C P r e s r,t * + t  +  X i r j O t  + £ ir , t
T = 0
where 7 ir and pt are, respectively, carrier-route and time fixed effects, t* is the period when Gol starts 
operating a route, LC C presrjt*+T are dummy variables indicating tha t Gol is operating route r at 
time t* 4- r , r  > 0 (I let K  = 5 in the empirical implementation), and X irj  is a vector of controls 
which might also be included, such as cost shifters in the case of a pricing equation. The coefficients 
measure the impact of LCC presence on the variable of interest.
P reem ptive Specification (P )
The baseline specification does not capture the effects of the threat of entry posed on the variable of 
interest when Gol operates within a neighbourhood of the endpoints of a route without actually flying 
the route. I thus define the variable LC C threatr^*-T,T > 1 taking value one whenever the LCC Gol 
is present in a neighbourhood (area of influence) of at least one of the endpoints of route r, but not 
route r  itself at time t* — r  (t* is the period where actual route entry at occurs). The preemptive
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specification thus consists on the baseline specification augmented with the indicators measuring the 
threat of entry, viz.
K  L
Vir,t  ~  'Kir "b f i t  “1“ ^   ^P TL C C p T C S r ^*^.T “I-  ^   ^d - T - L C C t h r e a t - f ^ * —j- “I-  X i r ^OL “f" £ ir,t  
r = 0  t — 1
where the coefficients ST measure the impact of the LCC threat on the variable of interest.
Although a particular case of the LC C threat variable consists on the case where Gol operates at 
the airport but not at a given route, the neighbourhood definition I  adopt is more general than the 
airport one, since it allows defining an area of influence of a route (such as a circle centered at the 
endpoint airports and radius d). It is worth noting tha t in the Brazilian dataset, the threats I observe 
are outside the airport, meaning to say tha t once Gol enters an airport, it will immediately operate 
all the routes originating or ending at the airport.7
Preem ptive Specification Controlling fo r  T im e-Varying Unobservables (P U )
The fixed-effects in specification P are unable to capture time-varying market unobservables. To illus­
trate  the importance of controlling for this effect, assume tha t LCC presence in a route is correlated 
with time-varying unobservables tha t are carrier- and market-specific, such as (i) income changes in a 
given market; (ii) nationwide advertising to stimulate LCC demand; (ii) a change in the cost structure 
in a given market, following the redesign of the network and resulting LCC increased presence in this 
market.
As the carrier-route and time fixed-effects are unable to adequately control for these unobservables, 
I adopt an error-component decomposition of the time fixed-effects th a t uses a fact specific to airline 
markets which allows to group routes into endpoint cities to control for city-time effects. As a result, 
the time fixed-effects can be decomposed into carrier-time fixed effects and city-time fixed effects, thus 
allowing for modelling time-varying observables at both the market and the carrier level. To perform 
this, note tha t a route r can be written as a combination of cities of origin o and destination d and 
tha t routes can be grouped into cities of origin and destination (thus markets, which appear in a much 
smaller number in the data). I thus replace the time- and carrier-route- fixed-effects with carrier-time 
and city-time fixed-effects. While the former are able to capture time-varying unobservables related to 
general strategic variables of the carriers, such as nationwide advertising and network decisions, the
7 Again, I refer the reader to the section describing the institutional details and the pattern of entry of Gol; within the hub- 
and-spoke network it adopts (which is in stark contrast with the point-to-point nework adopted by carriers such as Ryanair and 
easyJet), this means flying both from and to the hub.
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la tter capture market-specific changes. The PU specification then reads
K  L
Viod,t =  l iod  “b L^ it ~b Vo,t "b Vd,t “b ^   ^(3TL C C p r e S od t*+T “I- ^   ^5TL C C t h r e a t odt*_T -(- X iod,t a  -I- £iod,t
T = 0  T—l
where yiodj  measures the variable of interest of incumbent i flying from origin o to destination d at 
time t , 7 iod, fiit, u0)t, vdj  are respectively carrier-route, carrier-time, origin-time and destination time 
fixed-effects.
P reem ptive Specification Controlling fo r  Tim e- Varying Unobservables and Product 
D ifferentia tion  (P U D )
The specifications proposed so far do not account for product differentiation. As a result, given two 
routes entered (or threatened) by the entrant in a given period and origin, the incumbent reactions will 
differ only by the destination-time fixed effect. If, however, there are variables tha t shift the intensity 
of the reactions, such as flight distance, one can generalize the PU model by defining the PUD model 
as follows:
K  L
yiod,t = liod +  A4it +  vo,t +  Vd,t +  f3TLC C presodj*+T + E 5TLC C threatodf* - T +
T = 0  T = 1
“I~Ziod,tLC CpreSod tp  -j- X i od tOi £iod,t
where, Ziodj  is a vector of shifters of the intensity of reactions and p is a parameter to be estimated.
In the case of price reactions to entry, one would expect at least some of the 6 and coefficients to 
be negative and statistically significant, indicating fare cuts given the threat of actual entry of Gol. 
If product differentiation issues play a role in price responses, the p coefficients would be expected to 
have a positive sign, softening these reactions for routes where the rivalry between the incumbents 
and the entry is less intense.
D iscussion: Identification, Fixed-Effects
Throughout my analysis I assume that network decisions made by the LCC Gol (in particular, entry 
decisions) are exogenous. More precisely, I assume th a t its network decisions are made in advance 
(ie. are predetermined) of pricing decisions and tha t the fixed-effects can control for (time-varying) 
unobservables, so tha t my least squares estimates are consistently estimated. In what follows I justify 
this assumption economically, leaving a thorough set of robustness tests (which give additional support 
to the exogeneity assumption) to the Appendix.
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As discussed above (Section 1.2.2), network-related decisions have to be made well in advance of 
reactions for a number of reasons.8 First, in the case of a start-up, as was Gol in 2001, one needs 
a detailed business plan before starting operations, not only to present to potential investors, but 
also serve as guidance when establishing branches and maintenance centres at airports or hiring and 
training staff.
Second, one needs to plan (and order) well in advance a number of aircraft, choose their specifications 
and delivery times; typically, these decisions are made years in advance and impose extra restrictions 
on the company regarding network adjustment, since specific types of aircraft are designed for specific 
route lenghts.9
Third, the redesign of hub-and-spoke networks as the one of Gol also involves dealing with passengers 
who bought tickets in advance, in case of routes to be exited, and selling tickets for a new route before 
entry.
Fourth, while the response variables (be it a price or a quantity measure) are measured at the route 
level for a given incumbent, LC C threat and LCCpres  are the consequence of the complex network 
design of the entrant, so rejecting the exogeneity assumption in this specific case would amount to 
saying tha t the responses of a single route would lead to a network redefinition by the entrant.
Fifth, exogeneity is consistent with Gol’s entry pattern described in Section 1.2.2 — the underlying 
behavioural assumption is tha t the “radial” entry pattern of Gol starting from Sao Paulo, is not 
influenced by the reactions to entry. In other words, Gol has to enter the key markets (starting from 
Sao Paulo) if it is to succeed.
Another argument th a t needs to be addressed is the fact th a t route profitability is an unobserved 
variable (at least to the econometrician), implying tha t least squares renders inconsistent estimates. To 
account for that, previous studies since at least Windle and Dresner (1999) and Morrison (2001) have 
invested in careful modelling of fixed-effects. More recently, Gooslbee and Syverson (2005) put forth a 
model similar to my P (Preemptive) specification, whereas their 2008 paper is a particular case of my 
PU specification, with route fixed-effects 7 iod and incumbent-time fixed effects, p it. The way I specify 
my general model (PUD, but also PU) generalizes these earlier contributions by controlling also for 
time-varying market effects (profitability, in particular) using time-origin and time-destination fixed- 
effects, vQ)t and Vd,t, respectively. All in all, my final specification thus captures time-varying market 
unobservables and time-varying carrier unobservables (unobserved quality, for instance). If the route
8 As stated by Busse (2002, p. 304) in her study of airline price wars, "(...) airlines set their schedules well in advance of the actual 
flight; most airlines begin selling tickets six months before a flight." Busse also stresses the existence of airport slot restrictions, 
timing constraints imposed by by hub-and-spoke networks, and the necessity to physically coordinate with other (partner) airlines.
9 When it comes to planning its fleet size, G ol’s first annual report had a planning horizon of five years, while in its 2007 one 
it goes until 2014. Moreover, it started operating with a fleet of 6 aircraft in January 2001, which it increased to 10 by the end of 
2001, 19 by the end of 2002, 22 by the end of 2003, 27 by the end of 2004 and 41 by the end of 2005 - see Souza (2006).
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fixed-effects 7 iod capture market heterogeneity constant over time (such as the fact th a t a given route 
connects two state capitals), the carrier-time fixed-efects p it capture, for instance, varying financial 
conditions of an airline (bankruptcy, in particular), where the time-varying origin and destination 
fixed-effects capture changes in economic conditions (such as economic growth in the countryside due 
to the commodities boom), seasonality patterns (or tourism effects during holidays), and profitability.
One im portant variable not observed but which can be controlled for by the above fixed-effects is 
airline quality (one can think about leg room, or comfort in general to fix ideas). If quality is time- 
varying, but homogeneous across routes of a given carrier, then it is controlled for by p,it. In practice, 
quality tends to be quite stable over time for a given route, since fleets tend to be standardized to 
minimize costs and ordered well in advance (at least 2-3 years). W hat might vary is the difference 
in quality between an incumbent and the LCC, and this will be accounted for by using alternative 
variables in the interaction term  Zi0d:tLC C pres0d,t• In particular, I use flight distance as a control, 
since the difference in quality tends to increase in longer flights.
1.6 Estimation Results and Analysis
This section reports results on price and quantity reactions of the incumbents given the threat of 
entry and the actual presence of the LCC Gol. I start by estimating price reactions and the associated 
responses in demand (ticket sales), controlling for costs and alternative measures of product differ­
entiation. Next I focus on different measures of quantity responses (responses in the supply of seats 
by each incumbent at every route): first, I investigate excess capacity by estimating the responses in 
aircraft size and (a lower bound on) the number of flights; second, I investigate product reposition­
ing by estimating the responses in the share of seats supplied in weekdays/weekends and peak- and 
off-peak-time flights.
1.6.1 Incumbents Do React Preemptively Using Prices 
Baseline Specification (B)
The estimates from the baseline specification are hard to justify in economic terms: they show a 14% 
fare reduction at the period Gol starts flying a route with no response in the number of tickets sold 
for five months, as reported in Table 1.3. 10
10 This results implies that demand reacts very inelastically to fare reductions, a fact at odds with findings for the Brazilian market, 
where average own- and cross-price elasticities are in the range 2-4 (in absolute values) and 0.4-1.8 , respectively, see Oliveira (2007).
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Preemptive Specification (P)
When investigating preemptive effects, I consider a number of measures of neighbourhood or area of 
influence. First, I assume a route to be threatened whenever Gol entered the geographic region in either 
of the endpoint airports of a route, but not the route itself. Brazil is divided into five geographic regions 
(South, Southeast, Northeast, North and Midwest), so this is a very broad concept of neighbourhood. I 
also consider an alternative definition of regions by defining the coastal area into three regions and the 
inner part of the country into two regions (inner-North and inner-South), but the results were identical 
to tha t of geographic regions. 11 I then focused on more localized measures of area of influence: after 
obtaining the geographic coordinates of each airport and computing the distance between them, I 
defined an area of influence (or neighbourhood) to be a circle centered at a given airport and with 
radius d.12 Following this reasoning, whenever Gol operates within an area of influence, but not at 
a given route, this route is considered to be under threat. To this end, I define radii of 500km and 
1,000km . Overall, the results for the d^ooo criterion do not differ significantly from tha t of region, 
but those for d$oo tend to show stronger yet sometimes more unstable reactions to entry; this can be 
partly attributed to the fact tha t by considering a smaller neighbourhood one is effectively using a 
smaller sample, but the increasing reactions to an ever approaching threat by a competitor also makes 
economic sense. 13 So, for every route, we investigate whether there were reactions to the threat of 
entry going back up to four months using four alternative measures of area of influence.
Although one might argue tha t four months is not a long enough window, I choose to do so for 
a number of reasons. F irst, I am constrained by the data, since the first period an entry occurs in 
the dataset is period four; by increasing the number of lags, I am at risk of dropping im portant 
information and reducing the sample, a critical issue especially for the g^oo area of influence.14 Second, 
given the historically high Brazilian (real) interest rates, it would be surprising to see significant 
fare reductions many periods before entry, since an incumbent following this strategy would forego a 
substantial amount of revenues. 15 Third, the time it takes between Gol requiring to operate a route
11 When the area of influence is defined as the geographic region, there are 5 airports in the Southern region, 11 in the southeast, 
4 in the Northeast, 3 in the North and 2 in the Midwest. When considering the alternative criterion of zones of influence, I divide 
the coastal cities into three regions (with 5 airports in the Southern region, 3 in the Southeast and 5 in the Northeast) and divided 
the inner part of the country into 2 regions, “inner-North” , with 7 airports, and “inner-South” , with 5 airports. The results are 
robust to these definitions.
12 The use of areas of influence or neighbourhoods is by no means new — see for instance Davis (2006), who studies demand for 
movie theathres in the US accounting for their location.
13Of the 12, 22 and 24 airports which have neighbourhoods within, respectively, 250km, 500km and 1,000km, only 5, 11 and 12 
are threatened by Gol.
14The results of a larger number of lags for the di,ooo and region neighbourhood definitions shows that, by and large, fare cuts 
and quantity increases occur the same way as for the specifications whose results we report.
15 Alternatively, in the context of a repeated game where players have a discount 5 :=  y yy , a high (real) interest rate implies a 
low discount factor, so players give less importance to future payoffs ie. are impatient. As a result, foregoing profits today to avoid 
a future loss of profits is less likely to happen.
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and the regulator authorizing it is roughly one month, as discussed above. Finally, the state of financial 
fragility of the incumbents makes it hard for them to sustain aggressive fare cuts for long periods.
W hen allowing for preemption one obtains a fare reduction of about 21% at the month before Gol 
starts flying a route, as reported in Table 1.4. At the period entry occurs, the incumbents reduce 
fares again by 16-20%, which is followed by another reduction of about 6 % four periods after entry, 
suggesting tha t demand is indeed price-sensitive.
Together with the fare reduction prior to actual entry, there is an associated increase in ticket sales 
ranging from 31-52%, depending on the area of influence criterion considered. There is no significant 
effect at the month Gol enters a route, but further (marginally significant) increases occur two and 
five periods after entry.
Overall, the results for both price and ticket sales are robust to the choice of area of influence. 
Importantly, the preemption-related coefficients of the price equations are not only significant, but 
are also larger than those measuring fare reduction at entry, and the reaction in demand responds 
accordingly.
P reem ptive Specification Controlling fo r  Tim e-Varying Unobservables (P U )
The PU estimates suggest a significant fare reduction at the month prior to entry (24-36%), followed 
by more moderate reactions at the period of entry (18-12%) and four and five periods after the actual 
entry of Gol (3-5% and 6-9%, respectively), as reported in Table 1.5. As in the case of the Preemptive 
model, the effect of preemption on fares dominates that of post-entry reaction.
The response in ticket sales occurs only for the models with a wider area of influence (di,ooo and 
region), being insignificant whenever g^ oo- Although no model identifies reactions in quantity at the 
period Gol actually starts operating a route, all of them measure increases two and five periods after 
actual entry (25-28% and 15-21%, respectively). As opposed to what happens with price, the post­
entry responses in demand seem to dominate the preemptive effects, suggesting tha t they are somewhat 
sluggish.
By controlling for time-varying market unobservables, the results for the PU specification suggest 
that the P specification tends to underestimate preemptive reactions in prices and overestimate reac­
tions to actual entry at time t*. On the other hand, when it comes to quantity reactions the Preemptive 
specification tends to overestimate the preemptive responses and to underestimates the post-entry re­
actions.
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1.6.2 Product Differentiation Might Soften Price Responses
Preem ptive Specification Controlling fo r  T im e-Varying Unobservables and Product 
D ifferentiation  (PU D )
I now report the estimates for the PUD specification. Besides showing how product differentiation can 
soften both price and quantity responses, the results below are more in line with economic intuition.
I account for product differentiation using two alternatives. First, I interact LCC presence with 
flight distance, since the increased comfort offered by a legacy carrier as compared to a LCC tends 
to have a larger impact the longer the flight takes. Second, I also construct product differentiation 
indices using the distance-metric variables of Slade (2004) and Pinkse, Slade and Brett (2002). These 
variables measure the distance between products in the space of characteristics, thus providing an 
index of product differentiation. In what follows, I use the distance-metric between the characteristic 
x of two products i and j  defined by
wxij =  dm(xi ,x j )  =  —  ^
1 +  2 | Xi  — Xj
-  1
where the characteristics are nsspiQdtt and nsscciQdtt which are, respectively, the share of non-stop seats 
during peak time of the i-th incumbent on the od-th city-pair at month t and the share of non-stop 
seats linking central airports of the i-th incumbent on the od-th city-pair at month t, both of which 
are proxies for convenience and level of service of airline i at a route.
The estimates of distance only and distance plus distance-metric variables are reported in Tables 1.6 
and 1.7, respectively. In the former, there is mixed evidence about the significance of distance across 
alternative measures of neighbourhood for prices, whereas in the la tter the distance-metric variables 
are always significant. Despite the concerns regarding the endogeneity of the distance-metric variables 
when using shares as characteristics, the results with and without distance-metric proxies send the 
same basic message: incumbents respond strongly in prices, both before and at the period Gol starts 
operating a route. The post-entry effects are concentrated two months after Gol’s entry occurred. The 
main difference induced by the inclusion of the distance-metric variables is the stronger price response 
at the period of entry.
The estimates for the PUD specification are relatively robust to the choice of the area of influence: 
as reported in Table 1.6, incumbents tend to preempt by reducing fares by 25-35% at the month before 
Gol starts flying a route. Then, given the actual entry of the LCC, incumbents reduce fares again by 
20-25%, but tend not to react in prices in the periods following entry. Product differentiation tends to 
soften these price reactions by about 8 % per 1 ,0 0 0 km flown.
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The impact on quantities also tends to precede LCC entry: for the wider areas of influence (^1,000 
and region), the increase of the number of tickets sold at the period immediately before actual entry of 
the LCC is in the range 14-22%, and this increase is going to be at least 30% once Gol starts flying a 
route.16 Except for the second month after entry, when quantities increase by about 23%, the quantity 
responses are not significant up to period t* +  5. As in the case of prices, product differentiation (or, 
more precisely, the interaction between LCC presence and distance) softens the response in quantities 
by 23-32%, which is slightly less than the quantity increase observed at the period t* of entry.
When comparing the PUD and PU estimates, the latter seems to underestimate price reactions at 
the period Gol starts flying a route and to overestimate price reactions after entry (price reactions 
at period t* +  5 are significant for the PU specification). Moreover, the PU specification does not 
detect any quantity reactions at the period of entry (especially worrying given the price reactions at 
periods t* — 1 and t* itself) and again overestimate the reactions at period t* +  5. W hen comparing 
the alternative criteria of area of influence, the PU specification results suggests th a t price reactions 
at the period of entry are stronger the larger the area of influence, exactly the opposite result obtained 
for the PUD specification.
The findings above suggest tha t there occurs preemption in the form of fare reductions at the 
period immediately before entry of the LCC in a route. This is followed by further fare reductions at 
the period of entry, then by accommodation after entry has occurred. Regardless of the measure of area 
of influence considered, the preemptive reductions exceed those occurring at entry by at least 20%. 
Quantity responds to the preemptive fare reductions at the month before entry and again two months 
after entry has occurred. Product differentiation will, however, soften price responses, suggesting tha t 
most of the competitive action happens at shorter routes where the schedules of the entrant is similar 
to those of the incumbents. Finally, price and quantity responses tend to be stronger for the smaller 
areas of influence ie. the closer Gol gets, the stronger the response of the established players.
1.6.3 Price Responses Are Not Cost-Driven
So far I have abstracted from costs when investigating price responses, and Table 1.8 reports tha t 
costs do not drive price responses.
The cost information available is, for a given route and incumbent, the average operating costs 
excluding (financial variables such as) depreciation, amortization, leasing and insurance, thus being
16The quantity estimates for the smaller areas of influence look less plausible. In particular, the results for the ^250 specification, 
according to which quantities decrease by 33% two months before entry and then increase by 79% one month before entry might 
be caused by the small number of airports/routes involved.
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closely related to route an airport costs. The results should also reflect the good job done by the 
fixed-effects in controlling for unobservables.
I .6.4 Excess Capacity?
I do not have information on the amount of seats supplied by each incumbent in a given route, so I 
resort to indirect information to try  to learn about the existence of preemption in the form of excess 
capacity. Basically, incumbents can generate excess capacity for a route either by increasing aircraft 
size (replacing a 95-seater with, say, a 120- or 150-seater) or by adjusting the network, which consists 
of creating (or rescheduling) flights.
I s ta rt by using information on the average aircraft size used by incumbent i at route od. Overall, 
there is an increasing trend in aircraft size in the dataset regardless of Gol’s presence, but using the 
framework of the PUD specification I investigate whether there is a response in terms of aircraft 
utilization to the threat of entry of Gol. Following this reasoning, an incumbent feeling threatened by 
the LCC could, even in the short run, use larger aircraft in a route in an attem pt to dissuade Gol from 
operating this route. The results in Table 1.9 show no evidence of preemptive behaviour of tha t sort. 
Although there are responses at the period when Gol starts flying a route, they are marginal — the 
4-5% coefficients correspond to roughly six seats in the median 118-seater in the data and ten seats in 
the case of the biggest aircraft observed in the sample. W hat incumbents really tend to look at when 
determining aircraft size for a route are costs and flight distance. I thus conclude tha t there are no 
substantial adjustments in aircraft size given the potential entry of Gol.
I then  have a second look at excess capacity by deriving an estimate of the number of flights in a 
route using data on aircraft size and the number of tickets sold by each incumbent at a given period 
and route. By dividing the number of tickets by the aircraft size, I get a lower bound on the number 
of flights (LBF) each incumbent is operating on a route at a given period (this is the number of fully 
booked flights each incumbents would need to satisfy its demand).
The results from a regression using the natural logarithm of LBF as the dependent variable are 
reported in Table 1.9. The results show a 16-26% increase at the period Gol starts flying a route plus 
another 24-29% increase two months afterwards, with no significant evidence for action before Gol 
enters the route. I then go back to the price regressions (Table 1.6) and note tha t there were fare cuts 
at periods t* — 1 (between 13% and 37%, depending on the measure of neighbourhood used) and t* 
(between 14% and 19%), so I interpret the changes in LBF as being fuelled by these price changes.
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1.6.5 Network Adjustment and Product Repositioning
I now use the information on the shares of seats supplied to investigate a potential repositioning of 
the incumbent carriers given the threat of Gol’s entry. Although I do not observe the quantity of seats 
supplied, I observe shares of seats offered at (1) peak time during weekdays; (2) off-peak time during 
weekdays; (3) peak time during weekends; and (4) off-peak time during weekends and the typical route 
sees a clearly decreasing pattern for (l)-(4).
The results reported in Tables 1.10 and 1.11 show no evidence of any meaningful preemptive ad­
justm ent in any of the shares, and not much action at all in what regards the weekend shares, either 
pre-, at or post-entry. There is, however, some evidence of an increase in the share of peak time flights 
during weekdays and a decrease in the share of off-peak flights also on weekdays, both of which tend 
to be followed by a further increase and decrease, respectively, two months after the entry of Gol. 
Given the tendency of the LCCs in general, and Gol in particular, to operate in off-peak times, this 
is suggestive of accommodation by the incumbents, as they are avoiding head-to-head competition 
with the entrant by focusing on the supply of flights more conveniently scheduled (from the traveller’s 
viewpoint), and which are more highly priced.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper studied the reactions by incumbent airlines to the threat and actual entry of the low-cost 
carrier Gol in the Brazilian domestic air transport market.
The results show evidence of preemptive behaviour by the incumbents in the form of fare cuts. 
Although the incumbents do respond to the threat of entry ie. to the fact tha t Gol is operating within 
the area of influence of a route, and to actual entry, they do not sustain these responses post-entry, in 
what I interpret as accommodation by the incumbents. Importantly, the responses to potential entry 
are at least as im portant as the ones to actual entry.
There is also evidence of repositioning in the supply of seats, with an increase of peak time flights 
on weekdays and a decrease of off-peak time flights also on weekdays, in what suggests an attem pt to 
avoid head-to-head competition with the entrant.
The results show the importance of controlling for time-varying market unobservables, tha t costs 
are not the driving force behind price reactions and tha t product differentiation tends to soften price 
responses, suggesting that most of the competitive action tends to occur in short-haul routes.
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On a more general level, the results of the paper suggest th a t reactions to entry are not only 
preemptive with respect to entry at the route itself, but also with respect to entry at the airport, a 
traditional predictor of route entry in the literature.
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TABLE 1.1. Operational Information of the Main Airlines in the Brazilian Domestic Market -  2002
I te m U n it G o l T A M V A R IG V A S P
R e v en u e  p e r  P a s se n g e r -K ilo m e te r s  (R P K ) Passenger X km (bn) 3.22 9.34 10.48 8.89
R P K  M a rk et S h a re Fraction 0.12 0.35 0.39 0.13
Traffic p er  E m p lo y e e Passenger X km (mn) 1.56 1.23 0.75 0.70
L oad F a cto r Fraction 0.68 0.53 0.59 0.55
U n it  C o st BRL/Passenger x km 0.20 0.33 0.33 0.31
Y ie ld B R L /Passengerxkm 0.21 0.29 0.31 0.27
O p e ra tin g  M a rg in Fraction 0.06 - 0.12 -0 .0 5 -0 .1 6
N o te :  This table compares operational characteristics of the LCC Gol to those of the incumbent airlines in the Brazilian market. 
BRL is the Brazilian currency, the Real. Passenger indicates the number of revenue-passengers traveled whereas RPK is defined 
as revenue-passenger tim es kilometers. The market share is defined as the ratio of the firm’s RPK over the RPK of the industry. 
Operating margin is defined as the ratio of operating profits (or losses) over total revenues.
TABLE 1.2. Evolution of Gol’s Actual Presence in the Sample
G o l’s P r e se n c e
In it ia l P e r io d  
S e p te m b e r  2001
S a m p le  
M id -p e r io d  
D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 2
F in a l P er io d  
M arch  20 0 4
R o u te s  S erv ed 51 70 76
% S a m p le  R o u te s 54 74 81
C it ie s  S erv ed 11 22 25
% S a m p le  C it ie s 38 76 90
l.A  Appendix: Variable Description
This Appendix describes the variables used in the study.
• yieldio^t'. is the natural logarithm of average yield (revenue per passenger-kilometers) of the 
i-th incumbent on the od-th route at month t. A route is defined as a directional (one-way) city- 
pair. Yields are expressed in local currency (BRL -  Brazilian Real) and are related to all tickets 
sold in a given period for a given airline on a given route. Information available in DAC’s (non­
published) Average Yield of Monitored Airport-Pairs Report. Only major incumbent’s average yields 
are considered. Average yields are not disaggregated by fare class. Yields were deflated by a consumer 
price index, IPCA (source: IBGE).
•  LC C pres0d,t*+T: a dummy variable tha t controls for the route presence of the entrant Gol 
Airlines at time t* +  r .  t* is the time period in which it actually establishes presence (flights) on the 
route. Information available in the HOTRAN reports.
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TABLE 1.3. Baseline Specification Results: Price and Demand Responses
P r ice T ic k e t  S a le s
V a r ia b le T im e + R o u te  F E T im e-(-R o u te  F E
L C C prest* -0.137** -0.064
(-3.31) (-0.73)
LCCprest*_|_i -0.016 0.065
(-0.89) (0.96)
L C C p r e s f + 2 0.029 0.065
(0.73) (0.91)
L C C p r e s t*+3 -0.011 -0.127
(-0.24) (-1.26)
L C C p r e s t*+ 4 -0.032** 0.005
(-2.27) (0.08)
L C C pres** +5 -0.014 0.047*
(-0.55) (0.79)
R -sq u a r e d 0.834 0.923
N o te :  This table reports estim ates of the Baseline specification for (logarithms of) prices and demand (ticket sales) as the dependent 
variables. LCCpres denotes the actual entry of the LCC on a route. Standard errors are clustered by route to control for intertemporal 
correlation, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported within parentheses. Significance at the 10% and 5% significance levels 
are denoted by * and ** respectively. Fixed effects not reported.
• L C C threat0d,t*-T• a dummy variable that controls for the threat of route presence of the 
entrant Gol Airlines. A route is threatened if (1) it operates in an airport in the same geographic 
region as either airport o or airport d (this leads to the “region” concept); (2) if it operates in the 
same zone of influence of either airport o or airport d (this leads to  the same results as the region 
concept - results not reported); (3) it operates whithin 250/500/1,000km as either airport o or airport 
d (this leads to the variables ^2 5 0 ^ 5 0 0  and d^ooo)-
•  nsspiodj'- the share of non-stop seats during peak time of the i-th incumbent on the od-th city- 
pair at month t (=  number of non-stop and peak-time seats of airline i over number of total non-stop 
and peak-time seats in the market). It is a proxy for convenience and level of service of airline i at a 
route. For this calculation, “peak time” was defined considering all flights with departure within 5am 
to 10am (morning peak) and 4.30pm to 10pm (evening peak) on weekdays, and those with departure 
from 7pm to 10pm on Sundays. DAC’s HOTRAN Report provides the information of flight number /  
weekdays /  departure times, which made possible the segregation into “peak” and “off-peak” periods.
•  nsscciodj: the share of non-stop seats linking central airports of the i-th incumbent on the 
od-th city-pair at month t  (=  number of non stop seats of airline i linking airports close to the city 
center over number of to tal non stop seats linking airports close to the city center in the market). 
Also a proxy for convenience and level of service of airline i. Airports close to the city center are: Sao 
Paulo’s Congonhas (CGH), Rio de Janeiro’s Santos Dumont (SDU) and Belo Horizonte’s Pampulha
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TABLE 1.4. Preemptive Specification Results: Price and Demand Responses
V a ria b le
P r ic e T ick e t S a le s
dgoo dl.ooo R e g io n dgoo di,ooo R e g io n
L C C th rea tt*  -4 0.036 0.031 0.085** -0.002 -0.046 -0.018
(1.41) (1.27) (3.50) (-0.03) (-0.75) (-0.29)
L C C th r e a tt» _3 -0.007 0.001 -0.005 0.066 0.065 0.094
(-0.26) (0 .02) (-0 .22) (0.75) (0.82) (1.20)
L C C threat**  _ 2 0.006 0.024 0.023 -0.189* -0.140 -0.128
(0.19) (0.89) (0.84) (-1.95) (1.47) (1.33)
L C C threat**  _ i -0 .210** -0.207** -0 .210** 0.400** 0.340** 0.315*
(-4.69) (-4.80) (-4.04) (4.12) (3.45) (2.21)
L CC pres** -0.167** -0.189** -0.185** -0.011 0.045 0.060
(-4.28) (-5.33) (-4.30) (-0 .11) (0.57) (0.64)
L CC pres** -0.018 -0.014 -0.015 0.059 0.053 0.051
(-0.97) (-0.74) (-0.76) (0.85) (0.81) (0.76)
L C C p r es**+2 -0.013 -0.001 -0.007 0.105* 0.109* 0.119*
(-0.47) (-0.03) (-0.31) (1.70) (1.85) (1.84)
L C C p r e s**+3 -0.045 -0.038 -0.036 -0.176 -0.163 -0.156
(-0.98) (-0.92) (-0.91) (-1.60) (-1.64) (-1.60)
L C C p r e s**-)_4 -0.060** -0.068** -0.060* 0.039 0.073 0.065
(-2.77) (-3.38) (-3.19) (0.52) (1.00) (0.86)
L C C p r est*+ 5 -0.060* -0.048 -0.073** 0.105* 0.057* 0.069
(-1.71) (-1.51) (-2.76) (1.94) (0.94) (1 1 1 )
R -sq u a r e d 0.835 0.835 0.834 0.923 0.923 0.923
N o te : This table compares alternative versions of the Preemptive specification for (logarithms of) prices and demand (ticket sales) 
as the dependent variables. LCCthreat denotes the fact that Gol is operating within a neighbourhood (measured by distance within 
500 and 1,000km from a given airport) but not on the airport itself. LCCpres denotes the actual entry of the LCC on a route. 
Standard errors are clustered by route to control for intertemporal correlation, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported within 
parentheses. Significance at the 10% and 5% significance levels are denoted by * and ** respectively. Fixed effects not reported.
(PLU); these cities have one downtown airport and one international airport. Information available in 
the HOTRAN reports.
•  Code Share^od,*: a dummy variable indicating a code share agreement between Tam and Varig. 
cdshare =  1 from March 2003 to the end of the sample and only for routes in which both Tam and Varig 
had flights. Route-specific data on flight operations was collected from DAC’s HOTRAN, “Horario 
de Transporte” , a data system tha t generates reports containing information of all scheduled flights 
within the country (non-published information), disaggregated by airline/flight code. Therefore, data 
on flight frequency and number of available seats were accessible on a monthly basis with information 
from HOTRAN being collected for the mid-point day of each month.
•  The shares of peak time and off-peak time flights on weekdays and weekends of the i-th 
incumbent on the od-th city-pair at month t.
•  Average aircraft size of the i-th incumbent on the od-th city-pair at month t.
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TABLE 1.5. PU Specification Results: Price and Demand Responses
V a ria b le
P r ic e T ick et S a le s
dsoo di.ooo R e g io n dsoo di,ooo R e g io n
L C C th r e a tt»_4 0.035** 0.035** 0.038** -0.085 -0.021 -0.001
(2.72) (2.82) (3.24) (-1.14) (-0.29) (0 .02)
L C C th rea tt*  _3 -0.011 -0.005 -0.007 0.047 0.041 0.076
(-0.40) (-0 .21) (-0.28) (0.57) (0.56) (1.02)
L C C threat**  _2 0.029** 0.031** 0.029** 0.064 0.038 0.042
(2.40) (2 .88) (2.87) (-1.06) (0.65) (0.72)
L C C threat**  _ i -0.328** -0.248** -0.244** 0.206 0.250* 0.238*
(-6.19) (-5.33) (-4.73) (1.31) (1.96) (1.65)
L C C pres** -0 .100** -0.109** -0 .120** -0.026 0.028 0.068
(-3.26) (-3.14) (-3.22) (-0.28) (0.32) (0.71)
LCCpres**_|_i -0.030 -0.009 -0.010 0.084 0.063 0.062
(-1.30) (-0.42) (-0.47) (1.50) (1.23) (0.71)
L C C p r e s**+2 -0.010 -0.013 -0.010 0.284** 0.264** 0.246**
(-0.55) (-0.58) (-0.42) (2 .22) (2 .12) (2.07)
L C C p r e s**+ 3 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.078 -0.076 -0.073
(-0.53) (-0.50) (-0.51) (-1.09) (-1.09) (-1.10)
L C C pres** + 4 -0.030** -0.049* -0.048* 0.008 0.059 0.069
(-1.99) (-1.86) (-1.82) (0.14) (0.92) (1.17)
L C C p r es t*_)-5 -0.094** -0.067** -0.065** 0 .211** 0.163* 0.147*
(-3.10) (-2.04) (-2 .01) (2.31) (1.81) (1.73)
R -sq u a r e d 0.933 0.933 0.934 0.950 0.950 0.950
N o te :  This table compares alternative versions of the PU specification for (logarithms of) prices and demand (ticket sales) as the 
dependent variables. LCCthreat denotes the fact that Gol is operating within a neighbourhood (measured by distance within 500 
and 1,000km from a given airport) but not on the airport itself. LCCpres denotes the actual entry of the LCC on a route. Standard 
errors are clustered by route-carrier to control for intertemporal correlation, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported within 
parentheses. Significance at the 10% and 5% significance levels are denoted by * and ** respectively. Fixed effects not reported.
• Costiodj the average operating costs excluding depreciation, amortization, leasing and insur­
ance for the i-th incumbent on the od-th city-pair at month t.
• Distance^: the distance (in 1,000km) between origin and destination, computed using the 
geographic coordinates of the airports o and d.
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TABLE 1.6. PUD Specification Results: Price and Demand Responses -  Distance Variable
V a ria b le
P r ic e T ick e t S a le s
dsoo di,ooo R e g io n dsoo d 1,000 R e g io n
L C C th rea tt*  _4 0.036** 0.035** 0.036 -0.087 -0.024 0.045
(2.77) (2.86) (0.79) (-1.16) (-0.35) (0.83)
L C C th rea tt*  _3 -0.012 -0.006 -0.094 0.054 0.045 -0.039
(-0.45) (-0.24) (2.47) (0.64) (0.61) (-0.44)
L C C th r e a tt* _2 0.028** 0.030** 0.035 0.066 0.040 0.026
(2.35) (2.81) (0.92) (1.09) (0 .68) (0.24)
L C C th rea tt*  - i -0.337** -0.242** -0.128** 0.238 0.216* -0.063
(-6.65) (-4.84) (-2.15) (1.56) (1.67) (-0.63)
L C C prest* -0.186** -0.159** -0.141** 0.310** 0.305** 0 .211**
(-3.40) (-3.21) (-2.46) (2.80) (2 .68) (2.31)
L C C p r est*-(-i -0.025 -0.006 -0.021 0.065 0.046 0.059
(-1.13) (-0.27) (-0.89) (1.28) (0 .88) (1.22)
L C C p r e s f +2 -0.003 -0.006 -0.021 0.233* 0.227* 0.265**
(-0.16) (-0.26) (-0.81) (1.96) (1.94) (2.12)
L C C p r est*+ 3 -0.013 -0.013 -0.005 -0.076 -0.075 -0.074
(-0.56) (-0.50) (-0.13) (-1.08) (-1.07) (-0.87)
L C C p r est*+4 -0.028* -0.046* -0.018 0.002 0.042 -0.035
(-1.95) (-1.80) (-0.76) (0.03) (0.70) (-0.58)
L C C p r est*+5 -0.058* -0.046 -0.063 0.069 0.042 0.065
(-1.86) (-1.22) (-1.78) (0.73) (0.48) (0.70)
L C C p res X D is ta n c e 0.083** 0.051 0.052 -0.324** -0.284** -0.313**
(2.31) (1.35) (1.35) (-4.52) (-3.73) (-4.14)
C o d e-sh a r e -0.070 -0.070 -0.070* 0.166 0.166 0.166
(-1.60) (-1.61) (-1.61) (1.46) (1.46) (1.46)
R -sq u a red 0.935 0.933 0.933 0.950 0.950 0.950
N o te :  This table compares alternative versions of the PUD specification for (logarithms of) prices and demand (ticket sales) as the  
dependent variables. LCCthreat denotes the fact that Gol is operating within a neighbourhood (measured by distance within 500 
and 1,000km from a given airport) but not on the airport itself. LCCpres denotes the actual entry of the LCC on a route. Standard 
errors are clustered by route-carrier to control for intertemporal correlation, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported within  
parentheses. Significance at the 10% and 5% significance levels are denoted by * and ** respectively. Fixed effects not reported.
l.B  Appendix: Endogeneity Issues
l .B . l  Identification
So far, I have estimated models such as the PUD specification,
K  L
Viod,t =  7 iod +  Pit +  vo,t +  Vd,t +  fiTL C C p r e s 0d,t*+T +  £  5TL C C th re a t0dft* -r  +
T = 0  T = 1
~^~ i^od,tIJHHp^'^^od,tP d* Xiod,t& “I- £iod,t
assuming tha t both the threat and the entry of Gol are exogenous, as in much of the literature, see eg. 
Goolsbee and Syverson (2008). If, however, this reasoning is not valid, the OLS method can generate
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TABLE 1.7. PUD Specification Results: Price and Demand Responses -  Distance-Metric Variables
V a riab le
P r ic e T ick et S a les
dgoo d i.ooo R e g io n dsoo di.ooo R e g io n
L C C th rea tt*  _4 0.037** 0.037** 0.040** -0.090 -0.027 -0.009
(2.88) (2.91) (3.40) (-1.20) (-0.39) (-0.14)
L C C th r e a tt*_3 -0.013 -0.006 -0.007 0.054 0.045 0.078
(-0.49) (-0.26) (-0.31) (0.65) (0.61) (1.05)
L C C th rea tt*  -2 0.028** 0.030** 0.029** 0.066 0.040 0.046
(2.32) (2.73) (2.79) (-1.11) (-0.70) (-0.80)
L C C th r e a tt*-1 -0.350** -0.257** -0.262** 0.249 0 .222* 0.143*
(-7.39) (-5.22) (-3.92) (1.59) (1.67) (0.80)
L C C prest* -0.242** -0.214** -0.191** 0.342** 0.336** 0.300**
(-4.74) (-4.63) (-4.00) (2.90) (2.79) (2.58)
L C C p r est*+i -0.024 -0.005 -0.008 0.065 0.045 0.047
(-1.10) (-0 .02) (-0.36) (1.27) (0 .86) (0.92)
L C C p r e s f + 2 -0.003 -0.012 -0.012 0.234** 0.229* 0.231**
(-0.18) (-0.54) (-0.55) (2 .00) (1.96) (2.01)
L C C p r e st*+3 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 -0.073 -0.072 -0.071
(-0.76) (-0 .66) (-0 .68) (-1.06) (-1.05) (-1.04)
L C C p r es t*-|-4 -0.024 -0.044* -0.046* 0.001 0.042 0.037
(-1.64) (-1.67) (-1.75) (0 .01) (0.69) (0.58)
L C C p r est*+ 5 -0.048 -0.035 -0.048 0.067 0.040 0.054
(-1.61) (-0.96) (-1.27) (0.71) (0.45) (0.60)
L C C p res  x D is ta n c e 0.085** 0.051 0.013 -0.320** -0.280** -0.234**
(2.11) (1.20) (0.26) (-4.32) (-3.52) (-2.42)
L C C p r es  x w n ssp 0.042** 0.039** 0.040** -0.056 -0.053 -0.054
(2.18) (2.00) (2.05) (-0.65) (-0.62) (-0.62)
L C C p res  x w n sc c 0 .100** 0 .102** 0.103** -0.007 -0.011 -0.011
(4.82) (4.89) (4.92) (-0.13) (-0 .20) (-0 .21)
C o d e-sh a r e -0.089* -0.090* -0.090* 0.164 0.166 0.166
(-1.82) (-1.84) (-1.84) (1.43) (1.44) (1.45)
R -sq u a r e d 0.935 0.934 0.934 0.950 0.950 0.950
N o te :  This table compares alternative versions of the PUD specification for (logarithms of) prices and demand (ticket sales) as the  
dependent variables. LCCthreat denotes the fact that Gol is operating within a neighbourhood (measured by distance within 500 
and 1,000km from a given airport) but not on the airport itself. LCCpres denotes the actual entry of the LCC on a route. Standard 
errors are clustered by route-carrier to control for intertemporal correlation, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported within 
parentheses. Significance at the 10% and 5% significance levels are denoted by * and ** respectively. Fixed effects not reported.
inconsistent estimates. To address such a problem, I also use instrumental variables to estimate the 
reactions to entry using the two-step GMM estimator with standard errors clustered at the route-level.
The first task is to devise an identification strategy under endogeneity using data at a quite disag­
gregated level (regional Brazilian data, municipalities in particular) which is observed at a high enough 
frequency during the sample period (September 2001-March 2004) to be highly correlated with the 
0-1 decision of the LCC to enter a route, but not with the error term. To this end I resort to the data 
from the Brazilian Statistics Bureau (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatfstica - IBGE) and the
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TABLE 1.8. PUD Specification Results: Price Responses -  Cost Controls
V aria b le
P r ic e
dsoo d i,ooo R e g io n
L C C th rea tt*  - 4 0.037** 0.036** 0.036
(2.82) (2.89) (0.80)
L C C th reatt*  - 3 -0.012 -0.006 -0.096**
(-0.44) (-0.23) (2.58)
L C C th reatt*  -2 0.028** 0.030** 0.032
(2.33) (2.78) (0.85)
L C C th r e a tt* _ i -0.338** -0.242** -0.126**
(-6.65) (-4.82) (-2 .12)
L C C prest* -0.186** -0.159** -0.141**
(-3.41) (-3.21) (-2.46)
LCCprest*-|_i -0.024 -0.006 -0.020
(-1.09) (-0.25) (-0 .86)
L C C p rest*-|-2 -0.003 -0.006 -0.021
(-0.18) (-0.25) (-0.81)
L C C p r est*+3 -0.014 -0.014 -0.006
(-0.60) (-0.54) (-0.15)
L C C p rest*+4 -0.028* -0.046* -0.017
(-1.94) (-1.79) (-0.75)
L C C p rest*+ 5 -0.059* -0.047 -0.064*
(-1.89) (-1.25) (-1.81)
L C C p r e sx D  is ta n c e 0.083** 0.051 0.053
(2.32) (1.36) (1.35)
C o d e-sh a re -0.069 -0.069 -0.069
(-1.54) (-1.55) (-1.55)
C o st C o n tro ls -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(-1.17) (-1.12) (-1.14)
R -sq u a red 0.933 0.933 0.933
N o te :  This table compares alternative versions of the PU D  specification for (logarithms of) price as the dependent variable. 
LCCthreat denotes the fact that Gol is operating within a neighbourhood (measured by distance within 500 and 1,000km from a 
given airport) but not on the airport itself. LCCpres denotes the actual entry of the LCC on a route. Standard errors are clustered by 
route-carrier to control for intertemporal correlation, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported within parentheses. Significance 
at the 10% and 5% significance levels are denoted by * and ** respectively. Fixed effects not reported.
Secretariat of the Treasury of the Finance Ministry (Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional, Ministerio da 
Fazenda - STN). The related literature has resorted to  three main classes of instruments:
1. exogenous demand and cost shifters;
2. demand and/or cost characteristics of rivals on a given route or of the same firm on other routes; 
and
3. lagged or transformed variables.
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TABLE 1.9. Incumbents’ Response in Aircraft Utilization and Number of Flights
A v e ra g e  A ircra ft  S ize N u m b e r  o f  F lig h ts
V a r ia b le dsoo di,ooo R e g io n dsoo dl.ooo R e g io n
L C C th r e a tt*- 4 -0.002 0.008 0.041** -0.070 -0.019 -0.012
(-0.55) (1.25) (2.62) (-0.92) (-0.27) (-0 .21)
L C C th rea tt*  _3 0.002 0.005 -0.054* 0.056 0.042 0.071
(0.30) (0.87) (-1.99) (0.65) (0.55) (0 .68)
L C C th rea tt*  -2 0.007** 0.004 0.055* 0.056 0.031 -0.92
(2.38) (1.32) (1.82) (0.91) (0.54) (0.82)
L C C th r e a t t* - l -0.024** -0.018* -0.019 0.230 0.224* -0.013*
(-2.20) (-1.71) (-1.13) (1.50) (1.74) (-0.14)
L C C prest* 0.043** 0.047** 0.052** 0.259** 0.256** 0.160*
(2.41) (2.75) (3.43) (2.34) (2.23) (1.74)
LCC prest*-)-i 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.071 0.053 0.064
(0.72) (0.92) (0.72) (1.36) (1.01) (1.28)
L C C p r es t*+2 -0.016* -0.018* -0.023** 0.257** 0.249** 0.287**
(-1.71) (-1.90) (-2.42) (2 .12) (2.07) (2.27)
L C C p r est*+3 -0 .010* -0.009** -0.006 -0.088 -0.088 -0.089
(-1.92) (-1.84) (-0.97) (-1.21) (-1.22) (-1.00)
L C C p r es t*-|-4 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.007 0.050 -0.026
(-0.31) (-0.23) (-0 .21) (0 .12) (0.81) (-0.44)
L C C p r e s f+ s -0.038** -0.040** -0.041** 0.075 0.049 0.076
(-2.55) (-2.63) (-2.86) (0.75) (0.52) (0.79)
LC C p re s  x D  is ta n c e -0.042** -0.043** -0.045** -0.276** -0.237** -0.260**
(-2.50) (-2.57) (-2.76) (-3.73) (-2.93) (-3.27)
C o d e-sh a r e 0.076** 0.076** 0.076** 0.119 0.119 0.118
(2.45) (2.45) (2.45) (1.17) (1.17) (1.17)
C o s ts  C o n tro ls -0.076** -0.076** -0.076**
(-15.44) (-15.44) (-15.39)
R -sq u a red 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.943 0.943 0.943
N o te : This table compares alternative versions of the PUD specification for (logarithms of) aircraft size and the (lower bound 
on the) number of flights as the dependent variables. LCCthreat denotes the fact that Gol is operating within a neighbourhood 
(measured by distance within 500 and 1,000km from a given airport) but not on the airport itself. LCCpres denotes the actual entry 
of the LCC on a route. Standard errors are clustered by route-carrier to control for intertemporal correlation, and the corresponding 
t-statistics are reported within parentheses. Significance at the 10% and 5% significance levels are denoted by * and ** respectively. 
Fixed effects not reported.
Berry, Carnall and Spiller (1996) and Borenstein (1989) have used a combination of approaches (1) 
and (2), notably population at the endpoint cities, whereas a number of papers have used approach 
(3) — Evans, Froeb and Werden (1995) and Marin (1995) have used lagged variables (which I difficult 
to use in our short panel) and Evans and Kessides (1993) have used the ranking of the firms according 
to their presence at a given route.
The instruments I use are measures of market (origin and destination) population and tax  revenues, 
both in levels and in growth rates. While population provides a rough estimate of the potential market 
of a given route, tax revenues are a proxy for the economic activity of a market. Importantly, these
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TABLE 1.10. Incumbents’ Response in the Share of Seats Supplied -  Weekdays
P ea k  T im e  o n  W eek d a y s O ff-p ea k  T im e  o n  W eek d a y s
V a r ia b le dsoo d 1,000 R e g io n dsoo d i,o o o  R e g io n
L C C threat^ * — 4 -0.007 -0.014** 0.047 0.005 0.012 -0.037
(-1.32) (-2.15) (1.52) (0.77) (1.65) (-1.31)
L C C th rea tt*  -3 0.011 0.010 -0.020 -0.014 -0.013 -0.005
(1.03) (1.10) (-0.45) (-1.39) (-1.55) (-0 .12)
L C C th rea tt*  _2 0.009** 0 .011** 0.028 -0 .010** -0 .012** -0.009
(2 .01) (2.68) (0 .68) (-2 .21) (-2 .86) (-0.25)
L C C th rea tt*  _ i 0.000 0.006 0.014 -0.004 -0.013 -0.030
(0 .01) (0.32) (0.55) (-0.19) (-0.63) (-1.20)
L C C prest* 0.056* 0.056* 0.071** -0.058* -0.058* -0.075**
(1.87) (1.95) (2.63) (-1.65) (-1.76) (-2.38)
L C C p r es t*+1 0.015 0.014 0.009 -0.016 -0.015 -0.009
(1.27) (1.22) (1.04) (-1.48) (-1.38) (-1.09)
L C C p r e s f +2 0.040** 0.041** 0.026* -0.050** -0.050** -0.035**
(2.13) (2.18) (1.71) (-2.50) (-2.51) (-2.17)
L C C p rest* -1-3 0.005 0.003 0.015* 0.000 0.002 -0.011
(0.77) (0.50) (1.89) (0 .02) (0.29) (-1.48)
L C C p rest* -1-4 0.014 0.016** 0.015* -0.017* -0.023** -0 .020**
(1.44) (2.02) (1.99) (-1.71) (-2.82) (-2.51)
L C C p r es t*+5 0.003 0.003 0.000 -0.015 -0.014 -0.013
(0.13) (0.13) (0.02) (-0.60) (-0.57) (-0.56)
L C C p res  x  D is ta n c e -0.046 -0.044 -0.043 0.042 0.038 0.037
(-1.62) (-1.56) (-1.52) (1.32) (1.22) (1.15)
C o d e -sh a r e -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009
(-0.17) (-0.17) (-0.16) (-0.42) (-0.42) (-0.43)
R -sq u a r e d 0.843 0.843 0.844 0.833 0.833 0.833
N o te : This table compares alternative versions of the PUD specification for the share of seats at weekday peak and off-peak 
times as the dependent variables. LCCthreat denotes the fact that Gol is operating within a neighbourhood (measured by distance 
within 500 and 1,000km from a given airport) but not on the airport itself. LCCpres denotes the actual entry of the LCC on a 
route. Standard errors are clustered by route-carrier to control for intertemporal correlation, and the corresponding t-statistics are 
reported within parentheses. Significance at the 10% and 5% significance levels are denoted by * and ** respectively. Fixed effects 
not reported.
variables are correlated with the attractiveness of a market and should be exogenous, as desired from 
a candidate instrument.
l .B .2 Data Sources and Construction of Instruments
To the best of my knowledge, no historical series at the municipal level is recorded at the monthly 
frequency, and most of them are recorded in intervals of five or ten years, often in connection with the 
Brazilian Census Survey. Most series are recorded only up to year 2000, including:
1. Among those recorded at ten-year intervals:
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TABLE 1.11. Incumbents’ Response in the Share of Seats Supplied -  Weekends
P ea k  T im e  o n  W eek en d s O ff-p ea k  T im e  o n W eek en d s
V a r ia b le dsoo d 1,000 R e g io n dsoo d 1,000 R eg io n
L C C th rea tt*  _4 0.004 0.004 -0.006 0.004 0.004 -0.042
(1.13) (1.26) (-0.85) (1.13) (1.26) (-1.42)
L C C th rea tt*  -3 0.003 0.002 0 .020** 0.003 0.002 0.015
(0.81) (0.72) (2 .00) (0.81) (0.72) (0.34)
L C C th rea tt*  — 2 0.000 0.000 -0.017** 0.000 0.000 -0.026
(0 .12) (0 .00) (-2.16) (0 .12) (0 .00) (-0.65)
L C C th rea tt*  _ i 0.001 0.004 0.015** 0.001 0.004 -0.015
(0.19) (0.72) (2 .12) (0.19) (0.72) (-0.56)
L C C prest* -0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.075**
(-0.30) (-0.25) (-0 .01) (-0.30) (-0.25) (-2.60)
LCC prest*-(-i 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.010
(0 .02) (-0.04) (-0.54) (0 .02) (-0.04) (-1.12)
L C C p r est*+2 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 -0.029*
(1.19) (1.04) (1.05) (1.19) (1.04) (-1.80)
L C C p r es t*-(-3 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.013*
(-1.01) (-1.11) (-0.70) (-1.01) (-1.11) (-1.72)
L C C p r es t*+4 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.018**
(0.45) (1.03) (0.78) (0.45) (1.03) (-2.10)
L C C p r es t*+ 5 0.014**1 0.013** 0.015** 0.014** 0.013** 0.002
(2 .20) (2.15) (2.39) (2 .20) (2.15) (0.07)
L C C  p r e s  x D  is ta n c e 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.005
(1.00) (1.16) (1.29) ( 1.00) (1.16) (1.48)
C o d e-sh a r e 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 -0.001
(0.69) (0.70) (0.70) (0.69) (0.70) (-0.03)
R -sq u a red 0.825 0.826 0.826 0.825 0.825 0.844
N o te :  This table compares alternative versions of the PUD specification for the share of seats at weekend peak and off-peak 
tim es as the dependent variables. LCCthreat denotes the fact that Gol is operating within a neighbourhood (measured by distance 
within 500 and 1,000km from a given airport) but not on the airport itself. LCCpres denotes the actual entry of the LCC on a 
route. Standard errors are clustered by route-carrier to control for intertemporal correlation, and the corresponding t-statistics are 
reported within parentheses. Significance at the 10% and 5% significance levels are denoted by * and ** respectively. Fixed effects 
not reported.
(a) All but one of population-related measures are recorded in ten-year intervals, the last ob­
servation being from year 2000;
(b) Measures of capital related to housing (3 series);
2. Among those recorded at five year intervals:
(a) Gross product of municipalities and all their components (including industrial production, 
15 series in total);
(b) Employment, wage-related expenses, number of commercial establishments (15 series);
(c) Income-related measures;
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3. Among those recorded annually:
(a) Human capital;
(b) Credit and banking-related series (including bank branches, savings, deposits).
Given this restriction, I am left with (i) an estimate of population at the municipality level computed 
by IBGE, and (ii) a set of public finance series, which are recorded (or estimated) annually and 
whose last observation is recorded after the end of the route dataset. Following a preliminary analysis 
accounting for missing values and collinearity among the series, I then selected two series:
1. The population estimated by the IBGE at the municipal level; and
2. The municipal revenues from the value-added tax on services, which is charged on every transac­
tion generated by services, such as private doctors and dentists, but also cleaning and accounting 
services.
Both variables should be related to the size of the economy of the municipality, thus indicating how 
attractive the market (route) is. As the series are sampled annually, I interpolate them using a cubic 
spline to generate monthly data. I then use the interpolated series both in levels and growth rates, 
since entry could be correlated to both the level and the growth of the population (or tax revenues) 
of a given market. Finally, the instruments for entry of a given route are the population (tax revenue) 
instrument is calculated as the product of the populations (tax revenues) o f its two endpoint cities, and 
the growth rate in population (tax revenue) is calculated from the series in levels. A similar construction 
of the population instrument has been previously used in Berry (1992) and Berry, Carnall and Spiller 
(1996), when studying entry and demand in the airline industry, respectively.
l .B .3 Estimation Strategy and Results
Together with the estimation of the IV regressions, I also conducted diagnostic tests to assess the 
reliability of the instruments and the corresponding IV estimates. First, I regress the potentially 
endogenous variable, LC C pres , on the instruments -  the aim is to check whether the instruments are 
relevant and valid using the first-stage F-statistic of joint significance of the instruments (the rule of 
thumb in Staiger and Stock (1997) is th a t the F-statistic should exceed 10).As commonly happens 
with clustered standard errors, the covariance matrix of the orthogonality conditions is rank-deficient, 
so I resort to the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell (FWL, see Frisch and Waugh, 1933 and Lovell, 1963) adapted 
to instrumental variables and perform the estimation.
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For each reaction equation I estimate, the validity of our instruments is assessed using the Hansen 
J-statistic for overidentification. Provided th a t the instruments satisfy the relevance and validity con­
ditions, IV estimates can be consistent but inefficient. Therefore, if regressors are exogenous, consistent 
and more efficient, estimates produced by OLS are preferred.17
I start by considering all instruments; in case they are rejected by the J-test, I use subsets of 
the instruments and examine the adequacy of the specifications checking both the C- and J-tests if 
applicable (in some cases the models become exactly identified).
For Baseline, Preemptive and PU specifications, estimated using all instruments, (i) the Hansen- 
Sargan J-statistics have high p-values, suggesting tha t the null hypothesis is not rejected and the 
instrument excludability requirement is satisfied ie. the over-identification tests do not reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are independent of the second-stage disturbance terms at the usual 
significance levels; (ii) the C-tests do not reject the null of exogeneity of the potentially endogenous 
variable. All in all, the coefficient estimates of the GMM and least squares estimate, as well as their 
significances, are strikingly similar.
For the variants of the PUD specification, which I estimate using the instruments in levels, the models 
become exactly identified and I cannot reject the null of exogeneity of the potentially endogenous 
variables. Again, GMM and least squares estimates, as well as their significances, are quite similar.
The quantity specifications (aircraft size, number of flights and shares of seats supplied) are esti­
mated using the instruments in growth rates and, again, one cannot reject the null of exogeneity — 
with the benefit of hindsight, this can be attributed, at least in part, to the good job done by the 
fixed-effects in accounting for unobservables. Table 1.12 summarizes the results of the J- and C-tests 
for all specifications.
Finally, I  also report two sets of results for the sake of illustration. Table 1.13 reports GMM estimates 
of price reactions using the population and tax revenue instruments for the PUD specification with 
both distance and cost controls. The magnitudes of the IV estimates are very close to the least 
squares ones, as is the pattern of significant coefficients, with the exception of LC C preSf+ i and the 
Code-share estimates. The same holds for the results in Table 1.14, which reports GMM estimates of 
aircraft utilization using the growth rates of population and tax revenue as instruments, again with 
both distance and cost controls.
17I test for exogeneity using a GMM distance, or C-test. Under conditional homoskedasticity, this is numerically equivalent to a 
Durbin-W u-Hausman test statistic.
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TABLE 1.12. Tests of Exogeneity and Overidentifying Restrictions
S p ec if ic a t io n
E x o g e n e ity  
Ho: E x o g e n e ity
O v er id . R e s tr ic t io n s  
Ho". M o m e n ts  n o t  r e je c te d
In s tr u m e n ts E st im a tio n  M e th o d
Table 1.3 
B a se lin e Not rejected Not rejected All LS
Table 1.4 
P r e e m p t iv e Not rejected Not rejected All LS
Table 1.5 
P U Not rejected Not rejected All LS
Table 1.6 
P U D + D is ta n c e Not rejected N A Levels LS
Table 1.7
P U D + D is t a n c e + D is t . - m e t r ic Not rejected N A Levels LS
Table 1.8
P  U  D + D  ista n ce -j-C o n tro ls Not rejected N A Levels LS
Table 1.9 
A ir cr a ft  S ize Not rejected N A Growth rates LS
N u m b e r  o f  F lig h ts Not rejected N A Growth rates LS
Table 1.10
Sh a re  — p e a k , w ’days Not rejected N A Growth rates LS
Sh a re  — o ff-p ea k , w ’d a y s Not rejected N A Growth rates LS
Table 1.11
S h are  — p e a k , w ’en d s Not rejected N A Growth rates LS
S h a re  — o ff-p ea k , w ’en d s Not rejected N A Growth rates LS
N o te :  This table summarizes the results of tests of exogeneity (C-tests) and overidentifying restrictions (J-tests) for the price 
specifications reported in Tables 1.3-1.8 , the supply variables of Table 1.9 and the shares in Tables 1.10-1.11 using the standard 
significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. W henever a model is exactly identified, I report N A  for the J-test. The instruments used 
are, for a given route, (i) the product of the populations of the endpoint cities; (ii) the growth rate of (i); (iii) the product of the 
(service) value-added tax revenues of the endpoint cities and (iv) the growth rate of (iii). Given the outcomes of the exogeneity 
and overidentifying restrictions tests, the last column reports whether the least squares (LS) or the instrumental variable (IV) 
estim ation method should be used.
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TABLE 1.13. PUD Specification Results: IV Estimation of Price Responses -  Distance Variable and Cost 
Controls
P r ic e
V ar ia b le dsoo di.ooo R e g io n
L C C th r e a tt*_ 4 0.043** 0.038** 0.033
(2.69) (3.25) (0.78)
L C C th r e a tt«_3 -0.006 0.003 0.106**
(-0.24) (-0 .12) (3.12)
L C C th rea tf*  _2 0.027** 0.030** 0.025
(2.41) (2.93) (0.73)
L C C th r e a tf* _ i -0.344** -0.237** -0.115**
(-7.90) (-5.08) (-2.07)
L C C prest* -0.219** -0.150** -0.132**
(-4.31) (-3.26) (-2.46)
L C C p rest* + i -0.043** -0.024 -0.039**
(-2.71) (-1.40) (-2.34)
L C C p r est*+2 0.004 -0.003 -0.020
(0.24) (-0 .12) (-0.81)
L C C p r est*+ 3 -0.012 -0.010 -0.001
(-0.60) (-0.44) (-0 .02)
L C C p r est*_|_4 -0.031** -0.048** -0.022
(-2.40) (-1.99) (-1.01)
L C C p r est. +5 -0.048* -0.040 -0.055*
(-1.66) (-1.15) (-1.69)
LC C p res  x D  is ta n c e 0.068** 0.044 0.047
(1.96) (1.28) (1.29)
C o d e-sh a r e -0.072* -0.078* -0.078*
(-1.74) (-1.90) (-1.90)
C o st  C o n tro ls 0.081** -0.002 -0.002
(4.73) (-0.82) (-0.83)
J - s ta t  p -v a lu e NA NA NA
C -s ta t  p -v a lu e 0.42 0.42 0.41
N o te :  This table compares alternative versions of the PUD specification for (logarithms of) price as the dependent variable. 
LCCthreat denotes the fact that Gol is operating within a neighbourhood (measured by distance within 500 and 1,000km from a 
given airport) but not on the airport itself. LCCpres denotes the actual entry of the LCC on a route. W henever a model is exactly  
identified, I report N A  for the J-test. The instruments used are, for each given route, the product of the populations of the endpoint 
cities and the product of the (service) value-added tax revenues of the endpoint cities. Standard errors are clustered by route-carrier 
to  control for intertemporal correlation, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported within parentheses. Significance at the 10% 
and 5% significance levels are denoted by * and ** respectively. Fixed effects not reported.
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TABLE 1.14. IV Estimation of Responses in Aircraft Utilization
A v e r a g e  A ir cr a ft  S ize
V a r ia b le dsoo di.ooo R e g io n
L C C th r e a tt*_4 -0.002 0.008 0.040**
(-0.51) (1.27) (2.75)
L C C th r e a tt*_3 0.003 0.006 -0.052**
(0.51) (1.14) (-2.12)
L C C th r e a tt»_2 0.008** 0.006** 0.054**
(3.18) (2.07) (2.03)
L C C threat**  _ i -0.028** -0.023** -0.022
(-2.72) (-2.37) (-1.47)
L C C prest* 0.040** 0.044** 0.049**
(2.42) (2.79) (3.44)
L C C pres** +1 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.55) (0.77) (0.67)
L C C p r es**+2 -0.015* -0.017* -0 .022**
(-1.73) (-1.85) (-2.53)
L C C p r es t*+3 -0 .012** -0 .012** -0.007
(-2.47) (-2.47) (-1.36)
L C C p r es**+4 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005
(-0.67) (-0.73) (-0.51)
L C C pres**-1-5 -0.034** -0.034** -0.038**
(-2.49) (-2.50) (-2.87)
L C C p re s  x D  is ta n c e -0.039** -0.041** -0.043**
(-2.51) (-2.65) (-2.84)
C o d e -sh a r e 0.081** 0.081** 0.081**
(2.84) (2.84) (2.87)
C o s ts  C o n tro ls -0.076** -0.076** -0.076**
(-17.02) (-16.86) (-17.43)
J - s ta t  p -v a lu e NA NA NA
C -s ta t  p -v a lu e 0.17 0.14 0.20
N o te : This table compares alternative versions of the PUD specification for (logarithms of) aircraft size and the (lower bound 
on Ihe) number of flights as the dependent variables. LCCthreat denotes the fact that Gol is operating within a neighbourhood 
((measured by distance within 500 and 1,000km from a given airport) but not on the airport itself. LCCpres denotes the actual 
entry of the LCC on a route. Whenever a model is exactly identified, I report N A  for the J-test. The instruments used are, for 
ea c l given route, growth rates of the product of the populations of the endpoint cities and the product of the (service) value-added 
ta x  revenues of the endpoint cities. Standard errors are clustered by route-carrier to control for intertemporal correlation, and the 
corresponding t-statistics are reported within parentheses. Significance at the 10% and 5% significance levels are denoted by * and 
*** respectively. Fixed effects not reported.
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2Term Structure Modelling with Observable State 
Variables
2.1 Introduction
The interaction between the term structure of interest rates and macroeconomic variables has been 
extensively explored in a number of papers in the last decade or so, thanks in part to the fact that 
’yields-only’ models based on no-arbitrage were found to do well in fitting the cross-section of yields 
at a particular point in time (de Jong, 2000; Dai and Singleton, 2000), but poorly in describing the 
dynamics of the yield curve (Duffee, 2002; Brousseau, 2002) . 1 This paper proposes and implements a 
parsimonious three-factor model of the term structure whose dynamics is driven uniquely by observable 
state variables, as opposed to latent variables.2 It builds upon a three-factor model describing the term 
structure behaviour first proposed in Nelson and Siegel (1987) and recetly reinterpreted by Diebold 
and Li (2006, DL) as a dynamic latent factor model.
The literature can be divided into three main streams, according to their methods and purposes. 
The first strand of the literature relies on the optimizing behaviour of economic agents, which can 
thus be cast whithin the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework .3 Currently, this
C ontributions to the literature in the last decade include Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Rudebusch (1995, 2002), Evans and 
Marshall (1996), Fuhrer (1996), Dewachter and Lyrio (2006), HOrdahl, Tristani and Vestin (2006), Wu (2002), Piazzesi (2005), Ang 
and Piazzesi (2003), and Bikbov and Chernov (2005).
2In the text I usually refer to state variables for the sake of generality, but in the literature the set of variables that have been 
mostly used are macroeconomic variables.
3Early contributions to the literature of equilibrium pricing include Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985), Campbell (1986) and Dunn 
and Singleton (1986). The recursive preferences of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) have been used extensively , as in 
Campbell (1993, 1996, 1999), Duffie, Schroder and Skiadas (1997) and more recently, Schneider and Piazzesi (2006), while Wachter
(2006) adapts a consumption habit utility specification a la Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
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approach still needs unreasonable assumptions about risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution (EIS) to deliver satisfactory results .4
A second strand of the literature adopts only the very basic structure of the DSGE approach, 
namely the absence of arbitrage opportunities, to study the term  structure of interest rates, usually 
imposing no-arbitrage when estimating a Vector Autoregression of yields.5 6 The main (empirical) 
lesson from this stream of literature is tha t one needs a combination of (observed) state variables plus 
an unobserved factor to explain the dynamcs of the term structure of interest rates.
The route I follow in this paper belongs to a third strand of the literature, going back to Nelson 
and Siegel (1987) and Diebold and Li (2006) in tha t it decomposes the yield curve into three factors, 
namely level, slope and curvature and relates them to observable state variables — macroeconomic 
variables in particular — to forecast the term structure of interest rates. The intuition of the modelling 
strategy I adopt goes as follows. If the term structure moves as a result of changes in the economic 
fundamentals — here represented by a set of state variables — the term  structure factors (and, by 
consequence, the term structure dynamics) should be somehow linked to these state variables. In this 
paper, I make this link explicit, so tha t the movements of the term  structure are completely exerted 
by the underlying state variables.
The approach I propose contributes to the literature from both the theoretical and the empirical 
viewpoints. First, the replacement of latent factors with observable state variables as the only drivers 
of the term structure factors allows comparing alternative views on the way state variables — macro- 
economic variables, in particular — influence the yield curve dynamics .7 Besides telling more about 
the economic fundamentals than latent variables, the use of observable variables might also provide 
guidance to the construction of theoretical models of the term structure dynamics. Additionally, the 
method enables testing hypotheses of economic interest — as a result, instead of pre-specifying the
4The risk aversion parameter typically needs to be substantially high, in what Mehra and Prescott (1985) called the equity 
premium puzzle. Recently, Bansal and Yaron (2004) were albe to match the equity premium using recursive preferences and a 
plausible value for the risk aversion parameter, but this in turn crucially relies on the high persistence of consumption shocks. See 
also Schneider and Piazzesi (2006) for the use of recursive preferences and Wachter (2006) for the combined use of a consumption 
habit utility specification based on Campbell and Cochrane (1999) with a model for the term structure of interests rates. As for 
the EIS, even its magnitude is subject to controversy, with Bansal, Kiku and Yaron (2007) and Attanasio and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2007) estim ating it to be above one and Hall (1988) and Campbell (1999) documenting it to  be close to zero.
5 See, for instance, Piazzesi (2005), Ang and Piazzesi (2003), and Bikbov and Chernov (2005).
6In practice, one needs to, first, specify the instantaneous interest rate and the prices of risk for the factors assumed to affect the 
yield curveas functions of state variables (such as economic activity and inflation); second, focus on the asset pricing implications 
of the structure imposed. Although not usually explored (or even made explicit) in the literature, for each choice of functional form 
above, in equilibrium there should be an economyconsistent with these choices.
7In a number of recent related studies, observable and latent factors coexist: Ang and Bekaert (2004) use one observable (inflation) 
and two latent factors; Rudebusch and Wu (2004) use two observable (GDP growth and inflation) and two latent; HOrdahl, Tristani 
and Vestin (2006) use three observable (the short rate, GDP growth, and inflation) and one latent one; Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi 
(2005) use two observable (inflation and GDP growth) and one latent factor. Exceptions include Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2004), 
which use the short rate, the term spread, and GDP growth as their state variables, and Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2004), which 
uses the short rate, the output gap, and inflation. As opposed to what I present in the empirical exercise, these papers do not 
conduct model comparisons, pre-specifying the state variables they use — this important aspect of the paper is discussed in detail 
in the sequel.
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drivers of the yield curve dynamics, I compare alternative models and select the best among them. 
Moreover, the explicit link between term  structure factors and observable state variables enables pol­
icy experiments to be performed. As a result, one can forecast the term  structure by using forecasted 
variables, or perform stress testing of the term structure using scenarios constructed using the state 
variables. This feature is especially useful to bankers, who are interested in forecasting bond prices 
and might have a better idea of the expected state of the economy than the expected state of the yield 
curve. This feature is also of value to financial authorities, as a tool to assess financial stability .8
Second, the method is robust to curse of dimensionality problems commonly appearing in traditional 
models. The curse of dimensionality imposes constraints on the number of yields one can use and, in 
particular, results in poor measures of the term structure curvature .9 Here, instead, the dimension of 
the parameter vector does not increase with the number of yields under study, just with the number 
of state variables explaining them, very much in the spirit of linear regression, where one loses degrees 
of freedom by including additional covariates, not more observations.
Third, the identification strategy comes out in a natural way. Essentially, the baseline model needs 
the state variables driving the term structure to be predetermined with respect to yields. When I 
incorporate a Taylor rule into the model, the identifying assumption made is also standard, requiring 
the state variables to be predetermined with respect to the monetary policy instrument.
Fourth, I conduct in- and out-of-sample studies using US data. The in-sample study uses a thorough 
set of macroeconomic variables to compare alternative specifications of the term  structure dynamics 
and suggests two models which I then use in the out-of-sample exercise: a parsimonious model where 
the level, slope and curvature factors of the term  structure are driven by, respectively, measures of 
inflation growth, monetary policy, and economic activity10, and a richer specification where the level 
is driven by measures of inflation growth and economic activity, the slope by monetary policy and 
economic activity, and the curvature by fiscal policy growth .11 The out-of-sample study shows that 
both specifications consistently outperform the (latent-variable) benchmark model in the study of the 
yield curve behaviour during the five NBER-dated recessions which occurred in the last three decades. 
Recessions are of interest not only for being bad states against which economic agents are willing to
8Stress testing has become crucial in the risk management toolbox of financial institutions. It is defined in BIS (2000) as "a 
generic term describing various techniques used by financial institutions to gauge their potential vulnerability to exceptional but 
plausible events". Due to the fact that standard Value at Risk (VaR) models have been found to be of limited use in measuring 
exposures to extreme events, stress testing has been incorporated into the risk management routine of financial institutions, and 
has even been stressed during the ongoing Basel II process as a useful tool in assessing banks’ internal models.
9 One needs at least three yields for the curvature to be defined, but by relying on only five yields, as is often done in the 
literature, one is unlikely to obtain accurate measures of this factor.
10 These are, respectively, the Consumer Price Index growth rate, the Fed Funds rate, and the Unemployment Rate.
11 The level is driven by the Consumer Price Index growth rate and the Unemployment Rate, the slope by the Fed Funds rate and 
the Unemployment Rate, and the curvature by the growth rate of the ratio between Government deficit and Industrial Production 
— the proxy measure of GDP at the monthly frequency.
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insure, but also for being periods which tend to be preceded by the inversion of the term  structure of 
interest rates, a feature usually difficult to be quickly captured — if at all — by term structure models.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews term structure estimation methods and 
recent developments of the Nelson-Siegel approach. Section 3 presents the model and discusses its 
identification and implementation. Section 4 presents simulation results, and Section 5 performs an 
empirical exercise using US data. The Appendix contains an empirical exercise using CRSP interest 
rate data  as a robustness check and discusses strategies for incorporating spatial modelling into the 
model.
2.2 Yield Curve Estimation
2.2.1 Static Methods
When analyzing the evolution of the yield curve over time, one striking feature is the variety of shapes 
it can have. These vary from flat ones, where longer term  rates are roughly the same as shorter ones, 
to upward-sloping ones, where longer term  rates are higher, but also include ’hump-shaped’, inverted, 
’spoon-shaped’ ones etc. As a result, yield curve fitting methods are expected to be flexible enough to 
match the different shapes the yield curve can have.
A number of approaches can be used to modelling the term structure of interest rates. First, one may 
consider models tha t make explicit assumptions about the evolution of state variables and use either 
equilibrium or arbitrage methods, which corresponds to modelling dynamic yield curves. According 
to this class of models, the evolution of the yield curve is modelled as depending linearly on a small 
number of (arbitrarily chosen) factors. Since in most of the cases the underlying state variable is the 
short term  interest rate, they are frequently labeled as ’short-rate models’. The landmarks of this 
approach are the papers by Vasicek (1977) and Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985, CIR), both of which 
use the short rate as the only underlying factor. Subsequent extensions to multi-factor models include 
the two-factor model of Longstaff and Schwartz (1992), and the three-factor one of Balduzzi, Das, 
Foresi and Sundaram (1996, BDFS). When it comes to fitting real data, one-factor models perform 
poorly: the yield curve corresponding to the Vasicek model does not allow a large range of shapes, 
whereas the ones corresponding to CIR and extensions allowing time-varying parameters such as Hull 
and W hite (1990) tend to evolve unrealistically over time. In what regards multi-factor models, there 
is an understanding tha t at least three factors are needed to generate a wide variety of yield curve 
shapes, although even so the fit close to the long end tends to be poor. Moreover, choosing the state 
variables involves both a certain degree of arbitrariness and a bit of art - direct factors may include
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the short rate, spot rates of various maturities, forward rates, swap rates, whereas indirect ones may 
include the short rate volatility, the mean short rate, the latter two rising issues such as the choice 
of the sample period involved in their calculations. Further, multi-factor models (such as the BDFS) 
usually lack of explicit formulae and are of difficult calibration to market prices.
Alternatively, one can smooth data obtained from asset prices to describe the static yield curve, 
usually without taking a view on the factors driving it. This corresponds to fitting, the yield curve as a 
whole. The analysis starts from information on asset prices, from which one extracts the corresponding 
yields. As there are only a few maturities available for which there are observations on prices (and, 
thus, yields), it is interesting to somehow ’connect’ those points in order to evaluate instruments with 
maturities different from those of the yields one has already extracted, usually imposing some degree 
of smoothness. Among the estimation methods most widely used, there are (regression and smoothing) 
spline techniques, kernel methods, but also parametric classes of curves, broadly known as the Nelson- 
Siegel family of curves. Among regression splines one can find several sub-varieties - McCulloch (1971, 
1975) used quadratic and cubic splines, Schaefer (1981) employed Bernstein polynomials, whereas 
Vasicek and Fong (1982) adopted exponential splines. Regression splines have some inconveniences 
though. One has to take into account the arbitrariness involved, first, in the choice of knot points, 
second, in the choice of basis functions. Thirdly, splines may oscillate too much and are too sensitive 
to modelling parameters, with the consequence of fitting poorly at too long and too short maturities. 
Fourthly, since splines are polynomials, they imply a discount function which diverges as maturity 
increases rather than converging to zero as required by theory - as a result, implied forward rates 
also diverge rather than converging to any fixed limit. Fifthly, there is no simple way to ensure that 
the discount function always declines with m aturity i.e. th a t all forward rates are positive. Although 
exponential splines are appealing in theory, it is not clear tha t they perform better than standard 
splines in practice (Shea, 1985). As for smoothing splines (Fisher, Nychka and Zervos, 1995), they 
reduce the amount of curvature as one may well desire when uncomfortable with regression splines, 
but at the expense of a worse fit to the yield curve.
The class of curves first proposed in Nelson and Siegel (1987) is parsimonious and does well in 
capturing the overall shape of the yield curve, being popular among practitioners and central banks 
alike (BIS, 2000) . 12 Their objective is to describe the yield curve, not being consistent with the absence 
of arbitrage opportunities. For a sample of N  bonds measured at a given point in time, the yield curve
12Although one could argue that a three-factor model could be too much of a simplification, Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba 
(2005) find no evidence that extensions of Nelson-Siegel using four or five factors would do better, which is consistent with previous 
findings of Dahlquist and Svensson (1994)
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as a function of time to m aturity t* is written as
y(Ti) = f t  + ft, + ft  ( 1 ~Aer .AT' -  e -ATi)  + u(Ti), i =
providing a parsimonious representation of the term structure which is consistent with a well-behaved 
discount function i.e. continuous, positive and decreasing in r ,  taking value 1 when t  = 0  and ap­
proaching Pi as r  grows large . 13 As we justify below, the parameters P i,P 2,Ps can be interpreted as, 
respectively, the level, (the negative of the) slope, and curvature components, whereas the parameter 
At controls the exponential decay of the yield curve: small values produce slow decay and can better 
fit the curve at long maturities, while large values generate a fast decay and can better fit the curve 
at short maturities. Moreover, A also determines where the loading on achieves its maximum. The 
loading on Pi is a constant, implying tha t an increase in this factor increases all yields equally, which 
results in a change in the level of the yield curve. The loading on P2 is a function tha t starts at 1 but 
decays monotonically to zero, implying tha t an increase in P2 increases short yields more than long 
yields, resulting in a change in the slope of the yield curve. As for /?3, this is related to the curvature 
of the term  structure, as an increase in P3 will have little effect on very short or very long yields, 
but will increase medium-term yields, thus resulting in an increase of curvature of the yield curve. As 
first described by Diebold and Li (2006), this representation can be related to a dynamic three-factor 
model of, respectively, level, slope, and curvature, which I describe in the following.
2.2.2 Nelson-Siegel and Beyond
The framework recently proposed in Diebold and Li (2006), and also used in Diebold, Rudebusch, 
and Aruoba (2006, DRA) reinterprets the Nelson and Siegel (1987) framework as a dynamic latent- 
factor model. 14 Following Diebold and Li (2006), for every time period i, the yield curve is a function 
of time-to-m aturity r  (or, rather, a combination of exponential functions thereof) and time-varying 
parameters interpreted as the level, slope, and curvature factors,
/  1 — g — AtTi \  /  J — g  — AtTj \
yt(Ti) = Pu  +  P2t ( — —  ) +  03t ( — ~\ r^- e~ tTi)  +  Ut(Ti); i = 1? N >t= 1’ T
Estimation could in principle be carried out using Nonlinear Least Squares (NLLS) although the usual 
practice since Nelson and Siegel (1987) — and also followed in Diebold and Li (2006) — has been to 
fix At to a constant value, compute the factor loadings (regressors), and then use OLS to estimate
13 Equivalently, it guarantees positive forward rates at all horizons.
14These m ethods still allow arbitrage opportunities, but the authors argue that a market as liquid as the one of US government 
bonds should not allow much scope for arbitrage opportunities.
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{(3t}. The param eter At determines the maturity r* at which the loading on the curvature factor 
achieves its maximum (usually between 2 and 3 years), and Diebold and Li (2006) simply pick a At 
such tha t this maximum is achieved at the midpoint between these maturities — 30 months — and set 
A* =  At = 0.0609. After computing the sequence {fit} of factors and the pricing errors, they model the 
factors as a univariate AR(1 ) models and compare the forecasting power of the model out-of-sample 
with a number of alternatives, with reasonable performance, especially given the simplicity of the 
model.
The above framework is intuitive and easy to implement, but is still based on latent variables 
— despite the consensus tha t changes in the yield curve are exerted by changes in macroeconomic 
conditions (or, more generally, changes in state variables), the factors in the DL framework remain 
latent, whereas in DRA latent and observable factors (pre-specified by the researchers) coexist. As a 
result, it offers no room for comparing alternative views on the main drivers of the term structure 
dynamics. Moreover, the empirical implementations restrict the dynamics of the time-varying factors 
in ways that, despite their reasonability, are difficult to be either verified or refuted: whereas Diebold 
and Li (2006) model the parameters {/3p}p=i as univariate AR(1) processes, Diebold, Rudebusch, and 
Aruoba (2006), generalize it to a first-order vector autoregression. In any case, the estimation of the 
stochastic processes driving the level, slope, and curvature factors does not acount for the measurement 
error coming from the fact tha t {(3p}p=i are estimated rather than observed, so tha t any asymptotic 
statements are likely to be misleading.
2.3 Term Structure Modelling
This section proposes a term  structure modelling approach building upon Nelson-Siegel and its rein- 
teipretation by Diebold and Li (2006). The main contrast with respect to the DL model is tha t here 
the term structure dynamics is solely driven by the dynamics of observable state variables, as opposed 
to latent factors. The intuition behind this idea is tha t if the yield curve moves as a result of changes 
in relevant state variables, the factors should be somehow linked to these state variables. As a result, 
ona can now, for instance, compare alternative hypotheses on the variables driving the term struc­
ture factors and state that level, slope and curvature factors are driven by, say, measures of economic 
activity, inflation, and monetary policy instrument, respectively.
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2.3.1 A  Model with State Variables
The DL model writes the yields at time t as a function of the maturity vector r ,
y t { r )  =  f i n  + p 2t ----- e_AtT) +
further assuming th a t A* is constant over time and setting it to a pre-specified value. Estimation of 
the param eter vector Pt for every period is carried out using linear least squares, which assumes tha t 
the error term  does not depend on maturity. This results in a time series of the parameter vector 
{Pt} whose dynamics is approximated by univariate first-order autoregressive processes for each of its 
components. The reasons for fixing At to a pre-specified value are, according to the authors, its lack 
of straightforward economic intuition and the gains from the use of simple linear techniques when 
estimating the model. In fact, given the small cross-sectional dimension of the yields dataset they use, 
fitting a nonlinear model can be a very challenging exercise. The main take-away point is, however, 
the latent-variable character of the DL model.
The main point of departure from DL in this paper is the link between the dynamics of the latent 
variables to the one of observable state variables predetermined relative to yt(r), which I denote by 
M t_ . 15 This is done by decomposing the parameter vector 6t :=  (/?*, A*)' as a sum of two components: 
the first, 0 := (p ' , A)', being a mean component, and the second being the combination of the state 
variables M t-  and parameters 9 := (cr,p,oJxY measuring their impact on the latent variables. Thus,
’ Pt  * P +  M t~=
_  At _ A
This specification can be seen as a random-coefficients one for the term  structure factors; the factors 
vary over time given realizations of the state variables. Decomposing the time-varying parameters as 
above assumes the relation between state variables and term  structure factors is deterministic, which 
might obviously lead to biased results if this assumption does not hold in practice.
The full model reads
yt(r) = X t ( \ t)Pt + ut{r)
’ Pt  " P +  Mt~=
^t A
15 In what follows, given two variables A  and B,  I write A t — if A  is predetermined with respect to B  within period t.
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where yt ( r ) is the column vector of yields observed at date t, the nonlinearity of the model comes 
from the estimation of At in the N  x 3 matrix of factor loadings at period t,
and the error term  is a martingale difference sequence with respect to current and past covariate 
information and uncorrelated in the m aturity domain i.e. £ ,[u t(r)u t(r)/] =  cr2I . 16
This model is more costly to be estimated from the numerical point of view, but this cost is offset by 
having the dynamics of {/3t} driven by state variables. Moreover, there are also gains from modelling the 
dynamics of {At}, apart from a pure generality argument. If the parameter /33t governs the intensity of 
the curvature of the yield curve, the parameter At governs the locus of its ’tilting point’ or, alternatively, 
where the loading associated to the factor /33t attains its maximum, thus making it unnatural to be 
disconnected to the analysis of the term  structure curvature.
In what regards identification, the argument goes as follows. D ata is observed at the monthly 
frequency, but recorded at different moments within a given month — the state variables M*_ are ob­
served at the beginning of each month, whereas the yields are observed at the end of the corresponding 
month . 17 As a result, the state variables Mf_ are predetermined with respect to the yields.
Important features of the method are its robustness to errors in variables, its parsimony, and its 
robustness to the curse of dimensionality. First, as opposed to DL, where (i) the extraction of the {/3t} 
sequence of parameters relies solely on the cross-sectional dimension of the data; (ii) the estimation 
of the A R(1 ) models for factor dynamics relies solely on the time series dimension of the data; and 
(iii) the estimation of the factor dynamics uses estimates of {fit } as if they were data, incurring in 
measurement error problems, estimation here relies on both the time series and the cross-sectional 
dimension of the data and is done in one step. Thus, by working on both T  and N ,  the asymptotic 
results tend to be much more accurate. Moreover, the fact th a t the estimation is done simultaneously 
avoids the measurement error coming from the fact tha t {/3p}p=i are estimated rather than observed 
in DL.
1( Although restrictive, alternative estim ation strategies allowing for spatial dependence ie. dependence across yields of close 
enaigh m aturities were also tried, but without much success.
11 In the empirical exercise using US data, the state variables are observed at the beginning of each month, whereas the yields 
are taken from the last working day of each month.
2.3. Term Structure Modelling 65
Second, parsimony results from the fact tha t the ultimate parameters of interest are time-invariant. 
Third, as opposed to traditional VAR models such as in Evans and Marshall (2002), the number of 
parameters to be estimated does not increase with the number of yields, even after imposing zero 
restrictions tha t imply exogeneity of macro variables with respect to yields.
Finally, when it comes to simulate the movements of the term  structure — or out-of-sample forecast­
ing, more generally — one just needs to plug-in updated (or forecasted) values of M*_ and compute the 
resulting yields forecasts; alternative models, such as DRA, which contain both latent and observable 
factors, would need to rely on extra assumptions on the latent part to do so.
2.3.2 Implementation
In this section I discuss the implementation of the model
yt {r) = X t ( \ t)(3t +  ut (r),  i =  1,.., T
Pt V +  Mt~=
. X t . A _
w h e r e  ? /* ( t )  i s  t h e  v e c t o r  o f  y i e l d s  o b s e r v e d  a t  d a t e  £, a n d  U t ( . )  i s  t h e  e r r o r  t e r m ,  b o t h  o f  d im e n s io n  
N  x lj is N  x 3, a n d  ^  arG 3 x 1^  Af a n d  A arG s c a l a r s 5 /^3 &rid bxg^  rGspGctivGly  ^ k^ x 1 a n d
k \  x 1 , and M t-  = ^  is 4 x k(= kp +  k \ ) . 18
Olxfc/3 M \  t -
The model consists of N  yield observations for each one of the T  periods, k state variables per 
period, and k +  4 parameters to be estimated, regardless of the number of yields or time periods in 
the sample — the dimension of the parameter vector grows only with the number of state variables in 
the model (say, at most three per factor, so tha t most likely k <  12). Since At =  A +  , one can
write Xt(Xt) =  X t(\ ,c r\)  but should bear in mind tha t both t  and M \t_ are also arguments of Af(.) 
but are omitted for convenience.
The assumption tha t the error term  u t { r )  is a martingale difference sequence with respect to current 
and past covariate information implies conditional moment restrictions of the form E  [w*(T)|VFf] =  0, 
where Wt is a vector of instruments including current and past covariate information. In particular, 
for every period t , one can use unconditional moments of the form E[W[ut(T)\ = 0, whose sample
!In particular, M t -  =  d i a g { m f i , m f 2, m f 3, In the general case, M t -  =  [ Mp t- > M \ t -  ] is 4 X k ( =  kp +  k\ ) .
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counterpart is
0 N T  E E  UitWit
t=l i=l 
T  N
t(ri)  -  X t (Ti, 6 \ ) P  -  X t (Ti, 0 x ) M p t - 0 p )  Wit
t= 1 2=1
w ith  6  :=  =  (Z^, cr^; A, cr^)' an d  w here it should  be n o ted  th a t  M \ t ~  ap p ears  inside X t ( . , .)
an d  is o m itted  for convenience.
Before defining the estimation problem, stack the yields by period to form the N T  x 1 vector 
V — [3/ iW />y2 W ',.. . ,y T W /],} the Xt{.) and M pt-  matrices to form the N T  x 3 m atrix X (9 \ )  = 
[Xi(0Ay, X 2(9xy , ..., X t (0xYY and the N T  x k matrix 
X M ( 0 x) = [(Xi(0x)Mpi- ) ' , (X 2{0\)Mp2~ y , •••, (X T (9\)MpT_y}f of dimension , define 
Z t{0x) = X t{9\)M pt- \  and its stacked version which is of dimension N T  x (3 +  k ), Z (9\)  =
[Z \{9 \y , Z2{9\)', . . . ,Z t {9\)']', and let W  = [W{,..., Wj]  be an instrument m atrix of dimension N T  x 
r (>  k + 4). I use a Generalized Method of Moments estimator 9 of 9, which is such tha t the quadratic 
distance between Gn t {6) =  ^ >t=l uitwit from zero is minimized:
9 = avgmm [Gn t {9)]r A n t  [Gn t (9)}
=  arg mm 
0€0
=  arg mm
0G0
N T
1
W 'u
t 1 . 1
A n t ^ W ' uN T
N T
W ' [ y - Z ( 9 x)9p\ A n t N T
W ' [y — Z{9\)9p\
where A n t  is an N T  x N T , possibly random, positive semi-definite weighting matrix with rank at 
least A;+  4 , and the last line shows tha t nonlinearity comes from the subset of parameters 9\ = (A, cr^)' 
governing the locus of the tilting point of the yield curve.
One particular case of the above estimator is when Wt = Zt(9x), dzt(ex)e,3dOx and A n t  — I n t ,  which
results in the Nonlinear Least Squares estimator. Here, the associated covariance matrix is given by
n = E  (V^AoVo)-1 E  (Vj,A0VoA0V«) E  (V ^ o V * )-1
where the asymptotic variance is Vo =  lim ^T —oo 7j f V a r  T t= i  T,iLi uitwi t \ , V* :=  =
with details given in the Appendix, and Aq is a positive semi-definite m atrix 
such tha t A n t  -A9 A q.
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The estimation problem raises a number of issues. First, the model is robust to curse of dimension­
ality issues, as the dimension of the parameter vector does not increase with the number of yields, but 
with the number of state variables, which is kept at a manageable size. As a result, one does need to 
restrain the number of yields used when estimating the yield curve, a fact which brings the undesirable 
consequence of poorly measuring the term structure curvature and, as a result, poorly estimating the 
connection between this factor and any state variables associated to it.
Second, more than just allowing the comparison of alternative specifications, one can test competing 
theories about variables driving the term structure dynamics using inference tools.
Finally, and in contrast with most of the literature, the estimation makes use of both the cross- 
sectional and time series dimensions of the data, resulting in much faster convergence of the parameter 
estimates .19 This is of special interest given issues commonly raised against VAR models used in the 
analysis of monetary policy: Rudebusch (1998), for instance, points out tha t the use of quarterly data, 
together with the relatively frequent changes in monetary policy in the postwar period results in either 
short time series or misspecified VAR models, thus making inference unreliable: using quarterly data, 
the twenty years of the ’Greenspan era’ correspond to only 80 observations.
2.4 Finite-Sample Performance
This section presents a simulation study investigating the finite-sample performance of the estimation 
method. To do so, I generate state variables M*_, regressors X t , population param eter values, and 
errors to generate the variables yt . For every experiment, I compute the results of 500 replications, with 
time-series and cross section dimensions given by, respectively, T  (=  10,50,100) and N  (=  25,50,100).
The state variables M t-  are constructed by taking the exponent of independent standard Gaussian 
random variables, the regressors X t  are standard Gaussian random variables, whereas the error terms 
ut are Gaussian variables with a variance of 0.2.
In what follows, I consider the model
yt {r) = X t {\t)Pt + M r )
" a  ' V + M t-=
. A t . A
19 The following Section illustrates the finite-sample proprties of the method and the convergence in both the maturity and time 
dimensions of the data.
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TABLE 2.1. Simulation Results for Single-Variable Factor Specification
P a n e l A
N  =  25
T  =  10  
N  =  50 N  =  100
1.075 0.987 0.993
Pi [0.642] [0.323] [0.112]
0 2
0.925 1.016 1.013
[0.675] [0.389] [0.208]
@3
0.786 0.942 0.946
[1.136] [0.765] [0.628]
0.053 0.051 0.049
A
[0.030] [0.019] [0.011]
0.995 0.999 1.003
[0.102] [0.077] [0.042]
0 0 2
1.004 0.999 0.995
[0.119] [0.105] [0.082]
a H
1.064 1.036 1.024
[0.442] [0.334] [0.259]
0 \
0.011 0.010 0.010
[0.011] [0.006] [0.004]
N o te :  Standard errors are reported within square brackets.
with each factor driven by one state variable. As in the empirical exercise, I make the curvature-related 
factors and At i.e. the curvature intensity and the location where the curve tilts are driven by the 
same state variable, so tha t M t-  = diag{m it-,  m,2t- ,  rn^t-, In all the experiments, (3 — (1 , 1 , 1 )',
crp =  (1 ,1,1)', A =  0.05, and cr\ =  0.01.
The simulation results reported in Tables 2.1-3 (with standard errors inside square brackets) show 
fast convergence of the 6 parameter estimates to their population values, with increasing precision in 
both N  and T. For the closest case to the smallest subset of data used in the empirical section, where 
N  = T  = 50, the biases are negligible. In what concerns precision, estimates for and crpi tend to 
be more precisely estimated than their counterparts because the corresponding factor loadings do not 
involve any parameters to be estimated, thus having no uncertainty.
2.5 Application
2.5.1 The Data
The data  set used comprises end-of-month yields from US bonds from January, 1970 to December, 
2003 and US macroeconomic variables obtained from the US Federal Reserve macroeconomic database
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TABLE 2.2. Simulation Results for Single-Variable Factor Specification cont’d
P a n e l B T  =  50
N  =  25 N  =  50 N  =  100
0.998 0.989 1.000
0 1 [0.458] [0.134] [0.055]
02
1.015 1.007 0.997
[0.470] [0.146] [0.095]
03
0.895 1.016 0.996
[0.742] [0.340] [0.274]
0.050 0.050 0.050
A
[0.015] [0.006] [0.005]
CT/3l
1.000 1.002 1.000
[0.040] [0.028] [0.014]
<702
0.996 0.999 1.000
[0.045] [0.033] [0.025]
a H
1.033 0.995 1.002
[0.165] [0.094] [0.075]
<7\
0.010 0.010 0.010
[0.003] [0.002] [0.001]
N o te : Standard errors are reported within square brackets.
TABLE 2.3. Simulation Results for Single-Variable Factor Specification cont’dd
P a n e l C
N  =  25
T  =  100  
N  =  50 N  =  100
0 1
1.003 1.000 0.998
[0.367] [0.108] [0.045]
0 2
0.999 1.002 1.004
[0.373] [0.129] [0.075]
03
0.956 0.985 0.985
[0.577] [0.269] [0.203]
0.050 0.050 0.050
X
[0.010] [0.004] [0.003]
1.000 1.000 1.000
[0.033] [0.021] [0.010]
<702
0.999 1.000 1.000
[0.035] [0.026] [0.018]
1.011 1.006 1.003
[0.111] [0.064] [0.049]
<7\
0.010 0.010 0.010
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
N o te : Standard errors are reported within square brackets.
— the FRED — and observed at the monthly frequency.20 For every given period, the macroeconomic 
variables used are predetermined with respect to the interest data used .21
20The dataset is available from http://research.stlouisfed .org/fred2/.
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2.5.1.1 Interest Rates
The interest rate  data  used consists on the December 2003 version of the unsmoothed Fama-Bliss 
yields described and thoroughly discussed in Bliss (1997).22 It includes all available issues up to tha t 
date, implying tha t the range of available maturities from which the term structures are estimated 
will not be uniform throughout the sample period i.e. I use an unbalanced panel of yields ranging from 
42 to 134 observations per period. The average number of yields for the full sample is 86.944, with a 
standard error of 26.854, the number of periods in the full sample is T  = 408 months, and the longest 
m aturity used in the study is 60 months. The main features in the data are the average upward-sloping 
yield curve, the fact tha t yield volatility tends to decrease with m aturity whereas persistence tends to 
increase with maturity.
2.5.1.2 Macroeconomic Variables
Based on the existing literature, I consider a measures of inflation, economic activity, monetary pol­
icy, and fiscal policy. The inflation measures used are the CPI (Consumer Price Index For All Urban 
Consumers: All Items, seasonally adjusted), PPI1 (Producer Price Index: Finished Goods, seasonally 
adjusted), PPI2 (Producer Price Index: All Commodities, not seasonally adjusted), PPI3 (Producer 
Price Index: Industrial Commodities, not seasonally adjusted), and PCE (Personal Consumption Ex­
penditures: Chain-type Price Index, seasonally adjusted) — all measured in growth rates.
The measures of economic activity used are HOUST (Housing Starts: Total: New Privately Owned 
Housing Units Started, seasonally adjusted), INDPRO (Industrial Production Index, seasonally ad­
justed), EMP (Civilian Employment, seasonally adjusted) — all measured in growth rates — plus TCU 
(Capacity Utilization: Total Industry, seasonally adjusted), HELP (Index of Help Wanted Advertising 
in Newspapers, seasonally adjusted) and UR (Unemployment Rate, seasonally adjusted), measured in 
levels.
The monetary policy instruments used are FF (Federal funds effective rate), NONBR (Non-Borrowed 
Reserves of Depository Institutions, seasonally adjusted — the monetary aggregate the Fed targeted 
during the period from October, 1979 to October, 1982), and M l (Money Stock, in Billions of Dollars, 
seasonally adjusted).
All the above variables are recorded at the monthly frequency, and were obtained from the FRED 
database. Finally, following Dai and Philippon’s (2005) recent finding that fiscal policy affects the term 
structure, I introduce the variable DEBT, which is their quarterly fiscal policy variable interpolated to
21 For instance, when using the yield curve of 31 March, 1970, I make sure I only use variables dated prior to that e.g. 1 March, 
1970. In particular, the variables in level used date from 1 March, 1970, and the variables in growth rate are the increment from 1 
February 1970 to 1 March, 1970.
221 thank Robert Bliss for making his data available.
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the  monthly frequency and divided by INDPRO, a proxy variable for GDP at the monthly frequency. 
Table 2.4 summarizes the macroeconomic variables used.
2.5.2 On The Economic Determinants of the Yield Curve
This section starts by selectively reviewing the literature addressing the relation between macroeco­
nomic variables and the yield curve factors, thus paving the way for the empirical strategy I implement 
next. It goes without saying tha t with a set of macroeconomic variables as big as the one available from 
the FRED, there are countless alternative specifications to be compared (153 =  3375 using only the 
contemporaneous variables described above), so tha t a pragmatic starting point would be to consider 
specifications based on the existing literature and summarized in Table 2.5. The evidence documented 
in the literature is used to construct alternative configurations of M t-  which are then compared. For 
the sake of parsimony, I devote a section to single-variable (SV) specifications — the ones where each 
factor is driven by one state variable only — before addressing the general multi-variable (MV) case. 
I then use the ’best’ SV and MV specifications in the out-of-sample comparison with the benchmark 
Diebold-Li model.
Much of the work in macro-finance gained momentum in the late 1990s (see Diebold, Piazzesi, and 
Rudebusch, 2005, and references therein for the latest account on the literature). One of the early 
papers is Evans and Marshall (1996) — to which Evans and Marshall (1998) also relates — where, 
using a VAR framework, the authors study the impact of shocks of measures of monetary policy, 
employment and inflation on the nominal term  structure of interest rates. Their results suggest tha t 
the main effect of both employment and inflation measures is to induce a parallel shift of the yield 
curve, whereas (short-run) fluctuations in the slope and curvature of the yield curve are primarily 
attributed to the monetary policy shocks.
Also within the VAR framework, but imposing no-arbitrage restrictions, Ang and Piazzesi (2003) 
construct inflation and economic growth indices which they address as macro factors. By a factor 
representation of the pricing kernel they obtain a tractable way to examine how those macro factors 
affect the yield curve dynamics. However, in their study macro factors are able to explain only the short 
end and the middle of the yield curve. Due to difficulty to deal with the long end they introduce latent 
factors, now allowing the pricing kernel to be driven by both macro and latent factors. By relying on 
a Gaussian assumption and on the affine specification, they find tha t the slope and curvature factors 
can be explained by the macro factors, whereas the level factor can be only dealt with by using latent 
factors. In a related paper, but within a different framework, Piazzesi (2005) finds that monetary 
policy shocks change the slope of the yield curve, since they affect short rates more than long ones.
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More recently, Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006) examine the correlations between Nelson- 
Siegel factors and macroeconomic variables under a VAR framework and find tha t the level factor is 
highly correlated with inflation and the slope factor is highly correlated with real activity, whereas the 
curvature factor does not appear to be related to any of the macroeconomic variables used.
2.5.3 In-Sample Analysis
I start estimating SV specifications, where each factor is driven by one state variable only. These can 
be seen either as a parsimonious way of approaching the problem or as a first step before considering 
more complex (and difficult to compute) specifications for M t- ,  besides providing additional out-of- 
sample benchmarks for those more complex specifications. A simplifying assumption made throughout 
the exercise is the curvature intensity and the parameter governing the location of the tilting point 
of the yield curve are the same.
Given two competing specifications with the same number of variables, I compare them using the 
Mean Absolute Error criterion (both the average and the median of the MAE’s across time). The MAE 
is of special interest here for providing a model selection criterion, an idea of goodness-of-fit, and of 
mispricing of the specifications. Table 2.6 reports results of selected specifications from an exercise 
designed to select the best forecasting variables from the different categories.23
The preliminary results in Table 2.6 provide a number of insights on the forecasting ability of the 
state variables. First, the economic activity variable doing the best job at explaining the level factor 
is UR (see specifications 15-20), the unemployment rate; in what regards the inflation variables, their 
performance is less clear, but CPI and PCE tend to provide the lowest MAE’s (see specifications 1-5).
As for explaining the slope, the best monetary policy variable is FF (see specifications 6 -8 ), whereas 
the best economic activity variable is UR (see specifications 21-26). Finally, the best monetary policy 
variable explaining curvature is FF (see specifications 27-29), and the best economic activity variable 
is UR (see specifications 9-14).
Given the above findings plus the recent evidence tha t fiscal policy does play a role at explaining 
the curvature factor of the term structure (Dai and Philippon, 2005), we also include the variable 
DEBT in our empirical exercise together with the ones already mentioned. As a result, we estimate 
SV specifications using the three choices for the state variables explaining the level factor, the two 
choices explaining the slope factor, and the three choices explaining the curvature factor, being left
23The results are robust with respect to choice of selection criterion used — using the minimum value of the criterion function, 
the AIC or the BIC criteria gives the same results.
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w ith  18 alternative specifications to examine. Table 2.7 reports the results of the comparison using 
th e  MAE criterion.
Table 2.7 shows a clear dominance of the specifications for which inflation (either CPI or PCE) 
explains the level, monetary policy (FF) explains the slope, and economic activity (UR) explains the 
curvature of the term  structure. Interestingly, the fact th a t inflation is the key driver of the level factor 
holds regardless whether CPI or PCE are used, although the literature tends to prefer the latter (see 
DRA and Duffee, 2005). However, although in line with the literature, it does not exactly match any 
of the papers listed above.
In what follows, I refer to the best SV specification (specification 7 in Table 2.7) as SV — see Table 
2.8 for the corresponding parameter estimates. The param eter estimates for the SV model show the 
positive impact of CPI on the level of the term structure, the impact of the monetary policy instrument 
FF  on the slope (actually defined as —/32t), and the impact of UR on both the intensity and the locus 
of the curvature, all of them found to be significant using Newey and West (1987) standard errors to 
account for the time dependence in the data. Interestingly, neither the CPI nor the UR are revised, 
which makes them even more attractive as predetermined variables with respect to yields. When 
coupled with the real time Taylor rule proposed in Evans (1997), the findings are consistent with what 
one would intuitively expect, in the sense tha t the yield curve tends to invert for values of FF above 
the Taylor rule, but remaining upward-sloping for values below the threshold.
Based on the findings in the literature, SV specifications are likely too simple to provide a sat­
isfactory account of the term structure dynamics. The next step is thus to study the more general 
MV specifications. Based on the results reported in Table 2.6, I employ a general-to-specific approach 
starting with a specification where CPI, PCE and UR drive the level, FF and UR drive the slope, and 
DEBT, FF and UR drive the curvature. The alternative specifications compared in Table 2.9 show 
that several coefficients in the larger models are statistically insignificant. The model with the smaller 
BIC and with all of the parameters statistically significant is specification 7 — which I from now on 
refer to as MV —, which has the level driven by CPI and UR, the slope by FF and UR, and the 
curvature by DEBT. Albeit more parsimonious than the full model the average MAE is only slightly 
larger.
The parameter estimates for the MV model are reported in Table 2.10. The findings reported in 
Table 2.10 are in line with previous results in tha t economic activity and inflation drive the level factor, 
economic activity and monetary policy drive the slope, and fiscal policy drives the curvature factor. 
However, the performance of the model in terms of MAE is very similar to the SV model.
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The parameter estimates — all of which significant — show the upward impact of inflation on the 
term  structure, as expected. The parameters related to the slope also have the expected sign, with FF 
affecting shorter rates more strongly, but UR having the opposite effect.
2.5.4 Incorporating Economic Relations
So far, the model presented considers only state variables which are predetermined with respect to 
the yield curve, not exploring (i) any interdependence among them; (ii) any forecasts of their future 
values, both of which are expected to play a role at explaining future realizations of the yield curve. 
In this section I discuss how to incorporate into the model information on the joint behaviour of the 
state variables. Intuitively, by informing the model tha t certain variables are related one should expect 
to get more accurate results, provided the relation imposed holds.
In this section I inform the model about the joint behaviour of the state variables using a feedback 
interest rule, or Taylor rule. Taylor (1993) suggested a simple formula describing how the US Federal 
Open Market committee has set the Federal funds rate since 1987 as a response to  measures of inflation 
and output gaps — this relationship has been dubbed the Taylor rule and has been extensively studied 
and developed since then. Despite its simplicity, the Taylor rule has a number of appealing properties. 
Woodford (2001) shows how it incorporates several features of an optimal monetary policy in a class of 
optimizing models, and provides conditions under which the Taylor rule has a stabilizing effect on the 
economy. More recent developments such as Clarida, Gall and Gertler (2000) propose and estimate a 
Taylor rule incorporating both forward- and backward-looking elements. The former account for the 
fact tha t the monetary authority is considering future paths of the output and inflation gaps when 
setting the current value of the monetary policy instrument, whereas the latter arises as a consequence 
of interest rate smoothing conducted by the monetary policy authority.24 In what follows, I estimate 
both forward- and backward-looking versions of the Taylor rule. Instead of using quarterly data, as in 
Clarida, Gall, and Gertler (2000), I use monthly observations and find that, by and large, their results 
follow through to the monthly frequency.
The results of this section provide the ground for alternative ways of computing out-of-sample 
forecasts, in the sense that one can plug into the model estimated quantities generated by a model 
inspired by (or consistent with) economic theory to obtain estimates of the future behaviour of the 
term structure.
14 See also Rudebusch (1995).
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2.5.4.1 Taylor Rules
In what follows I consider the following specification proposed and estimated (using quarterly US 
data) in Clarida, Gall, and Gertler (2000), which nests both forward- and backward-looking versions 
of the Taylor rule and states tha t the target rate each period is a linear function of the gaps between
expected inflation and output and their respective target levels,
r* =  rr* +  tt* +  - f  [E \t/)t ) -  7r*] +  7 9E  (gUg\ipt)
where ipt is the information set available at time t , 717^  denotes the percent change in the price level
between periods t and t +  (expressed in annual rates), n* is the target for inflation, rr*{= r* — 7r*) 
is the long-run equilibrium real rate, with r* being, by definition, the desired nominal rate when both 
output and inflation are at their target values, gtj is a measure of the average output gap between 
periods t and t +  lg, with the output gap being defined as the percent deviation between actual GDP 
and the corresponding target.25
Following Clarida, Gall, and Gertler (2000), the actual Fed funds rate follows
rt =  p{L)rt- 1 +  (1 -  p)r*t
where p(L) = pi +  p2L  -(- ... +  pirl ) r~x and p = p (l) =  p j , which postulates a partial adjustment
j=1
of the Fed funds rate to the target r£, with p being an indicator of the degree of smoothing of interest 
changes by the monetary policy authority.
Combining the target rate and Fed funds equations results in the Taylor rule
rt = (1 -  p) [rr* +  (1 -  7 ^)71-* +  7 ^7 +  7 9gt,ig\ +  p(L)rt- \  +  et
where et = (1 -  p) (7 * [E fa jJ ip t)  -  1rtj2w] +  7 5 -  gt,ig]) is a linear combination of forecast
errors, thus being orthogonal to any variable in the information set ipt . As one can only identify the 
term rr* +  (1 — 7^)^*, but not rr* or ^  separately, and the inflation target is of interest, Clarida, 
Gall and Gertler (2000) assume th a t the equilibrium real rate rr* equals its sample average. This 
specification allows a number of choices regarding the lead/lag periods of inflation and output, ln and 
lg, respectively, and lags for the Fed funds, lr . The parameters of interest are 7r*, 7 7r, j 9, {pj}lj —i, so
25 Typically, the information set at tim e t  contains past values of the Fed Funds rate and other economic variables, and usually 
no information on current inflation and output measures.
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th a t the dimension of the parameter vector is 3 +  lr . It also nests a number of specifications, as shown 
in Table 2.11.26.
The regression equation above implies the set of moment conditions
E  ([7 7  -  (1 -  p) [rr* +  (1 -  7 *)n* +  7 *nt u  +  l 9gt,ig\ ~  p{L)rt-\]  zt) = 0
where zt is a vector of instruments known when 77 is set (zt £ 7/7 ) and 717^ ,  gtjg, and rt - 1 also 
belong in 7/7 .
The above moment conditions are used to obtain parameter estimates using the Generalized Method 
of Moments. As in Clarida, Gall, and Gertler (2000), I set the equilibrium rate rr* to its sample average, 
so as to be able to identify the inflation target. To make the feedback rule consistent with the SV 
specification, I replace r  with F F , 7r with C P /, and I also follow Evans (1997)’s implementation of the 
Taylor rule, replacing the output gap with the unemployment gap using Okun’s law, besides setting 
the natural rate of unemployment to UR£ = UR* = 6.27 Moreover, I assume tha t current inflation 
and unemployment are not observed when setting the Fed Funds rate i.e. neither of them  belongs in 
7/7 . The moment conditions thus become
E(e*t zt) = 0
wlere et* =  [FFt -  (1 -  p)[rr* +  (1 -  7 c p i )C P P  + 7 c w m M , i „ ,  +  + 7 ^ 3 ( 6  -  U R t- -  
p ( l)F F t-{\.
Interestingly, given tha t in the SV specification the slope is driven by the Fed funds rate, the above 
specification can be linked to  the interest-rate rule proposed in McCallum (1994), according to which 
the monetary authority reacts to term premia — the slope in particular — when setting the monetary 
pdicy instrument.28
The parameter estimates of the forward-looking Taylor rule are reported in Table 2.12. Although 
only the former is statistically significant, the responses to CPI inflation and unemployment rate are 
consistent with the results in Clarida, Gall, and Gertler (2000), which uses 1960:1-1996:4 data  at the 
quarterly — as opposed to monthly — frequency. The closest inflation target level to their estimates 
is given by FWTR1, although not significant, and the interest rate smoothing param eter is more
2 Note that the Taylor rule is usually applied to quarterly data, whereas I consider monthly data.
2 Arthur Okun observed that a one percent fall in the unemployment rate from its full employment level tended to produce a 
thEe percent increase in real GDP relative to trend. See Evans (1997) for discussion and robustness checks.
2 The McCallum interest-rate rule also allows rationalizing the empirical failure of the expectations hypothesis — see also Kugler 
(1197) and Gallmeyer, Hollifield, and Zin (2005).
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persistent than theirs. The goodness-of-fit of the specifications is very similar and none of them is 
rejected when testing for overidentifying restrictions.
Forward-looking Taylor rules might give accurate descriptions in-sample, but if the aim is to do out- 
of sample forecasting, one needs backward-looking ones. Table 2.13 reports estimates for alternative 
specifications of backward-looking Taylor rules regarding the choice of I c p i  and I j j r , the horizons at 
which the monetary policy authority looks when setting the monetary policy instrument.
The results for the backward-looking Taylor rules are robust to alternative horizons, and suggest 
th a t — at least at the monthly frequency — the monetary authority looks mostly at past inflation 
and past values of the monetary policy instrument when setting its current value. The persistence in 
the Fed funds rate is shown to be high, and even the non-significant parameters ryUR and CPI*  tend 
to gravitate across a relatively narrow interval, at least for non-zero values of I c p i  and I j j r -  The J- 
statistics suggest th a t the horizon at which the Fed looks is at least six months back. When compared 
to the forward-looking estimates, the responses to inflation seem to be tougher, and both the response 
to unemployment and the inflation target level are found not to be statistically significant.
2.5.5 Out-of-Sample Analysis
In this section I perform an out-of-sample study by considering five episodes of economic interest: the 
five NBER-dated US recessions which have entirely occurred during the period 1970-2003. Recessions 
are of economic interest per se being bad states of nature, characterized by reduced economic activity 
and increased lay-off of workers, thus being events against which economic agents are willing to insure. 
Moreover, within the term structure literature, recessions are of interest for being periods which tend 
to be preceded by the inversion of the yield curve, a feature often difficult to be quickly captured — 
if at all — by term structure models, making the exercise both more interesting and challenging. The 
recessions considered are described in Table 2.14.29
For every month in each of the five recessions, I compare the forecasts of the alternative specifications 
using two measures of accuracy . I also report results for specifications SV-TR and MV-TR, which 
incorporate the Taylor rule in an attem pt to improve forecasting ability.
The ways I compute the out-of-sample forecasts are as follows:
For the macro-based specifications, assume the estimation sample has observations from periods 
t =  1,..., T, where t = 1 is January, 1970 and t = T  is the month preceding the recession of interest. 
After obtaining parameter estimates using the estimation sample, the yield curve forecast for period
29 The NBER-dated recession going from December 1 9 6 9  to November 1 9 7 0  is not considered here since the dataset starts on 
January, 1 9 7 0 .
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t* >  T, denoted as yt*\T are obtained either from observed or estimated values Mt* of the state 
variables using the previously estimated parameters — in the case of the SV and MV specifications, I 
keep the param eter estimates fixed and keep updating the matrix Mt* of state variables every period
W hen it comes to the SV-TR and MV-TR specifications, I estimate the Taylor rules as above, and 
just update the information on C P I , U R , and F F  every period, thus obtaining a Taylor rule-based 
estimate of the value of F F  the following period.
Finally, for the DL model, I estimate the model for every period t = 1, ...,T , compute the AR(1) 
processes describing the dynamics of each factor, and re-estimate the model at every period t > £*.30
As a measure of ’overall accuracy’, I compute average MAEs for the entire duration of each recession
i.e. for every month t* of a given recession, I compute
1 Nt*
OAt* =  —  IS** (Ti)  ”  yt* (r i) M* e  Recession
** 3 = 1
where Nt* refers to the number of yield at period t* in the recession. The results reported in Tables 
2.15-16.
The results in Tables 2.15-16 show tha t the macro-based specifications consistently outperform the 
latent variable model. As a m atter of fact, DL cannot beat its competitors for any month in recessions 
R3-5. W hen comparing SV and MV specifications, the former tends to perform better in the first two 
or three months of the recessions, being then outperformed by the latter. This suggests tha t it might 
take time for all the state variables to work in favour of the MV specification in such periods.
Panel A shows the dominance of the MV-TR model, especially during the second half of the recession. 
Its performance is followed by the SV-TR model, which suggests tha t Taylor rules convey information 
about the future state of the term structure.
Panel B shows the potential effect of a change in policy regime on the forecasting ability of the TR 
specifications — R2 was the first recession following the monetary policy experiment, right after its 
introduction.31 As a result, the SV and MV-TR models perform closely, and the Taylor rule does not 
seem to provide a substantial gain to the models incorporating it.
Panels C-E show a clear dominance of the MV-TR specification, which might suggest two things. 
First, tha t SV specifications are way too simple to describe the term  structure dynamics. Second, tha t 
incorporating Taylor rules does indeed play a role, improving the accuracy of the forecasts.
,0 See Diebold and Li (2005) for a thorough out-of-sample comparison of their model and previously existing ones.
J1See Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) for a study of how the Taylor rule changed with this regime change.
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As a measure of ’maturity-disaggregated accuracy’, I report time-averaged MAEs for fixed maturities
i.e. for a given m aturity Tj I calculate
M D A Tj \ y t * { T j ) ~ y t { T j ) \ J  =
t* GRecession
where #t*  denotes the number of periods in the recession. The results are reported in Table 2.17-19.
The results reported in Tables 2.17-19 confirm the view tha t macro-based specifications outperform 
the benchmark DL model. Panel A shows the superior performance of the MV-TR specification up to 
the 36-month maturity, after which the DL specification tends to do better.
Panels B and C show the superior performance of the MV and, to a lesser extent, SV specifications, 
most likely due to the change in the policy regime resulting from the monetary policy experiment. 
Panels D and E show a dominance of the MV specification, at least for maturities up to 10-12 months. 
In Panel D, the better performing specification from the 11-month m aturity towards the long end of 
the curve is MV-TR, whereas in Panel E it is specification SV which performs better between the 24- 
to 60-month maturities.
Although it is not obvious which macro-based specification performs best throughout the exercises, 
all of them consistently outperform the latent-variable benchmark.
Conclusion
This paper proposes a term structure model whose factors are uniquely driven by observable — as 
opposed to latent — state variables. The explicit link between the term structure factors and the state 
variables allows comparing alternative views on the drivers of its dynamics and competing economic 
hypotheses.
The method is robust to curse of dimensionality issues commonly appearing in the literature. This 
happens because instead of increasing with the number of observations (yields) used, the dimension 
of the parameter vector increases with the number of state variables, which is kept at a manageable 
size. As a result, the method is in a position to deliver more accurate measures of the curvature factor, 
thus better explaining intermediate maturities i.e. the ’belly’ of the curve.
The estimation method uses both the cross-sectional and time series dimensions of the data, which 
results in faster convergence of the parameter estimates and more reliable inference. This is in stark 
contrast with VAR models, which are subject to the criticism tha t they make researchers choose 
between either short time series or misspecified models, thus making inference unreliable — a direct 
consequence of the frequent changes in policy regimes in the postwar period (Rudebusch, 1998).
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The empirical exercise uses a comprehensible set of US macroeconomic data to compare alternative 
specifications of the term  structure. In the in-sample study, the baseline (SV) specification is such 
tha t the level, slope and curvature factors are driven by, respectively, measures of inflation (CPI 
growth), monetary policy (the Fed Funds rate), and economic activity (the unemployment rate). The 
out-of-sample study compares macro-based models to a latent-variable benchmark model for the five 
NBER-dated recessions which occurred in the last three decades, showing tha t the former consistently 
outperforms the latter — a finding which is robust to alternative criteria.
This paper raises a number of questions for future research. First, how does the method perform 
using alternatives such as expectations variables obtained in consensus forecasts as state variables.
Second, how it performs as a risk management tool, making it appealing to both financial institutions 
and regulators, especially under the ongoing Basel II process.
Third, how it performs when coupled with VAR models feeding it with macroeconomic variables, 
or measures such as the Bernanke and Mihov (1998) monetary policy indicator.
Fourth, how it can be adapted to the study of credit risk, either at the country or the corporate 
level.
Finally, although the method relies on the Nelson-Siegel yield curve fitting method, it is by no means 
restricted to it. Nelson-Siegel is used here due to its intuitive appeal, well-known properties, and the 
common understanding tha t it is a reasonable first-order approximation to the yield curve. Alternative 
methods can be also used, and are left for future research.
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TABLE 2.4. Macroeconomic Variables by Group
E c o n o m ic  A c t iv ity In fla tio n M o n e ta r y  P o lic y F isca l P o lic y
u r £ CPI f f £ DEBT
t c u £ PCE NONBR
h e l p £ PPI1 M l
IP PPI2
EMP P P I3 ^
HOUST
N o te : Variables in levels and not seasonally adjusted are marked with the superscripts ^ and ^ , respectively. The remaining 
variables are measured in growth rates and are seasonally adjusted.
TABLE 2.5. Macroeconomic Variables Driving Term Structure Factors
R eferen ce L ev e l F actor S lo p e  F a cto r C u rv a tu re  F actor
Evans & Marshall (1996)
Employment
Inflation
Monetary Policy Monetary Policy
Ang & Piazzesi (2003) - Inflation Output
Piazzesi (2005) - Monetary Policy -
DRA (2005) Inflation Output -
2.A Appendix A: Covariance Matrix Derivation
As in the text, V q = V CT/3, V<xA^ , where
with general element
V j j = X ( 0 A)
=  X M ( 0 x)
A dX
9 X , ( » x )
dX
d X t (0x )
dX
d x T{ex)
ax
P
dXtif ix)
d \
0 011-  011-  +  exP (~  P  +  M \ t - c r \ )  Ti)
0 021-  021-  +  exP ( -  p  +  M x t- l7 x)  T2)
0 4 > m -  0vt- +  exP ( -  @  +  M x t- c r x ) T N )
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TABLE 2.6. Preliminary Results for Single-Variable Specifications
S p e c if ic a t io n  L ev el S lo p e  C u rv a tu re  A v g (M A E ) M e d (M A E )
1 CPI FF M l 1.010 0.830
2 PCE FF M l 1.031 0.825
3 PPI1 FF M l 1.012 0.836
4 PPI2 FF M l 1.025 0.830
5 PPI3 FF M l 1.023 0.833
6 PCE FF DEBT 1.069 0.869
7 PCE NONBR DEBT 1.822 1.395
8 PCE M l DEBT 1.823 1.415
9 CPI FF UR 0.833 0.696
10 CPI FF TCU 1.022 0.851
11 CPI FF HELP 1.058 0.893
12 CPI FF IP 1.036 0.873
13 CPI FF EMP 1.042 0.898
14 CPI FF HOUST 1.050 0.889
15 UR FF DEBT 0.877 0.736
16 TCU FF DEBT 1.041 0.854
17 HELP FF DEBT 1.069 0.873
18 IP FF DEBT 1.053 0.881
19 EMP FF DEBT 1.063 0.851
20 HOUST FF DEBT 1.062 0.865
21 PCE UR M l 1.629 1.284
22 PCE TCU M l 1.817 1.449
23 PCE HELP M l 1.668 1.279
24 PCE IP M l 1.815 1.448
25 PCE EMP M l 1.817 1.437
26 PCE HOUST M l 1.811 1.401
27 UR FF FF 0.854 0.738
28 UR FF NONBR 0.884 0.746
29 UR FF M l 0.872 0.739
N o te :  The last two columns report, respectively, the average and the median MAE across time.
and
(Pit- =
_  e x p (-  (A +  M xt-(J\) T i ) -  _  1 -  exp(— (A +  M xt-(J\) T j )
(A +  ) n [(A +  Mxt-crx) T;]
Ti,i  -  1,..., N
Finally,
d X ( 9 x)
dX
" M Xl '
M x 2
_ M p N (Tj3 _ _ _
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TABLE 2.7. Further Results for Single-Variable Factor Specifications
S p ec ifica tio n L ev el S lo p e C u rv a tu re A v g (M A E ) M e d (M A E )
1 CPI FF DEBT 1.048 0.886
2 PCE FF DEBT 1.069 0.869
3 UR FF DEBT 0.876 0.729
4 CPI FF M l 1.010 0.830
5 PCE FF M l 1.031 0.825
6 UR FF M l 0.872 0.729
r CPI FF UR 0.833 0.696
8 PCE FF UR 0.836 0.701
9 UR FF UR 0.873 0.727
10 CPI UR DEBT 1.048 0.886
11 PCE UR DEBT 1.468 1.203
12 UR UR DEBT 1.521 1.272
13 CPI UR M l 1.462 1.199
14 PCE UR M l 1.467 1.170
15 UR UR M l 1.526 1.287
16 CPI UR UR 1.462 1.211
17 PCE UR UR 1.467 1.179
18 UR UR UR 1.523 1.262
N o te : (i) The last two columns report, respectively, the average and the median MAE across tim e (the smaller quantities of every 
column are underlined). The superscript * indicates the best specification according to the MAE criterion.
TABLE 2.8. Results for Best Single-Variable Factor Specification
S p ec ific a tio n ( P A Y P f i f x Y A v g -M e d (M A E )
011 : C P I 10.655 [0.091] 55.820 [1.317]
SV: P * : F F -1 0 .1 4 8  [0.089] 0.892 [0.003] 0.833 -  0.696
Pit  ■ UR -1 3 .6 6 1  [0.169] 2.177 [0.019]
At : U R 0.007 [0.001] 0.004 [0.001]
N o te : Newey-W est standard errors with 12 lags are reported within square brackets.
2.B Appendix B: Robustness Check Using the CRSP Data
In this Appendix I estimate a simplified version of the model on CRSP data and show tha t the SV 
and MV specifications still outperform the latent-variable benchmark even when pre-specifying the 
parameter A, as in Diebold and Li (2005). This once again suggests that, besides the advantages 
discussed in the text, observable state variables do play a role out-of-sample.
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TABLE 2.9. Results for Multi-Variable Factor Specifications
S p e c if ic a t io n L evel S lo p e C u rv a tu re A v g (M A E ) B IC
1 CPI, PCE0 , UR FF, UR D E B T , F F 0 , UR0 0.759 49.191
2 CPI, UR FF, UR DE B T , F F 0 , UR 0.759 45.097
3 CPI, PC E 0 , UR FF, UR DE B T , U R 0 0.844 45.100
4 CPI, PCE, UR FF, UR D E B T 0 ,F F 0 0.800 45.099
5 CPI, UR FF, UR DEBT, FF 0.972 41.025
6 CPI, PCE0 , UR FF, UR D E B T ,F F 0 , U R 0 0.819 41.004
7* CPI, UR FF, UR DEBT 0.820 36.910
N o te :  The last two columns report, respectively, the average MAE across time (the smaller quantities in every column are under­
lined) and Schwarz’s BIC model selection criterion. The superscript 0 denotes non-significance of the corresponding parameter, 
whereas the superscript * indicates the best specification according to the BIC.
TABLE 2.10. Results for Multi-Variable Factor Specification
S p ec if ic a t io n (P A )' P x Y A v g -M e d (M A E )
P i t  ■ c p i -2 .0 1 7 [0.304] 47.564 [1.330]
P i t  ■ U R 1.791 [0.014]
MV: ^ 2t : F F
2.094 [0.284] 0.886 [0.004]
0.820
P 2t : U R -1 .7 2 7 [0.017]
P3t : D E B T 2.011 [0.551] -6 .0 2 9 [0.153]
At : D E B T 0.031 [0.001] -0 .0 3 5 [0.002]
N o te :  Newey-W est standard errors with 12 lags are reported within square brackets.
TABLE 2.11. Specifications Nested within the Interest R ate Feedback Rule
S p ec ific a tio n w lg l r
(Backward) Taylor rule <  0 <  0 -
(Backward) Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing <  0 <  0 <  0
Clarida-Gah'-Gertler > 0 >  0 <  0
N o te :  The symbols l n , l g , l r  denote, respectively, the lags (or forward shifts, for negative values) of the inflation, economic activity 
and interest rate variables.
2.B.1 The Data
The data  set used comprises end-of-month price quotes (bid-ask average) of US bonds from June, 1964 
to March, 2000 collected by CRSP. Other than the bond yields, all remaining data are from the US 
Federal Reserve’s macroeconomic database — the FRED —, observed at the monthly frequency.
2.B.1.1 Interest Rates
For every period I consider 17 maturities, going up to the 10-year m aturity for a total of 430 months. 
The maturities used are as follows: 1 to 12 months, 24, 36, 48, 60, and 120 months. Although the
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TABLE 2.12. Param eter Estimates for Forward-Looking Interest Rate Rule
FW TR1 FW TR2 FW TR3 FW TR4
Ic p i 1 1 1 1
l u R 1 1 1 1
If f - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1
Instrument lags 1 2 3 4
7 C P / 2.427* 1.929** 1.702** 1.605**
[1.358] [0.870] [0.770] [0.746]
ryUR 0.454 0.473 0.618 0.615
[0.498] [0.381] [0.394] [0.404]
C P I* 2.020 1.640 1.085 0.911
[2.898] [3.054] [3.461] [4.084]
P 0.965*** 0.952*** 0.948*** 0.950***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
R 2 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993
J-statistic 0.377 7.787 10.654 12.894
df 2 5 8 11
N o te :  Specification FW TR1 uses a constant, current values of CPI and UR, and lagged values of CPI, UR, and FF as instruments. 
Specification FW TR2-4 use the same instruments as FW TR1 plus 2-4 lagged versions of CPI, UR, and UR. Newey-W est standard 
errors with 12 lags are reported inside square brackets. Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is denoted by superscripts *, 
**, and ***, respectively.
TABLE 2.13. Param eter Estimates for Backward-Looking Interest Rate Rule
BW TR1 BW TR2 BW TR3 BW TR4
Ic p i 0 - 2 - 6 - 1 0
Iu r 0 - 2 - 6 - 1 0
If f - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1
Instrument lags 1 1 1 1
7 C P / 2.264 2.273 2.355* 2.866*
[2.127] [1.408] [1.388] [1.691]
j U R 1.158 0.410 0.598 0.352
[1.380] [0.504] [0.431] [0.416]
C P I * 1.257 2.270 1.715 2.089
[6.491] [3.305] [2.177] [1.882]
P 0.986*** 0.964*** 0.951*** 0.949***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
R 2 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993
J-statistic 26.153*** 6.326* 1.128 0.860
df 2 2 2 2
N o te :  Specification BW TR1 uses a constant, current values of CPI and UR, and lagged values of CPI, UR, and FF as instruments. 
Specification BW TR2-4 use the same instruments as BW TR1 plus 2-4 lagged versions of CPI, UR, and UR. Newey-W est standard 
errors with 12 lags are reported inside square brackets. Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is denoted by superscripts *, 
**, and ***, respectively.
analysis does not require the maturities to be fixed, this greatly simplifies the empirical exercise. Table 
2.20 reports some sample statistics of the bond data.
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TABLE 2.14. NBER-Dated Recessions Considered
R e c e ss io n  C o d e S ta r t  D a te E n d  D a te D u r a tio n
R 1 November, 1973 March, 1975 16 months
R 2 January, 1980 July, 1980 6 months
R 3 July, 1981 November, 1982 16 months
R 4 July, 1990 March, 1991 8 months
R 5 March, 2001 November, 2001 8 months
The main features in the data are the average upward-sloping yield curve, the fact tha t yield volatility 
tends to decrease with maturity whereas persistence tends to increase with maturity. The autocorre­
lations of all yields are individually significant up to lag nine (results available upon request).
2.B.1.2 Macroeconomic Variables
Based on the existing literature, I consider a number of measures of inflation, economic activity, 
m onetary policy, and fiscal policy. The inflation measures used are the CPI (Consumer Price Index For 
All Urban Consumers: All Items), PPI1-3 (Producer Price Index: Finished Goods, All Commodities, 
and Industrial Commodities, respectively), and PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures: Chain- 
type Price Index) - all measured in growth rates; the measures of economic activity used are HOUST 
(Housing Starts: Total: New Privately Owned Housing Units Started), INDPRO (Industrial Production 
Index), the HELP index (Index of Help Wanted Advertising in Newspapers), UR (Unemployment 
Rate), and EMP (Civilian Employment) - both HELP and UR are considered in levels and growth 
rates; the monetary policy instruments used are FF (Federal funds effective rate), NONBR (Non- 
Borrowed Reserves of Depository Institutions), and M l (M l Money Stock, in Billions of Dollars). 
All these variables are seasonally adjusted, of monthly frequency, and were obtained from the FRED 
database. Finally, following Dai and Philipon (2005)’s recent finding tha t fiscal policy affects the 
term structure, the fiscal policy variable used is DEBT (Outstanding Credit Market Debt of U.S. 
Government, S tate and Local Governments, and Private Nonfinancial Sectors).
2 .B .2  In-Sam ple A nalysis
2.B.2.1 Single-Variable Factor Specifications
The empirical implementation starts by investigating specifications where each factor is driven by one 
state variable only i.e. M t- = diag{mit-,Tri2t- ,rn st-}• This can be seen either as a parsimonious way 
of approaching the problem or as a first step before considering more complex specifications for Mt~.
2.B. Appendix B: Robustness Check Using the CRSP D ata 87
TABLE 2.15. Overall Accuracy of Alternative Specifications - Recessions 1-3
P a n e l A
D L S V
R e c e ss io n  R 1  
S V -T R  M V M V -T R
1 st m o n th 1.31 1.56 0.65 1.71 1.00
2n d  m o n th 0.81 1.16 0.82 1.22 1.13
3rd  m o n th 0.62 1.17 0.79 1.16 1.08
4 th  m o n th 0.60 0.56 0.39 0.68 0.59
5 th  m o n th 1.09 0.45 0.33 0.52 0.41
6 th  m o n th 1.48 0.95 0.85 0.87 0.67
7 th  m o n th 1.37 1.21 1.13 0.94 1.00
8 th  m o n th 1.57 1.67 1.60 1.39 1.15
9 th  m o n th 1.74 1.69 1.67 1.32 1.15
1 0 th  m o n th 1.88 1.12 1.13 0.83 0.67
1 1 th  m o n th 1.14 1.05 1.06 0.92 0.63
1 2 th  m o n th 1.38 0.71 0.79 0.61 0 . 2 4
1 3 th  m o n th 1.05 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.28
1 4 th  m o n th 0.77 0.37 0.40 0.57 0.43
1 5 th  m o n th 0.99 0.71 0.65 1.79 1.07
1 6 th  m o n th 0.73 1.09 1.03 1.68 1.65
P a n e l B R e ce ss io n R 2
D L S V S V -T R M V M V -T R
1 st m o n th 4.48 0 . 8 8 1.38 1.03 1.26
2n d  m o n th 4.57 1.69 1.77 1.82 1.69
3rd  m o n th 4.28 1.48 1.35 1.45 1.28
4 th  m o n th 1.99 3.22 2.26 3.25 2.55
5 th  m o n th 1.81 0.81 1.08 0.90 1.18
6 th  m o n th 1.60 0.91 0.74 0.83 0 . 6 6
P a n e l  C R e ce ss io n R 3
D L S V S V -T R M V M V -T R
1 st m o n th 1.81 0 . 8 8 5.36 1.01 4.98
2 n d  m o n th 3.50 2.47 2.58 2.47 1.89
3rd  m o n th 5.18 2.61 2.65 2.58 2.25
4 th  m o n th 4.98 2.32 2.31 2.40 2.05
5 th  m o n th 3.72 1.71 1.68 1.65 1.52
6 th  m o n th 4.84 2.43 2.36 2.22 2 . 1 4
7 th  m o n th 4.94 2.32 2.28 1.93 2.00
8 th  m o n th 4.85 1.21 1.26 1.25 0.90
9 th  m o n th 4.58 2.49 2.52 2.39 2.30
1 0 th  m o n th 4.74 1.03 1.08 0.91 0.91
1 1 th  m o n th 4.79 0.69 0.72 0.74 0.59
1 2 th  m o n th 5.72 1.54 1.59 1.53 1 . 4 0
1 3 th  m o n th 5.02 1.55 1.58 1.62 1.51
1 4 th  m o n th 4.47 2.67 2.66 2.53 2.49
1 5 th  m o n th 2.98 1.76 1.75 1.59 1.63
1 6 th  m o n th 2.81 1.87 1.86 1.71 1.69
N o te : The quantities in italics are the smaller values for a given time period and episode.
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TABLE 2.16. Overall Accuracy of Alternative Specifications - Recessions 4-5
P a n e l D
D L S V
R e c e ss io n  R 4  
S V -T R  M V M V -T R
1st m o n th 1.30 0.46 0.35 0.40 0.38
2nd  m o n th 0.97 0.90 0.93 0.91 0.82
3rd  m o n th 1.02 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.64
4 th  m o n th 1.11 0.64 0.64 0.67 0.59
5 th  m o n th 1.52 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.53
6 th  m o n th 1.77 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.51
7 th  m o n th 1.86 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.82
8 th  m o n th 1.88 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.95
P a n e l E R e c e ss io n R 5
D L S V S V -T R M V M V -T R
1st m o n th 1.79 0.84 3.45 0.69 3.75
2nd  m o n th 2.52 0.64 0.65 0.60 0.56
3rd  m o n th 2.98 0.71 0.72 0.78 0.55
4 th  m o n th 3.24 0.93 0.94 0.91 0.74
5 th  m o n th 3.71 0.78 0.79 0.75 0.71
6 th  m o n th 4.03 0.96 0.97 0.90 0.86
7 th  m o n th 4.72 1.29 1.30 1.32 1.21
8 th  m o n th 4.79 1.23 1.23 1.17 1.34
N o te :  The quantities in italics are the smaller values for a given tim e period and episode.
Table 2.21 shows tha t the best performing specification has PCE explaining the level, FF explaining 
the slope, and DEBT explaining the curvature.
2.B.2.2 Multi-Variable Factor Specifications
Based on the findings in the literature and the results obtained for the SV case, I now allow for more 
state variables to influence the term  structure factors. The findings reported in Tables 2.22-23 are in 
line with previous results in tha t inflation (actually, two measures of inflation, PC E and PPI1) drives 
the level factor, monetary policy drives the slope, and fiscal policy drives the curvature factor. The 
model is surprisingly similar to the SV specification previously obtained, as their differ only by the 
inclusion of the extra measure of inflation driving the level factor. Tables 2.22-23 display the results.
As opposed to previous findings in the literature, however, no inclusion of economic activity measures 
was found to  improve on the best specification obtained improved the goodness-of-fit of the model. 
This finding could be rationalized by arguing that economic agents take into account some form of 
the Taylor rule when looking at the economic variables available to them  and analyzing their impact 
on the yield curve. Hereafter we refer to the best specification for the multi-variable case (with level
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TABLE 2.17. Maturity-Disaggregated Accuracy - Recessions 1 and 2
P a n e l A
D L S V
R e c e ss io n  R l  
S V -T R  M V M V -T R
lm o 2.45 0.90 0.96 0.90 0.73
2 m o 1.36 0.86 0.90 0.86 0.70
3 m o 0.63 0.83 0.85 0.82 0.67
4 m o 0.95 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.65
5 m o 1.49 0.57 0.57 0 . 5 4 0.58
6 m o 1.93 0.60 0.57 0.58 0.58
7 m o 2.23 0.62 0.56 0.63 0.59
8 m o 2.36 0.66 0.56 0.66 0.55
9 m o 2.37 0.71 0.59 0.71 0.58
lO m o 2.27 0.75 0.63 0.76 0.61
l l m o 2.12 0.78 0.65 0.80 0.63
1 2m o 1.94 0.81 0.66 0.90 0.72
2 4 m o 1.27 0.91 0.76 1.00 0.76
3 6 m o 0.84 0.91 0.80 1.01 0.79
4 8 m o 0.70 1.02 0.86 1.03 0.77
6 0 m o 0.93 2.13 1.95 2.21 2.01
P a n e l B R e c e ss io n R 2
D L S V S V -T R M V M V -T R
lm o 2.89 1.61 2.32 1.57 2.17
2 m o 2.57 1.60 2.30 1.55 2.14
3 m o 2.81 1.57 2.26 1.51 2.09
4 m o 3.09 1.52 2.20 1.46 2.02
5 m o 3.42 1.45 2.12 1.39 1.95
6 m o 3.67 1.33 1.98 1.31 1.81
7 m o 3.94 1.25 1.86 1 . 2 4 1.69
8 m o 4.12 1.19 1.74 1.19 1.58
9 m o 4.19 1.15 1.63 1.14 1.49
lO m o 4.21 1.13 1.54 1.09 1.40
l l m o 4.22 1.03 1.49 1.10 1.37
12m o 4.22 1.01 1.47 1.13 1.33
2 4 m o 3.06 1.02 0.97 1.04 0.85
3 6 m o 2.80 0.92 0.96 0.93 1.03
4 8 m o 1.89 1.85 1.56 1.89 1.68
6 0 m o 4.00 3.38 2.95 3.45 2.87
N ote: The quantities in italics are the smaller values for a given time period and episode.
being driven by PCA and PPI1, slope driven by FF, and curvature being driven by DEBT) as the 
MV specification.
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TABLE 2.18. Maturity-Disaggregated Accuracy - Recessions 3 and 4
P a n e l C
D L S V
R e c e ss io n  R 3  
S V -T R  M V M V -T R
lm o 3.73 1 . 4 4 1.89 1.49 1.73
2m o 1.64 1 . 4 3 1.88 1.48 1.71
3m o 0.79 1.44 1.90 1.48 1.71
4 m o 1.65 1 . 4 6 1.91 1.51 1.71
5m o 2.72 1 . 4 0 1.85 1 . 4 0 1.60
6m o 3.57 1.48 1.91 1.45 1.66
Tmo 4.17 1.55 1.97 1.50 1.71
8 m o 4.58 1.51 1.93 1.43 1.66
9m o 4.84 1.57 1.97 1.51 1.72
lO m o 5.01 1.62 2.01 1.58 1.77
l l m o 5.11 1.68 2.05 1.65 1.82
12m o 5.18 1.78 2.14 1.71 1.83
24m o 4.57 1.37 1.74 1.24 1.40
36 m o 5.01 2.16 2.32 2.02 2.06
48 m o 3.63 1.66 1.90 1.61 1.71
60 m o 4-28 4.61 4.81 4.57 4.69
P a n e l D R e c e ss io n R 4
D L S V S V -T R M V M V -T R
lm o 6.90 0.68 0.79 0.65 0.75
2m o 5.77 0.71 0.82 0.69 0.78
3m o 4.83 0.71 0.82 0.70 0.78
4 m o 4.07 0.70 0.80 0.69 0.76
5m o 3.47 0.67 0.78 0.67 0.72
6m o 3.00 0.67 0.77 0.67 0.71
7m o 2.64 0.66 0.70 0.66 0.66
8 m o 2.35 0.39 0.45 0.33 0.39
9m o 2.13 0.39 0.45 0.35 0.39
lO m o 1.93 0.40 0.44 0.37 0.38
l l m o 1.77 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.39
12m o 1.63 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.40
24m o 1.35 0.57 0.56 0.53 O. 4 8
3 6 m o 0.98 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.50
48 m o 0 . 4 2 1.25 1.17 1.26 1.11
6 0 m o 0.84 0.69 0.61 0.70 0.60
N o te :  The quantities in italics are the smaller values for a given time period and episode.
2.B.2.3 In-Sample Comparison of Specifications
Once parameter estimates were obtained I am now in a position to compare the in-sample behaviour 
of the specifications. Table 2.24 reports results in terms of R 2 and MAE quantities according to which 
parsimony is well rewarded in our context, given how closely the measures of goodness-of-fit are.
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TABLE 2.19. Maturity-Disaggregated Accuracy - Recession 5
P a n e l E
D L SV
R e c e ss io n  R 5  
S V -T R  M V M V -T R
lm o 7.01 1.36 1.73 1.21 2.02
2m o 6.45 1.42 1.79 1.28 2.07
3m o 5.98 1.45 1.82 1.31 2.09
4m o 5.59 1.47 1.84 1.33 2.10
5m o 5.28 1.47 1.87 1.33 2.09
6m o 5.03 1.51 1.87 1.36 2.10
7m o 4.84 1.50 1.47 1.35 2.08
8 m o 4.69 1.11 1.47 0.99 1.71
9 m o 4.57 1.10 1.47 0.97 1.69
lO m o 4.45 1.08 1.47 0 . 9 4 1.65
l l m o 4.35 1.08 1.44 0.93 1.63
12m o 4.24 1.06 1.42 0.91 1.59
2 4m o 3.33 0.54 0.87 0.61 0.87
3 6 m o 2.79 0.78 0.95 0.80 0.78
4 8 m o 2.73 0.87 1.24 0.85 1.02
6 0 m o 2.35 1.51 1.85 1.59 1.64
N o te :  The quantities in italics are the smaller values for a given time period and episode.
TABLE 2.20. Basic Statistics of Yields
M ea n S td . E rror M in M a x A C F ( l ) A C F (9 )
lm o 6.136 2.512 2.600 16.360 0.956* 0.959*
2m o 6.315 2.549 2.740 16.170 0.971* 0.781*
3 m o 6.467 2.549 2.760 16.030 0.972* 0.789*
4 m o 6.545 2.598 2.810 16.100 0.973* 0.793*
5m o 6.627 2.597 2.850 16.190 0.973* 0.798*
6 m o 6.688 2.594 2.850 16.520 0.974* 0.799*
7m o 6.727 2.583 2.920 16.170 0.974* 0.800*
8 m o 6.780 2.577 2.930 16.300 0.975* 0.800*
9 m o 6.829 2.580 2.980 16.360 0.974* 0.799*
lO m o 6.852 2.577 3.010 16.400 0.974* 0.799*
l l m o 6.876 2.566 3.020 16.390 0.974* 0.799*
12m o 6.922 2.510 3.110 15.810 0.972* 0.795*
2 4m o 7.130 2.442 3.660 15.640 0.978* 0.815*
3 6m o 7.282 2.374 3.870 15.560 0.979* 0.829*
4 8 m o 7.401 2.343 3.970 15.820 0.980* 0.835*
6 0 m o 7.464 2.319 3.980 15.000 0.982* 0.847*
1 2 0 m o 7.535 2.268 4.110 15.210 0.984* 0.852*
N o te : Individual significance at the 5% level is denoted by a superscript *
2.B.3 Out-of-Sample Analysis
In this section I perform a small out-of-sample study by considering three episodes. These episodes 
are of economic interest due to NBER-dated US recessions which have occurred during the periods 
December, 1969 to November, 1970; January to July, 1980; and July, 1990 to March, 1991. I estimate
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TABLE 2.21. Results for Alternative Single-Variable Factor Specifications
P [s.e.] <7 [s.e.] MAE
L  : C P I  
S : F F  
C  : M l
7.292
-2 .3 5 6
-0 .8 2 6
[0.061]
[0.275]
[0.119]
82.213
0.441
-4 6 .8 8 9
[10.585]
[0.030]
[6.525]
1.939
1.560
L  : P C E  
S  : F F  
C  : M l
7.160
-2 .5 7 7
-0 .8 5 7
[0.063]
[0.252]
[0.111]
139.993
0.474
-4 2 .2 7 0
[14.686]
[0.026]
[5.930]
1.911
1.492
L  : P P /1  
S  : F F  
C  : M l
7.595
-2 .2 0 0
-0 .8 4 7
[0.052]
[0.300]
[0.127]
66.639
0.420
-4 1 .3 2 6
[6.849]
[0.032]
[6.838]
1.981
1.690
L  : P P /2  
S  : F F  
C  : M l
7.775
-2 .2 8 4
-0 .8 7 5
[0.056]
[0.300]
[0.127]
31.179
0.434
-3 8 .1 7 0
[4.215]
[0.031]
[6.704]
1.993
1.709
L  : P C E  
S  : F F  
C  : F F D
7.356
-2 .7 5 1
-1 .0 2 6
[0.046]
[0.241]
[0.103]
115.975
0.496
1.472
[8.269]
[0.024]
[0.394]
1.890
1.433
L  : P C E 7.088 [0.047] 126.068 [8.890]
1.848
1.344
S  . F F  
C : D E B T
-3 .2 4 5
-0 .7 2 8
[0.210]
[0.103]
0.567
-4 6 .2 2 7
[0.019]
[5.782]
L  : P C E  
S : N O N B R  
C : D E B T
5.512
0.748
-1 .2 6 4
[0.186]
[0.309]
[0.187]
510.668
-1 3 .1 6 2
33.981
[47.895]
[4.617]
[17.389]
1.946
1.584
L  : P C E  
S  : M l
5.648
1.162
[0.126]
[0.312]
489.530
-9 7 .1 2 9
[24.113]
[18.479]
1.989
1.696
C : D E B T -1 .4 4 9 [0.185] 60.586 [17.319]
N o te :  Standard errors inside squared brackets. Non-significant estim ates at the 5% significance level are marked with 0 .  The 
underlined MAE values are the smallest ones in the Table.
the DL, SV and MV specifications for three subsamples of the data, all of which starting from June, 
1964. The first ends in December, 1969, the second in December, 1979, and the third in December, 
1989.
The results reported in Table 2.25 show the overall out-of-sample behaviour of the macro-based 
specifications tend to outperform the benchmark, although the DL model tends to perform better in 
one-month ahead forecasts in two out of the three episodes considered. Although the MV specification 
performs better for the first episode, the more parsimonious SV specification seems to be doing a very 
good job for the second and third episodes considered.
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TABLE 2.22. Results for Alternative Multi-Variable Factor Specifications 
Panel A /3 [s.e.] a  [s.e.] MAE
L  : P C E  
S  : F F  
S : N O N B R  
C : D E B T
7.237
-3 .1 0 4
-0 .8 1 7
[0.044]
[0.213]
[0.101]
130.721
0.553
-8 .2 3 8
-3 3 .5 5 1
[9.040]
[0.019]
[2.179]
[5.243]
L  : C P I  
S  : F F  
S : N O N B R  
C : D E B T
6.922
-2 .6 8 0
-0 .7 2 4
[0.048]
[0.228]
[0.110]
177.428
0.494
-1 0 .8 2 1
-4 5 .0 8 8
[9.190]
[0.022]
[1.786]
[6.002]
L  : P C E —23.6810 [18.731]
L  : C P I 7.058 [0.044] 162.999 [16.663]
S  : F F -2 .9 0 6 [0.217] 0.523 [0.021]
S : N O N B R -0 .8 1 4 [0.103] -9 .3 5 7 [2.037]
C : D E B T -3 1 .8 1 9 [5.356]
L  : P C E 132.707 [9.378]
S  : F F 7.243 [0.046] 0.553 [0.019]
S : N O N B R -3 .1 2 5 [0.214] -5 .3 9 1 [2.400]
C : D E B T -0 .7 4 9 [0.104] -4 1 .5 4 2 [5.912]
C  : F F D 1.666 [0.398]
L  : P C E 133.358 [10.116]
S  : F F 7.214 [0.047] 0.492 [0.027]
S : N O N B R -4 .2 4 7 [0.242] -6 .9 9 7 [2.567]
S  : H E L P -0 .7 0 0 [0.110] 0.021 [0.003]
C : D E B T -5 3 .3 3 4 [6.599]
L  : P C E  
S  : F F  
S  : H E L P  
C : D E B T
7.059
-4 .4 8 6
-0 .6 7 4
[0.044]
[0.244]
[0.112]
161.146
0.472
0.025
-5 4 .2 5 3
[7.562]
[0.029]
[0.003]
[6.839]
1.889
1.427
1.960
1.624
1.934
1.547
1.892
1.436
1.924
1.510
1.903
1.458
N o te :  Standard errors inside squared brackets. Non-significant estim ates at the 5% significance level are marked with 0 .  The  
underlined MAE values are the smallest ones in the Table.
The results reported in Tables 2.26-27 confirm the view tha t macro-based specifications tend to 
outperform the benchmark DL model. For Table 2.26, which reports the results for year 1970, this 
dominance occurs for 12-13 of the 17 maturities considered. Most notably, the cumulative average 
MAE across maturities of the DL specification for the nine-month horizon is 50% larger than the ones 
of the macro-based specifications. Overall, the fitting of the macro-based specifications is much better 
than the DL one for the shorter half of the yield curve by significant orders of magnitude, although this 
dominance is reversed in favour of the DL specification when it comes to the longer end. A candidate 
explanation for this fact is the higher persistence and lower volatility of longer yields, as reported in 
Table 2.20.
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TABLE 2.23. Results for Alternative Multi-Variable Factor Specifications cont’d
Panel B P [s.e.] a  [s.e.] avg(?t ) MAE
L : P C E 54.966 [12.670]
L  : P P /1  
S  : F F  
S : N O N B R
7.315
-3 .2 0 4
-0 .7 3 2
[0.054]
[0.220]
[0.104]
30.765
0.567
-5 .0 9 3
[4.586]
[0.021]
[2.374]
0.954
1.866
1.369
C : D E B T -4 9 .8 1 8 [5.753]
L  : P C E 237.420 [14.652]
L  : P P /2
S - . F F
S : N O N B R
6.925
-2 .9 9 6
-0 .8 1 1
[0.055]
[0.209]
[0.101]
-1 8 .4 7 3
0.540
-8 .2 5 9
[3.607]
[0.019]
[2.342]
0.957
1.887
1.431
C : D E B T -3 4 .5 6 3 [5.454]
L  : P C E 170.695 [20.213]
L  : P P /3
S : F F
S : N O N B R
7.106
-2 .8 3 9
-0 .7 1 6
[0.073]
[0.232]
[0.110]
—1.9260 
0.519 
-7 .1 2 0
[4.842]
[0.022]
[2.707]
0.961
1.892
1.436
C : D E B T -5 1 .3 8 5 [6.372]
L  : P C E 58.423 [11.813]
L  : P P /1  
S - . F F  
S  -. N O N B R  
C  -. D E B T
7.395
-3 .2 1 4
-0 .6 1 8
[0.054]
[0.222]
[0.108]
16.708
0.562
2.2520
-6 2 .8 2 8
[4.611]
[0.021]
[2.593]
[6.214]
0.953
1.866
1.369
C  -. F F D 2.962 [0.393]
L -. P C E  
L -. P P /1  
S - . F F  
C  -. D E B T
6.885
-3 .1 7 2
-0 .6 6 9
[0.042]
[0.206]
[0.104]
181.628
21.672
0.558
-5 5 .5 2 2
[8.315]
[4.533]
[0.018]
[6.091]
0.957
1.863
1.356
N o te :  Standard errors inside squared brackets. Non-significant estim ates at the 5% significance level are marked with 0 .  The 
underlined MAE values are the smallest ones in the Table.
TABLE 2.24. Goodness-of-Fit of Alternative Models
M o d e l A v e ra g e  R 2 M ed ia n  R 2 A v e r a g e  M A E M ed ia n  M A E
S V 0.704 0.878 1.848 1.344
M V 0.705 0.884 1.866 1.369
The results reported in Table 2.27 are qualitatively similar to the ones of Table 2.26. However, the 
goodness-of-fit for all specifications tends to be worse than before, probably due to the change in the 
way monetary policy was being conducted during tha t period. Finally, Tables 2.26-27 shows a clear 
dominance of the macro-based specifications and, in particular, of the parsimonious SV specification 
over the competing alternatives.
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TABLE 2.25. Average MAEs Period-by-Period
D L
1970
S V M V D L
1980
S V M V D L
1990
S V M V
1 st m o n th 0.15 1.51 1.63 1.14 1.20 1.28 0.52 0.63 1.03
2 n d  m o n th 1.18 0.50 0.26 3.79 3.20 3.23 0.73 0.10 0.52
3rd  m o n th 1.56 0.80 0.86 4.68 2.29 2.34 0.95 0.31 0.85
4 th  m o n th 0.98 0.86 0.71 0.93 0.87 0.80 1.20 0.83 1.14
5 th  m o n th 1.13 1.25 1.13 0.91 0.80 0.81 0.91 0.54 0.67
6 th  m o n th 1.50 1.15 1.23 0.98 0.80 0.77 0.84 0.11 0.45
7 th  m o n th 1.86 0.72 0.64 0.34 1.11 1.10 0.61 0.30 0.38
8 th  m o n th 1.97 1.16 1.10 1.50 2.24 2.22 0.70 0.52 0.50
9 th  m o n th 2.34 0.59 0.89 2.61 2.53 2.46 0.57 0.56 0.68
1 0 th  m o n th 2.67 0.42 0.34 3.65 3.20 3.25 0.38 0.66 0.75
1 1 th  m o n th 3.86 0.50 0.44 4.96 3.36 3.49 0.21 0.22 0.14
1 2 th  m o n th 4.07 0.59 0.65 4.41 2.14 2.36 0.34 0.21 0.40
N o te : The underlined quantities are the smaller values for a given time period and episode.
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TABLE 2.26. MAEs of Alternative Specifications
P a n e l A 3rd  m o n th  o f  e v e n t 6 th  m o n th  o f  e v en t 9 th  m o n th  o f  e v e n t
1970 D L S V M V DL S V M V D L S V M V
lm o 1.09 0.54 0.70 1.47 0.33 0.42 1.82 0.32 0.39
2 m o 0.87 0.57 0.56 1.31 0.48 0.51 1.69 0.43 0.42
3 m o 0.92 0.69 0.69 1.18 0.61 0.56 1.58 0.50 0.49
4 m o 0.92 0.69 0.68 1.14 0.68 0.63 1.55 0.55 0.54
5 m o 0.94 0.70 0.65 1.14 0.71 0.65 1.50 0.64 0.62
6 m o 0.95 0.74 0.68 1.18 0.72 0.65 1.51 0.68 0.65
7 m o 0.95 0.79 0.74 1.11 0.83 0.77 1.45 0.78 0.76
8 m o 0.97 0.83 0.77 1.07 0.92 0.85 1.39 0.88 0.86
9 m o 1.03 0.81 0.76 1.08 0.96 0.89 1.39 0.91 0.89
lO m o 1.06 0.82 0.77 1.10 0.97 0.90 1.43 0.91 0.89
l l m o 1.10 0.82 0.77 1.13 0.98 0.92 1.45 0.92 0.90
1 2m o 1.11 0.85 0.80 1.13 1.01 0.95 1.46 0.94 0.92
2 4 m o 1.11 1.13 1.10 1.09 1.32 1.26 1.41 1.22 1.20
3 6 m o 1.06 1.29 1.26 1.02 1.47 1.43 1.29 1.41 1.40
4 8 m o 0.83 1.55 1.53 0.83 1.69 1.65 1.09 1.64 1.63
6 0 m o 0.77 1.61 1.59 0.79 1.73 1.69 1.05 1.66 1.66
1 2 0 m o 0.79 1.52 1.50 0.65 1.81 1.77 0.88 1.75 1.74
A v g 0.97 0.94 0.91 1.08 1.01 0.97 1.41 0.95 0.94
P a n e l B 3rd  m o n th  o f  e v e n t 6 th  m o n th  o f  e v en t 9 th  m o n th  o f  e v en t
1980 D L SV M V D L S V M V D L S V M V
lm o 3.15 1.37 1.51 2.27 1.55 1.57 2.00 1.36 1.38
2 m o 3.56 1.86 1.99 2.39 1.41 1.43 1.98 1.32 1.33
3 m o 3.69 2.06 2.19 2.44 1.37 1.37 2.13 1.41 1.41
4 m o 3.81 2.26 2.38 2.51 1.47 1.46 2.18 1.53 1.52
5 m o 3.88 2.40 2.51 2.51 1.49 1.49 2.19 1.58 1.57
6 m o 3.85 2.44 2.54 2.48 1.48 1.48 2.17 1.59 1.58
7 m o 3.78 2.44 2.53 2.44 1.45 1.44 2.16 1.58 1.57
8 m o 3.63 2.35 2.44 2.37 1.36 1.41 2.11 1.54 1.57
9 m o 3.76 2.55 2.63 2.46 1.44 1.54 2.17 1.62 1.67
lO m o 3.66 2.50 2.58 2.37 1.40 1.49 2.11 1.60 1.65
l l m o 3.69 2.59 2.66 2.37 1.44 1.53 2.10 1.63 1.68
1 2 m o 3.35 2.31 2.37 2.16 1.32 1.31 1.96 1.52 1.50
2 4 m o 2.86 2.34 2.34 1.84 1.48 1.50 1.67 1.74 1.74
3 6 m o 2.33 2.14 2.11 1.42 1.59 1.58 1.40 1.88 1.85
4 8 m o 1.98 2.02 1.96 1.16 1.67 1.64 1.23 1.97 1.93
6 0 m o 1.87 2.07 1.99 1.05 1.90 1.86 1.20 2.20 2.14
1 2 0 m o 1.66 2.22 2.09 0.97 2.13 2.05 1.11 2.35 2.26
A v g 3.21 2.23 2.28 2.07 1.53 1.54 1.88 1.67 1.67-------- -------- -------- ------------
N o te : The underlined quantities are the smaller values for a given time period and episode.
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TABLE 2.27. MAEs of Alternative Specifications cont’d
P a n e l C 3rd m o n th  o f  e v e n t 6 th  m o n th  o f  e v en t 9 th  m o n th  o f  e v en t
1990 D L S V M V D L S V M V D L S V M V
lm o 0.84 0.55 1.00 0.88 0.42 0.77 0.82 0.47 0.73
2 m o 0.92 0.43 0.89 1.03 0.48 0.84 0.96 0.50 0.76
3 m o 0.93 0.35 0.81 1.05 0.47 0.83 0.96 0.49 0.75
4 m o 0.84 0.37 0.83 0.98 0.46 0.82 0.89 0.50 0.76
5 m o 0.83 0.32 0.78 0.95 0.43 0.79 0.87 0.45 0.71
6 m o 0.78 0.31 0.77 0.91 0.41 0.77 0.81 0.44 0.71
7 m o 0.72 0.29 0.75 0.83 0.39 0.72 0.73 0.44 0.69
8 m o 0.67 0.31 0.77 0.78 0.34 0.71 0.69 0.39 0.66
9 m o 0.66 0.29 0.75 0.78 0.35 0.71 0.69 0.40 0.66
lO m o 0.62 0.28 0.71 0.76 0.37 0.70 0.67 0.40 0.65
l l m o 0.57 0.34 0.73 0.72 0.40 0.70 0.63 0.43 0.66
1 2m o 0.67 0.31 0.77 0.81 0.41 0.77 0.69 0.45 0.72
2 4 m o 0.57 0.36 0.82 0.72 0.45 0.78 0.61 0.45 0.69
3 6 m o 0.59 0.37 0.80 0.73 0.45 0.78 0.64 0.43 0.67
4 8 m o 0.66 0.34 0.81 0.81 0.44 0.82 0.75 0.39 0.66
6 0 m o 0.72 0.33 0.80 0.86 0.43 0.83 0.82 0.37 0.65
120m o 0.91 0.32 0.79 1.01 0.43 0.83 1.03 0.34 0.63
A v g 0.74 0.35 0.80 0.86 0.42 0.78 0.78 0.43 0.69
Note: The underlined quantities are the smaller values for a given time period and episode.
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Estimating The ‘Coordinated Effects’ of Mergers
3.1 Introduction
This paper empirically evaluates whether firms face incentives to tacitly collude in differentiated prod­
uct1 markets and whether these incentives change following a merger. Tacit collusion may appear when 
the same firms repeatedly interact in the same markets, since they may have an incentive to set high 
prices because they expect tha t by not doing so, their competitors will lower their own prices in the 
future. Mergers could facilitate - or enhance - the likelihood of collusion by reducing the number of 
firms th a t need to interact in a given market, thus facilitating the convergence of a focal point. Both 
academics2 and competition agencies3 have recognized tha t mergers can potentially facilitate tacit 
collusion by changing the incentives firms face when setting prices. Recent examples where antitrust 
authorities have invoked the theory of coordinated effects when attempting to block mergers include 
the Nestle-Perrier, Kali and Salz , Gencor-Lenrho, Airtours and Sony-BMG cases in the EU jurisdic­
tion, Safeway in the United Kingdom and ATP, Arch Coal, Cruises and Hospital Corporation in the 
US.
*In contrast w ith homogeneous products, differentiated products are not identical to other products in the same industry. 
According to the principle of  differentiation, in the words of Tirole (1988, p .278): "[uniproduct] firms generally do not want to 
locate at the same place in the product space . The reason is simply the Bertrand paradox: Two firms producing perfect substitutes 
face unbridled price com petition (at least in a static framework.) In contrast, product differentiation establishes clienteles ("market 
niches", in the business terminology) and allows firms to to enjoy some market power over these clienteles. Thus, firms usually wish 
to differentiate themselves from other firms." In this paper I deal with multiproduct firms, so that the above holds for products, 
instead of firms.
2 Chamberlin (1929) argued this point informally, while Stigler (1964) and Friedman (1971) formalized this intuition in the theory 
of repeated games. Following Stigler (1964), in order to sustain collusion firms must be able to (i) come to an agreement (which can 
be difficult when products are complex and differentiated), (ii) monitor each others’ behaviour (in order to detect undercutting) 
and, of course, (iii) enforce collusive behavior collectively by punishing the cheating firms. See Aumann (1986, 1989) and Mertens 
(1987) for surveys.
3 See for example the EU, UK or US Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
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In this paper, I take the most basic textbook model of tacit collusion4 to data in order to evaluate 
the way in which an actual merger impacts on firms incentives and ability to tacitly collude. In 
particular, I follow and expand Friedman’s (1971) model of tacit collusion to data and use it to inforip 
a merger investigation. In doing so, I generalize the standard textbook model of tacit collusion in 
a number of im portant ways. Specifically, I allow for product differentiation, multi-product firms, 
competitive fringes and multi-market contact. However, I recognize tha t even so, Friedman’s model 
makes a number of im portant and certainly unrealistic assumptions, most notably tha t firms benefit 
from complete information. Despite tha t fact, since Friedman’s model forms the basis of analysis in 
both  textbooks and, at least in significant part, law - via the ‘A irtours’ tests introduced by the Court 
of First Instance (CFI) in the Airtours judgment in Europe, I nonetheless consider tha t empirically 
exploring the economics of this benchmark model is a useful contribution. Future empirical research 
will, of course, need to explore coordinated effects merger simulation in incomplete information settings.
The intuition behind the coordinated effects of mergers can most easily be developed using Fried­
m an’s (1971) result that firms will be willing to coordinate whenever their share of monopoly profits 
is greater than their returns to not-coordinating. Specifically, if N is the number of firms, 6 is the 
discount rate and firms follow grim strategies, then essentially every modern industrial organization 
textbook establishes the relationship tha t collusion will be sustainable with N symmetric firms if
y C o llu sio n  =  ^ M o n o p o l y _  J )  >  ^D efection +  ^ N a s h / ^  _  «J) =  yD efection^  w h e f e  ^ N ash represents the
profits to a firm under static Nash behavior (with 7rNash =  0 for the case of a homogeneous prod­
ucts Bertrand competition stage game) and 7rDefectlon represents the payoff to a cheating firm who 
is assumed to receive it for one period. Since each firm’s payoff to collusion is declining in N, this 
relationship suggests that generically mergers (reductions in N) will make collusion easier to sustain 
since each firms share of collusive profits increases. In what follows, I show tha t this intuitive result is, 
in large part, misleading and, in fact, the elementary version of this theory will generally predict the 
opposite - th a t mergers will make tacit collusion harder to sustain, not easier. I establish this result 
in Proposition 1, my core theoretical contribution, and discus the intuition for my results there.
This research builds most directly on three significant literatures. First, I build on the empirical 
literature on the unilateral effects of mergers, and in particular merger simulation. This literature has 
evolved over the last two decades following the work of Davidson and Deneckere (1985), Farrell and 
Shapiro (1990), Baker and Bresnahan (1999), Hausman et al (1994) and Nevo (2000). The Bertrand
4See, for instance, Tirole (1988, Section 6.3)
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differentiated product model wherein firms compete in prices and market outcomes are characterized 
as the Nash equilibrium of the game provides the benchmark model in this literature.5
Second, I build on the empirical literature attem pting to evaluate the conduct of firms using game- 
theoretic pricing models. Specifically, authors such as Gollop and Roberts (1979), Roberts (1983), 
Suslow (1986), Bresnahan (1982, 1987), Nevo (2001), Slade (2002) and Salvo (2004) have attem pted 
to  evaluate whether observed equilibrium prices are more consistent with collusive or Nash equilibrium 
pricing. To do so, these papers compare the models of perfect collusion and static Nash equilibrium 
prices and evaluate which model better predicts observed market outcomes. An im portant contribution 
to  this literature was provided by Corts (1999) who critiqued this empirical literature on the grounds 
th a t the mapping between the empirical test of collusive behavior and the underlying theory of collusion 
was incomplete. One interpretation of this paper’s contribution is th a t it makes a modest step towards 
addressing tha t criticism seriously by taking an actual model of tacit collusion to data.
Third, this paper is also related to both the older and the more recent, and im portant, theoretical 
contributions on the coordinated effects of mergers. Specifically, I will follow Friedman (1971) closely, 
bu t in studying asymmetric contexts this work is related to Compte, Jenny and Rey (2002), Vasconcelos 
(2005) and Kuhn (2004) have recently studied collusion under asymmetric market structures. While 
Compte et al (2002) examine coordinated effects in the context of a Bertrand-Edgeworth homogeneous 
goods model with capacity constraints and calibrate their model with the data from the Nestle-Perrier 
case, Kuhn (2004) is the first paper to study mergers in differentiated product markets. I will abstract 
from capacity constraints, since I have no data about them. However, capacity can play an im portant 
role in tacit collusion. For example, Lambson (1996) argues tha t slight asymmetries in capacities can 
reduce the danger of tacit collusion.
Kuhn (2004) studies a richer context than I do, in tha t he studies collusion under imperfect infor­
mation, following, for example, Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti (1990). However, I note th a t while Kuhn’s 
information context is richer and more realistic, he must make other assumptions tha t make his model 
difficult to imagine using as a basis for informing empirical work - for instance, he considers only the 
case where the price for every good sold by each firm is the same.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 I describe the network server industry. Section 3 sets 
the framework to evaluate the incentives to collude. In Section 4 I describe the data, whereas Section 
5 discusses the implementation of the model. Section 6 describes the results.
5As an aside note that, in fact, this model has been used both to evaluate ‘unilateral’ effects of horizontal mergers and also 
as the basis for a literature evaluating vertical integration and restraints. (See Brenkers and Verboven (2006), Bonnet and Dubois 
(2008), Villas-Boas (2007) and m ost recently DG -CO M P’s decision in the TomTom-TeleAtlas case (2008).
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3.2 The Network Server Industry
3.2.1 Network Servers
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a paradigm shift in what concerns computer architecture as 
the mainframe-based system was superseded by the ‘client-server’ computer architecture tha t is the 
dominant nowadays.6 As a result, instead of centralized computing power and users interacting via 
‘dumb term inals’, processing power became more decentralized and flexible, distributed between PCs 
with their own operating systems, and with increasingly powerful machines - servers - linking these 
PCs altogether through networks.
Servers are heavy-duty computers tha t can both provide resources (such as software) and share 
resources (such as files) with other computers - the clients - on a computer network.7 Very much 
like desktops, servers consist of both hardware, such as the processors, memory and the hard-disk 
drive, as well as software, such as the operating system and specific applications. Servers are, however, 
more powerful and expensive machines than desktops costing anywhere from a thousand to several 
million dollars. W ith many users simultaneously using their services, they are typically deployed to 
run round-the-clock to tackle critical computing tasks such as keeping track of a retail chain’s sales, 
a customer database, logging phone calls and reconciling stock trade transactions, thus requiring 
better resistance to crashes, hacker attacks and other faults. Servers range from high-end Unix servers, 
with numerous processors and multimillion-dollar price tags, to comparatively inexpensive Intel-based 
machines running a Linux or Microsoft Windows operating system used, for instance, to power small 
LANs and low-volume Internet sites.8
Servers are now widespread in nearly every sector of the economy. Although the server market 
is smaller in unit volume than the desktop one, its products command higher margins. Moreover, 
selling a server can spur related spending on services and other products. Gartner Group (2008) 
reports the 2007 server market revenue to be of the order of $55bn, amounting to the shipment of 
almost 9mn units. At the global level, the main players are IBM, HP-Compaq, Sun and Dell, which 
jointly command over 75% of the market revenues - see Table 3.1. Financial corporations and the 
communications sector are responsible for, respectively, 25% and 14% of the industry world revenues, 
whereas Government purchases amount to 11%.9 Network servers have also been at the centre of a
6 See Bresnahan and Greenstein (1996) for an economic analysis of the transition.
7 For a basic discussion of servers see, for example, Sybex (2001).
8 LAN (local area network) is a local computer network for communication between computers. In particular, a network connecting 
computers from different offices.
9Gartner Group (2007).
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TABLE 3.1. Market Shares in the World Server Market
1999  2001  200 2  2 0 0 7
F irm s S a les U n its S a le s U n its S a le s U n its S a le s U n its
IB M 28.3 17.3 29.0 15.0 31.1 14.3 31.1 14.5
H P 14.4 12.3 26.6 9.7 25.2 30.1 28.3 29.8
C o m p a q 14.0 28.0 16.0 23.3 - - - -
Su n 14.0 5.2 15.4 5.8 15.1 6.0 10.8 3.8
D e ll 4.1 11.7 6.5 16.1 7.5 18.5 11.4 21.4
O th ers 25.2 24.9 6.5 30.1 21.1 31.1 13.9 27.1
M a rk et R e v en u e USD 48.5 bn USD 47.0 bn USD 43.1 bn USD 54.8 bn
M a rk et S h ip m en ts 3.4 mn units 4.4 mn units 4.6 mn units 8.8 mn units
N o te :  Data from Gartner Group (2000, 2002, 2003, 2008). Figures reported under sales and quantity are, respectively, revenue- and 
quantity-based market shares, illustrating the different presence of the players across market segments. Market shipments report 
the number of units sold in a given year worldwide.
number of recent competition policy debates, most notably the European Commission’s decision in 
2004 against Microsoft.10
3.2.2 Consolidation in the Network Server Industry
H P’s acquisition of Compaq was the highest profile merger during a period of marked consolidation 
in the server industry. The second half of the 1990s was marked by a series of mergers and acquisi­
tions in the computer industry and, in particular, in the network server industry - see Table 3.2. In 
particular, August 1997 and June 1998 saw Tandem and DEC being acquired by Compaq - the latter 
was the largest acquisition in computer industry at tha t time, creating the second largest computing 
company in the world in terms of revenue.11 In June 1999, the Fujitsu-Siemens 50-50 joint venture 
was announced, with the aim of creating Europe’s largest IT supplier and second PC vendor, offering 
a greater range of products by combining Fujitsu’s consumer and professional LAN-based PCs with 
Siemens’ servers and enterprise solution products.
Market consolidation since the mid-1990s may have resulted from the falling prices of servers. Market 
observers attribute falling prices to both demand shocks12 and a process of commoditization. Evidence
10In March 2004, the European Commission found Microsoft guilty of violating the EU com petition legislation and fined it in 
EUR 497mn, the biggest-ever fine in an EU competition case. The EC argued that Microsoft took advantage of its W indows virtual 
monopoly, unfairly leveraging its dominance over PC operating system s into other markets, especially the market for servers and 
media player software. In the media player front, Microsoft was accused of bundling by shipping W indows with its W indows Media 
Player, whereas in the server market the allegations were due to inter-operability issues ie. Microsoft was allegedly not allowing 
easy interaction between computer servers using a W indows OS and applications from vendors other than Microsoft itself.
11See http://w eb.archive.O rg/w eb/20050331034315/http://hl8000.w w w l.hp.com /corporate/history.htm l for details of the Com­
paq history.
12The industry benefited from the wave of ‘Millenium B ug’ new equipment purchases that took place at the end of the 1990s, 
suggesting positive demand shocks in the late 1990’s but that demand was temporary and the removal of this source of demand 
together with the availability of quality used equipment from bankrupt Internet companies in the early 2000s and uncertainties 
regarding the economic outlook led to a temporary slowdown in ICT spending and, in particular, a negative impact on the market
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TABLE 3.2. Key Events in the Network Server Industry 1996-2002
D a te E v e n t
1996
Febuary Cray acquired by SGI (Silicon Graphics)
February Packard Bell acquired by NEC, inter alia
July Sun acquires Cray Business System Division from SGI
23
199 7
June Tandem acquired by Compaq
11 August AST Research acquired by Samsung
1998
June DEC (Digital) acquired by Compaq
1 99 9
April Eckhard Pfeiffer resigns as Compaq’s CEO
17 June Joint venture creates Fujitsu Siemens
August Data General announced being acquired by EMC
September Intergrah exits PC and server business
24 September Sequent acquired by IBM
2
2 0 0 0
March SGI sells Cray to Tera Computer
4 April Tera Computer renamed Cray Inc
4
2001
September Announcement of HP and Compaq plans to merge
September M oody’s downgrades HP debt
September Standard and Poors put HP on negative outlook
December HP-Compaq merger cleared by Canadian Competition Bureau
200 2
January HP-Compaq merger cleared by EU DG Competition
March US FTC clears HP-Compaq merger
19 March HP shareholders approve merger
20 March Compaq shareholders approve merger
3 May Compaq becomes part of HP
7 May New HP-Compaq officially launched
of competition can be seen in both the high-end server arena, where in early 2001 Sun introduced its 
newest line at half the price of comparable IBM products and at the lower specification end of the 
market, where Dell and Compaq, the top two Windows server sellers, were reportedly involved in a 
price war to keep market share.13 Van Reenen (2006) estimates the yearly, quality-adjusted price fall
for servers. IDC (2002) reports that ‘The fallout from the dot-com bubble and the "perfect storm" in the IT industry that preceded 
it caused the worldwide server market to decline by nearly 20% in 2001’.
13Gartner Group (1999), documents that US revenues dropped by 4.3%, whereas shipments grew by 15.9% from 1997Q4 to 
1998Q4.
3.2. The Network Server Industry 111
for servers to be of the order of 30% between 1996 and 2001 in the US (and about 22% in Western 
Europe).14
The process of consolidation involved a number of acquisitions of smaller competitors by the bigger 
players - IBM, Sun, HP, Compaq and Dell. Acquisitions include those of Sequent, D ata General, DEC 
and Tandem by the bigger players and the Fujitsu-Siemens combined server operation, in an attem pt 
to  be able to take on the other big players, at least in Europe.
The process of consolidation involved a number of acquisitions of smaller competitors by the bigger 
players - IBM, Sun, HP, Compaq and Dell. Acquisitions include those of Sequent (by IBM), Data 
General (by EMC), DEC and Tandem (both by Compaq) and the Fujitsu-Siemens combined server 
operation, in an attem pt to be able to take on the other big players, at least in Europe.
3.2.3 The HP-Compaq Merger
Compaq was an established player in the computer industry by the time it entered the server market 
in about November 1989, producing its one-millionth server in November 1996, By 2001Q1 it ranked 
first in worldwide server sales.
Hewlett Packard (HP) had built a strong reputation in the inkjet and laser printer markets, which it 
introduced in 1984.15 In the 1990s, it expanded their computer product line, which initially had been 
targeted at university, research, and business customers, to reach consumers. HP also grew through a 
number of acquisitions, from Apollo Computer in 1989, to Convex Computer in 1995, before acquiring 
Compaq.
HP and Compaq formally announced their plans to merge on September 4, 2001 - see Table 3.2. 
According to HP, their aim was to create a $ 85bn global technology leader capable of challenging 
IBM ’s worldwide leading position. The cost of the deal was approximately $25bn, and the parties 
argued the cost-savings from synergies would amount to $2.5bn in savings, with an estimated 15,000 
job cuts. They further argued the combined entity would become the market leader in servers, storage, 
management software, printing and imaging, and PCs, being in a position to offer the end-to-end 
solutions tha t customers demand. The combined entity would also double H P’s profitable and growing 
services business, enhance its R&D and extend its customer base worldwide. The estimated cost- 
savings would add between $5 and $9 in present value to each HP share and increase earnings per
14Even before making any adjustments for quality increase, van Reenen (2006) reports price falls of about 10% in the US in the 
period 1996-2001. Interestingly, he finds distinct price trends for low-end and high-end servers: whereas the former fell by about 
30% per annum in 1996-2001, the latter fell by about 20%, suggesting that they belong to different market segments. This finding 
is supported by anecdotal evidence from market observers, according to which the high-end servers would face high demand from 
e-business, web applications and customer databases, not to mention computer intensive uses such as supply-chain management, 
weather forecast, video web applications, the design of molecules etc. (See Gartner Group (2001).)
15See h ttp ://w w w .hp .com /hp info/abouthp/h istn facts/ for details of H P ’s history.
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share by 13% during the first year following the merger. Moreover, according to HP, by improving its 
profitability the new company would have the financial strength to extend its successful imaging and 
printing franchise into new promising categories such as digital imaging and digital publishing.
The prevailing view at the time of the merger was that Compaq could help HP with additional 
market share in both desktops and servers, besides enabling a ‘substantial additional presence’ in 
the  service market, given its prior acquisition of DEC. According to Reuters, “Broad hints from HP 
and a look at market share led industry observers to conclude that HP would use Compaq’s well- 
regarded storage system and its NT servers, low-end network computers that run Microsoft Windows, 
in stitching together its product line-up. The combined company was also expected to use H P’s own 
high-end Unix servers and Compaq’s mainframe-style computer, the (Tandem) Himalaya.”16
Such a global merger requires clearance by a number of antitrust authorities. Despite the concern th a t 
the merger would be blocked by antitrust authorities, the merger was ultimately cleared in all markets 
where it underwent scrutiny. The merger first received clearance from the Canadian Competition 
Bureau in December 2001. The European Commission approved the merger in early 2002, after focusing 
on the activities of the combined company in the markets for PCs, servers, PDAs, storage solutions 
and services. And in March 2002, the merger was cleared by the FTC. The merger was completed in 
March 2002. Due to the sharp decline in share prices, the deal valued at $25bn when the merger was 
announced was then worth only $19bn, approximately.
3.3 Evaluating the Incentives to Collude
3.3.1 Qualitative Analysis of Coordinated Effects in the HP-Compaq Merger
Chamberlin (1929) argued informally tha t when the same firms repeatedly interact, oligopolists may 
have an incentive to implicitly or tacitly collude and the result would be prices above competitive 
levels. Stigler (1964), economic theory, antitrust merger guidelines and court judgments (in particular 
Airtours) all suggest tha t whether firms can tacitly sustain collusive prices depends on a number of 
factors. Specifically, Stigler (1964) argues tha t in order to sustain collusion firms must be able to 
(i) come to an agreement (which can be difficult when products are complex and differentiated), (ii) 
monitor each others’ behaviour (in order to detect undercutting) and, of course, (iii) enforce collusive 
behavior collectively by punishing the cheating firms.
A g reem en t. The server industry involves a significant number of large players, but with a material 
competitive fringe of smaller firms. The distribution of brands and market shares varies across time
16 See http://ww w.reuters.com /article/film N ews/idUSN 0245554920020322.
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and markets, but participants in my dataset include AST, Acer, Apple, Compaq, D ata General, Dell, 
Digital, Fujitsu, Gateway, HP, Hitachi, IBM, Micron, Mitsubishi, NCR, NEC, Siemens, SGI, Sun, 
Toshiba, Unisys and VA Linux. Most firms are multi-product firms and so the number of products 
is substantial. In my dataset, a single geographic market has a maximum of 222 products for sale 
in a single quarter.17 At face value, such a large number of differentiated products appear to make 
the  problem of agreeing on a tacitly collusive outcome very difficult in this industry. On the other 
hand, this is a setting where a considerable amount of the product heterogeneity may in fact not be 
greatly valued by customers in the sense that each firm may face a substantially elastic demand for its 
product, as consumers will easily substitute across providers -  at least at a given point in the quality 
spectrum .18
For the purposes of this paper I will suppose tha t firms can achieve such an agreement, despite the 
considerable complexity even without the ability to meet to exchange information and/or audit each 
others accounts. However, I make this assumption cautiously and I do note tha t this is potentially 
an im portant caveat for my results, as well as an im portant area for future research. Ideally, I would 
like to be able to  capture the way in which the number of dimensions of an agreement may affect the 
likelihood of collusion in the way in which the model I build cannot. Naturally, as in other areas of 
microeconomics, the way in which prices are related to product characteristics may provide such a 
dimension-reducing solution for tacit colluders (Lancaster, 1961, Gorman, 1955).19
M o n ito rin g . One of the Airtours20 conditions is sufficient market transparency to ensure that all 
tacitly colluding oligopolists would become aware ‘sufficiently precisely and quickly’ of the way in 
which other members’ market conduct is evolving. The industry has a considerable amount of publicly 
available market information, since companies such as IDC and Gartner publish detailed quarterly 
information on shipments (quantities) and revenues by product by geographic market. This degree of 
transparency is not universal across markets, but it is a considerably greater degree of transparency 
than was available in the Sony/BMG merger tha t was the subject of the Impala judgements by the CFI
17 The maximum number of products observed in our dataset was in Q3 of 2000 in the EU market area.
18 There is clearly a big quality difference between a high and a low-end server. However, it is less clear that consumers perceive 
significant differences across providers at a given point in the product quality spectrum.
19In the famous case involving GE and W estinghouse in electrical turbines, a published pricing book with formulae were used to 
help to map product characteristics to prices. Similarly, in the US airline industry the prospect of ‘per-mile’ pricing was allegedly 
used as a potential simplifying tool to facilitate a proposed tacitly collusive arrangement.
20Case T -342/99, Airtours v. Commission, CFI Judgment of June 6, 2002 (See in particular paragraph 62.) “[F]irst, each member 
of the dominant oligopoly must have the ability to  know how the other members are behaving in order to  monitor whether or 
not they are adopting the common policy. As the Commission specifically acknowledges, it is not enough for each member of the 
dominant oligopoly to be aware that interdependent market conduct is profitable for all of them but each member must also have 
a means of knowing whether the other operators are adopting the same strategy and whether they are maintaining it. There must, 
therefore, be sufficient market transparency for all members of the dominant oligopoly to be aware, sufficiently precisely and quickly, 
of the way in which the other members’ market conduct is evolving;”
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and subsequently by the ECJ21, but even this information must be treated carefully as at least some 
information is collated from voluntary reports from companies who may, on occasion, have incentives 
to  either over- or under-report sales.
Naturally, in addition to the industry data available, there are industry associations, publications 
and conferences which each provide opportunities for informal communication and/or intelligence 
gathering. Furthermore there is a considerable degree of multi-market contact and firms will often 
meet in forums, such as standard-setting organizations, as well as sometimes explicitly and legitimately 
cooperating through joint ventures.22
E n fo rc e m e n t. There are two aspects to stability of tacit collusion, internal and external stability 
which, respectively, apply to the ability of those tacitly colluding to sustain the collusive outcome(s) 
and the inability of those not tacitly colluding to gain by disrupting it. In the main, in this paper I 
focus on techniques th a t can help evaluate this aspect of a tacitly collusive theory of harm. One of 
the Airtours conditions23 was tha t tacit collusion must be sustainable over time and the CFI noted 
th a t some notion of retaliation was “inherent” in this condition.24 Retaliation can take a number of 
forms, from a reversion to Nash equilibrium to temporary price wars (See Green and Porter (1984) 
and Porter (1983)’s analysis of the railroad Joint Executive Committee in the 1880s.)
Two introductory observations are worthy of note in relation to the HP/Com paq merger. F irst, 
while I have noted tha t there are a number of features of the marketplace tha t potentially facilitate 
collusion in the server industry and other significant features hindering it, neither the D O J/FT C  nor 
DG Competition reported material consideration of a theory of harm of coordinated effects when 
analyzing the HP-Compaq case. Second, there were no significant objections to the merger from rivals 
such as Dell, IBM and Sun.
Before moving on to discuss consider enforcement in the context of the server industry, I pause to 
note tha t I am not able to consider whether there is an im portant role for capacity constraints in
21 In Sony/BM G  and the appeals by Impala, the question before the courts was whether or not the fact that sales numbers were 
published weekly in Billboard Magazine was sufficient to establish a level of transparency that would enable a competition authority 
to consider blocking the merger, even though transaction prices between retailers and music distributors were not published.
22 One such case is the NEC-Mitsubishi joint venture of computer monitors and LCD panels, agreed upon in Septem ­
ber 1999, see h ttp ://find articles.eom /p /artic les/m i_m 0C G N /is_3750/a i_55805203; Another such example is the collabora­
tion between HP and NEC to develop internet protocol servers for the Japanese market agreed upon in July 1999, see 
h ttp ://w w w .hoise.com /prim eur/99/articles/m onthly/A E -PR -08-99-19.htm l.
23See also, Gencor v Commission, para 276.
24 Case T -342/99, Airtours v. Commission, CFI Judgment of June 6, 2002 (See in particular paragraph 62.) “[Sjecond, the situation  
of tacit coordination must be sustainable over time, that is to say, there must be an incentive not to depart from the common 
policy on the market. As the Commission observes, it is only if all the members of the dominant oligopoly maintain the parallel 
conduct that all can benefit. The notion of retaliation in respect of conduct deviating from the common policy is thus inherent in 
this condition. In this instance, the parties concur that, for a situation of collective dominance to be viable, there must be adequate  
deterrents to ensure that there is a long-term incentive in not departing from the common policy, which means that each member 
of the dominant oligopoly must be aware that highly com petitive action on its part designed to increase its market share would 
provoke identical action by the others, so that it would derive no benefit from its initiative (see, to that effect, Gencor v Commission, 
paragraph 276);”
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facilitating or hindering tacit collusion in this paper, since I do not have data on either inventories or 
production capacities. I do so while noting that it is nonetheless possible tha t there is an im portant 
role for capacity constraints, perhaps resulting from the shortage of silicon (used to manufacture 
processors), processors themselves, or other components, such as memory and hard disks.
Finally, I note the issue of future market growth can be relevant to an evaluation of the likelihood 
of tacit collusion in an industry. At the end of the period of the dataset, the ‘perfect storm ’ in the 
IT  industry led many observers to believe tha t the market for servers was expected to shrink. In fact, 
research by G artner Group in August 2001 argued th a t companies had overspent $ lbn  on application 
server technology since 1998.25 Their report estimated tha t an additional $2bn was expected to be 
overspent in the following two years, and recommended tha t companies be cautious when acquiring 
server technology, pointing out that application server vendors were encouraging customers to purchase 
higher-end technology that they did not need.
3.3.2 The Benchm ark Model
In this section, I define the framework used for exploring internal stability of a tacitly colluding group 
of oligopolists. For the most part, the framework is exactly tha t developed by Friedman (1971) and 
familiar to all students of industrial organization since tha t time.26 I have, of course, had to generalize 
it appropriately to allow for differentiated products and multi-product firms. Readers familiar with 
unilateral effects merger simulation will also recognize considerable overlap with the framework typi­
cally examined in tha t literature, a fact tha t I view as a considerable strength of the approach I am 
suggesting.
3.3.2.1 The Stage Game
I begin by studying the stage-game of the dynamic model. The stage game is simply a standard 
differentiated product Bertrand pricing game, identical to tha t used in the unilateral effects merger 
simulation literature by Werden and Froeb (1994), Berry (1994), Hausman et al (1994), Berry, Levin- 
sohn and Pakes (1995) and Nevo (2002). Specifically, I suppose the existence of J  products in the 
market of interest and study the pricing game wherein each firm f  of the F  active ones produces a
25 See http://w w w .gartner.com /5_about/press_releases/2001/pr20010820b .htm l.
26The model builds upon a vast literature in the last four decades. Notable contributions to the literature of repeated games 
include Abreu (1986), who studies symmetric Cournot repeated games, and Brock and Scheinkman (1985) and Lambson (1987), 
who investigate symmetric Bertrand repeated games. Davidson and Deneckere (1984) study how mergers impact collusion using 
trigger strategies and exogenous market sharing rules, starting from a setting with symmetric capacities and Bertrand competition.
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subset of products, 3?/ C {1,..., J} , and chooses the prices of those products to maximize their profits:
, , E te _ ci ) DAp)
s.t. Dj(p) ^  o , j e S /
Pj ^  o , j e % f
where Cj is the marginal cost of product j , assumed constant. Provided equilibrium prices of all goods 
in the market are positive and all goods are sold in positive quantities as is universally assumed in the 
existing empirical literature (and so the constraints for this program do not bind in equilibrium), the 
first-order conditions are given by:
+  E  -  ci)  =  0
Pk
I now introduce the ‘ownership m atrix’ which, for every product in the market, assigns the firm
producing it. Define the m atrix A of dimension J  by J  and typical element
A jk = l{both  j  and k produced by the same firm, j , k  = 1,..., J}
where 1{.} is the indicator function. Notice tha t changing ownership structure in merger simulations 
amounts to changing this ownership indicator m atrix — in particular, a monopoly is denoted by setting 
every element of A equal to one. Using the ownership indicators, the firm’s first order condition may 
be simply rewritten as:
D k(p) +  E  A -  ci)  =  0,fc =  1, J
The (implicit) solution to  this set of equations, pNE = { p iE, . . . ,p jE), provides the prices at which
each firm is maximizing its profits given the prices of others, and hence is the Nash equilibrium price 
to the stage game. Notice tha t there is one of these first-order conditions from firm / ’s objective 
function for every k 6 $Sf. Since every product is owned by some firm, I obtain a total of J  first-order 
conditions, one for every product provided each firm chooses its prices to  maximize its own profits.
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3.3.2.2 The Repeated Game
I now consider the above analysis as a stage game within the broader context of an infinitely repeated 
game. Following the repeated game literature, each firm is assumed to maximize its net present value 
of profits, and I require tha t at each point in the game tree the firm makes choices which are optimal 
given tha t it reached th a t node of the game tree, so tha t I study sub-game perfect equilibria of the 
repeated game27.
The repeated game literature has developed a considerable range of possible punishment mecha­
nisms, including ‘simple penal codes’, as presented in Abreu (1988), and optimal punishment mecha­
nisms a la Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990). While such punishment mechanisms may well have 
a role in the analysis of tacit co-operation, I begin with the simple approach, suggested by Friedman 
(1971), of Nash reversion, which has a number of desirable properties. First, Abreu (1988, Theorem 
5) shows tha t simple strategies - a constant sequence of the same static Nash equilibrium - suffice 
to achieve any feasible subgame-perfect equilibrium payoff. Second, if any deviation is followed by 
a Nash reversion, the punishments are automatically ensured to be credible (Friedman, 1971). How­
ever, Nash reversion is usually not the most severe punishment to defection - this happens only if the 
Nash equilibrium of the stage game coincides with the minmax payoffs, as in my setting. However, 
understanding Nash reversion appears likely to  be a useful and tractable benchmark, leaving more 
sophisticated forms of punishment for further research.
As in Friedman, I consider the incentives to collude or defect when each player adopts grim strategies 
and consider the sustainability of a tacitly collusive equilibrium. To do so, I introduce the following 
notation. Denote the one period Nash equilibrium payoffs to firm /  as tt^ e  and the one period returns 
to collusion by firm /  as 7r^o/z. Similarly denote the one period gain to firm /  from defection when all 
other firms are playing collusively as 7r^e^.
A defector, when rivals are playing grim strategies, earns his one period defection payoff and then 
subsequently receives only his Nash equilibrium profits. Thus, the net anticipated return to defection 
today for firm /  is
while her payoff to collusion today and in all subsequent periods given tha t rivals continue to collude
is
- C o l l
Vfc °“ (6f ) =  j J - j -
27See Selten (1965).
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Hence, firm /  has no incentive to deviate from collusive pricing provided that:
7rColl s
I ^  >  * ? '  + t 5 7 ' f  = 1' - ' F
In  order to examine the incentives to collude using grim strategies, I must therefore consider the 
returns achieved by each firm in the three pricing scenarios -  ‘Collusion’, ‘Nash equilibrium pricing’ 
and ‘defection’. Since I discussed above how to compute Nash equilibrium and (perfect) collusion 
profits, it remains to show how to calculate the payoff to defection.
Is is worth mentioning tha t the only components in this equation tha t are not evaluated in a 
unilateral effects merger simulation are (i) the payoff to defection and (ii) the discount factor
6 f .  The former, like the Nash and collusive equilibrium payoffs, depends directly on the nature of the 
static  profit function for each firm and therefore may be easily calculated using the methodologies 
developed for the analysis of data  generated by static pricing games, as I detail below.
These F  incentive compatibility constraints play the key role in defining the set of situations in which 
tacit collusion is individually rational for each firm and hence feasible. Depending on the parameters 
of interest, one may wish to consider tha t these inequalities define a set of discount factors, a set of 
dem and and cost conditions or, alternatively, a set of collusive prices -  which, as we shall see, may or 
may not be the perfectly collusive prices we associate with maximizing industry profits.
In an antitrust case, the discount factor could usually be taken from internal documents specifying 
the companies required rate of return. Alternatively, if companies are listed, an asset pricing model 
could be used to infer an appropriate discount rate for payoffs. Thirdly, and more closely paralleling the 
theoretical literature, I can report the range of discount factors for which collusion could be sustained 
under any given industry structure. ,
3.3.2.3 The Payoff to Defection
Following the theoretical literature on repeated games, I define the payoff to defection to firm /  as 
the maximum amount of profits tha t could be achieved given its rivals’ prices (ie., treating them as 
fixed). In the case most directly of interest, where firm /  is deciding whether or not to defect from the 
collusive (industry profit maximizing) tacit agreement, other firms will be choosing their prices to be 
the collusive prices, and so the static payoff to firm /  when defecting is:
i r f ef := max V '  (pj -  C j ) D j ( p p C o U )
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s.t. Dj{pr pP0f11) ^  oj e S f  
Pj ^  0 J e S f
For the case of linear demand equations, this non-linear maximization problem is a quadratic objective 
function subject to linear constraints and so is easy to solve, even for large problems, using standard 
methods. Generally, it must be solved numerically but even in those cases it is a simpler mathematical 
object to evaluate than the Nash Equilibrium computed in unilateral effects merger simulations, since it 
involves only an optimization: the calculation of a ‘defection’ price simply involves finding the location 
on the deviating firms’ best response function at the point where i t’s rivals are charging collusive 
prices.
3.3.3 Extensions
3.3.3.1 Competitive Fringe
To study the effects of a competitive fringe, suppose the existence of Fdf dominant firms and Fcf  
firms constituting a competitive fringe, so that the total number of firms in the market is given by 
F  = Fdf + Fcf.  Assume also tha t there are two subsets of products, C {1,..., J^/} and S c/  C 
{Jdf+h Jdf+cf} where Jdf +  Jcf  — J , which owned by, respectively, the dominant firms and the 
competitive fringe and partition the price vector into components corresponding to dominant firms 
and the competitive fringe, p  =  (p^ 1 ,pcf ' ) ' . In this modified pricing game, the competitive fringe faces 
a flat demand curve, so tha t the solution to the problem
“ , E  (Pj -  ci ) DM
s.t. Dj(p) ^  O j j e S c f  
Pj ^  0, j  € S c/
and the associated first-order condition,
Dkip) +  dDd p ^  (Pj ~  Cj>} = 0’k e  ^ cf
is given by
3.3. Evaluating the Incentives to Collude 120
resulting in the zero-profit condition for this subset of firms. For the remaining Fdf dominant firms, 
the first-order condition is obtained in a similar way, but the demand curve faced by those firms is 
downward-sloping, so
Dk(p)  +  ^ 2  d~ r )r^  f e  ci )  =  ° ’ 6 %
j ^ d f  Pk
For a firm /  among the dominant firms, the static defection profits are obtained as the solution to 
the problem
irIj>ef := max V '  (p, -  c3)DJ(pdf ,pdff o11) 
s.t. Di(/f_r p V f°u) > 0,j  e  3 /
Pj > 0, j £ Qf
whereby the defecting firm f  only takes into account the prices set by the other dominant firms 
operating in the market, denoted by pjfp which are assumed to be collusion prices. It then follows 
that, among the remaining Fdf dominant firms, each firm /  faces an incentive-compatibility constraint 
similar to the ones in the standard model, whereby it has no incentive to deviate from collusive pricing 
provided that:
V f M (Sf) >  VjPe/(5/ ), f  =  l . . . ,F df
7 r ^ ° U  D p  f
r F t,  >
3.3.3.2 Partial Coalitions
The second approach I take is to consider what happens when the number of firms tha t tacitly 
cooperate is fewer than the full set of firms in the industry. T hat is, I suppose tha t a number of 
firms remain outside the tacitly cooperating coalition of firms so tha t the tacitly cooperating firms 
constitute only a partial coalition. I have considered tha t full cooperation would involve collusive prices 
that maximize industry profits, the profits tha t would result if every product were under the ownership 
of one firm. In this case, I assume tha t tacitly co-operative profits are those tha t result from the Nash 
equilibrium outcome that would have occurred if only all members of the coalition had merged. Doing 
so allows us to (i) consider what happens to the incentive compatibility of tacitly cooperating as the 
number of tacitly cooperating firms falls and (ii) consider what happens to the incentive to tacitly 
collude of those outside the tacitly collusive arrangement. This case is similar to tha t provided by 
the competitive fringe, except tha t those firms not tacitly cooperating are allowed to optimally (but
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statically) exploit market power endowed by the actions of the cartel. The problem can be stated as 
follows. Assume the existence of Fc firms taking part in the cartel and Fnc firms not taking part in the 
cartel and acting strategically, so tha t the total number of firms in the market is given by F  = Fc +  Fnc. 
Assume also th a t there are two subsets of products, S c C {1,..., J c } and S nc C {J c+1, •••, J c + n c }  where 
J c  +  J n c  =  J ,  which is owned by, respectively, the cartel and non-cartel firms. Now each firm faces the 
first order condition
J
D k(p) +  £  A ~ c j )  =  0 , k  = 1, J
where the ownership matrix now reflects the existence of a subset of firms taking part in the cartel ie. 
A j k  takes value one not only if products i  and j  are produced by the same firm, but also if i  and j  
belong to S c, the set of products produced by the cartel.
To define the defection profits I partition the price vector as p = (pc/,p nc/)/, for cartel and non-cartel 
firms, respectively. The static defection profits are now obtained as the solution to the problem
^  := r ~  c3)Dj(pCf ’PCl Cf° lliPnC)- J  -  j  -
> 0 , j € 9 /
Pj ^  O j e & f
with /  denoting the defecting firm and — /  the other firms constituting the cartel. The corresponding 
set incentive-compatibility constraints is given by
> VfDef(Sf ), /  =  ! . . ,  Fc
7rColl X srrNE
f  ^  D o f
1 . S f  >
3.3.3.3 Multimarket Contact
If firms interact repeatedly, not only over time but also across M  > 1 markets, be it geographical mar­
kets or market niches, collusion is more likely to happen (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990). Essentially, 
multimarket contact pools the incentive-compatibility constraints of the different markets where firms 
interact.
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In the standard model, I define as, respectively, the defection, collusion and Nash
static profits and 6 f iTn as the discount factor28 of firm /  operating in market m, I can define the value 
functions (6 f )  and V f ' f f  (<£/) as the sums across markets of the value functions to defection and 
collusion:
vSfdt) =
m m 1 ° f ’m
- C o l l
v ? j ? a f ) =  £ « * / . » ) = E r * £ -^ ^ L u/,m771 771 J  ’
The multimarket incentive-compatibility constraint for collusion for firm /  then reads
To study the effects of a competitive fringe coupled with multimarket contact, consider a firm f  
belonging to the subset of dominant firms and define ? r^ f , as, respectively, the defection,
collusion and Nash static profits and 5fjTn as the discount factor of dominant firm /  operating in 
market m. I can then define the value functions (8 f )  and VfffiQ .f)  35 the sums across markets 
of the value functions to defection and collusion:
f i r  71-N E
= E O v o  = E +r r f  ■ f  = L- F«
TTl 771 ^ ’
_ Coll
v m \ s } ) = E KSf(«/.-) = E ^
^  _  1 U /.m77i  m  J 1
and tie multimarket incentive-compatibility constraint for collusion for dominant firm /  then reads
> Vf% f (Sf ), f  = 1 ...,Fis
To study the effects of the cartel coupled with multimarket contact, consider a firm /  belonging to 
the  cartel and define as> respectively, the defection, collusion and Nash static profits
and 5f>m as the discount factor of firm /  of the cartel operating in market m. I can then define the 
valuefunctions V (6 f ) and V ^ l(5f) as the sums across markets of the value functions to defection
28'Wfallow for different discount factors across markets for the sake of generality, since firms might have different discount rates
for <e.g.emerging vis-a-vis developed markets.
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and collusion:
rN EX ,  -p/Vj
v ,% % ) = X O*/.™) = E /=!-.«
m m 1 °f,™
Coll
y fcM % )  =  E v^ ,(i/."*) =  E 7 ^ - /  = 1- ’-R-L LJ fro.
and the multimarket incentive-compatibility constraint for collusion for each firm /  taking part in the 
cartel reads
rC o l l(  r \  T/ D e f  I
3.4 Data
I have used data from the International D ata Corporation’s (IDC) Quarterly tracker database.29 This 
enables us to analyze the evolution of price, revenue and unit sold of every server since the first 
quarter of 1996 through the first quarter of 2001 in three major regions (USA, Western Europe, 
Japan). In principle IDC covers the population of models. It gathers revenue and characteristics data 
from vendors in all the main regions and then cross checks the company totals with global HQs and 
its own customer surveys. Transaction prices (called “street prices” by IDC) are also estimated on a 
region-specific, quarterly, model-by-model basis based on discussions with industry participants. These 
prices take into account the various discounts offered off the list price as well as trade-ins.
Looking in a cross section I define an observation in a region as a vendor-family-modeloperating 
system. A model (I use model and brand interchangeably) is distinguished within a family (with 
some grouping). So a typical example would be Sun Microsystem’s (vendor) Ultra-Enterprise (family) 
1000HE series (model) running UNIX (OS). There are 33 separately identified vendors most of whom 
will have only two or three families (IBM has the most models and seventeen individual “families” ).
One obvious concern is tha t the IDC data only has basic model characteristics. To address this 
substantial time was invested in collecting extra data on server characteristics and matching them 
into the IDC data. The IDC Quarterly Tracker was used as my “population” and matched in new 
server characteristics by name and by time period. Several sources were used to obtain these data, 
including the trade publication Datasources, company web pages, back issues of computer magazines 
and their web pages and major resellers. The final dataset covered 60% of the IDC models and over 
80% of the revenues of all servers.
29 7th June 2001 version. For a full description of this database and the recent evolution of the market see IDC (1998,2000b)
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The characteristics I have include the number of rack slots, the chip architecture (RISC, CISC or 
IA32), motherboard type (e.g. Symmetric Parallel Processing - SMP, Massively Parallel Processing - 
M PP), the types of operating system used (Windows, UNIX, Netware, OS390/OS400, VMS, Linux 
and others), vendor dummies and , whether the system is rack-optimised.30
I also collected GDP, exchange rate, consumer price and P P P  information from the OECD. Input 
cost indices were collected from various sources. Input prices for servers include the FRB’s (Federal 
Reserve Board) quality adjusted price index for semi-conductor chips (Aizorbe, 2000), BLS (Bureau 
of Labor Statistics) quality adjusted price indices for hard disk drives and other secondary electronic 
input products. All prices are in 1996 US dollars.31
Raw prices have fallen rapidly among servers (at about 15% per annum) and quality has improved 
dramatically. IBM, Compaq, HP, and Sun Microsystems have been the leading server hardware vendors 
throughout my sample period. Dell Computers entered in late 1995 and has grown dramatically to 
also be a major player by the end of the period.
I have also used stock market and balance sheet data to compute the firms’ discount factors. The 
former are from CRSP and COMPUSTAT Global, whereas the la tter are from COMPUSTAT Global, 
as well as interest rate data from the Bank of Japan. Finally, I also use the SMB, HML and momentum 
factors from Ken French’s webpage32.
3.5 Model Implementation
To implement the model, I need to estimate a set of incentive-compatibility constraints. The ingredients 
needed for that are
1. A demand model to calculate the firms’ static profit functions under alternative ownership 
schemes; and
2. An asset pricing model to obtain the firms’ discount rates.
Intuitively, the demand model chooses parameter values such tha t the distance between model-based 
(coming from utility maximization - see below) and observed market shares is minimized - see Berry 
(1994) for a thorough discussion. Since price is (potentially) endogenous, instrumental variable tech­
30 Rack-mounted servers are designed to fit into nineteen inch racks. They allow multiple machines to be clustered or managed in 
a single location.
31 The US CPI inflation rate from January/1996 to Decem ber/2007 is 36.03%, whereas the one from March/2001 to Decem ber/2007  
is 19.20%.
32 Available from http://m ba.tuck.dartm outh.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/D ata_L ibrary/f-f_factors.htm l
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niques whithin a GMM framework are employed; computation of the asset pricing model is standard, 
using regression techniques.
To compute the profit functions I also need estimates of the marginal costs of each product, and 
I obtain those using a standard technique in tha t I back out marginal costs from pre-merger prices. 
Simply put, one assumes tha t the first-order condition of the firm’s problem holds, so tha t the only 
unknowns are the marginal costs of the products in the market, for which the equation is solved for.33
In what follows I describe the demand model, the identification strategy and the calculation of 
discount factors.
3.5.1 Demand Estimation
My random-coefficients logit model follows Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995, BLP hereafter), whereby 
one starts with a microeconomic model of rational behaviour for individual consumers which is then 
aggregated, generating the (aggregate) market demands. Individual heterogeneity here is model in a 
way not to restrict substitution patterns a priori, so tha t the resulting cross-product elasticities are 
obtained as a result of their distance in characteristic space - as opposed to ,eg., the standard logit 
specification.
The conditional indirect utility u of individual i when consuming product j  from market m  is given 
by
K
U i j m  — ^   ^ “b ^ i j m  5 2 = l , . . . , / ; j '  =  l , . . . , e / ; 77 l = l , . . . ,  M
k —1
where Xjmk are observed product characteristics such as price, memory, speed and storage, repre­
sent unobserved (by the econometrician) product characteristics, assumed observed by all consumers. 
The consumer-specific coefficients can be decomposed as (3ik = Xk +  o-'kVi, where Xk measures the im­
pact of characteristic k on mean utility, the unobservable consumer attributes are denoted by , the 
vector o k measures the impact of unobservable consumer attributes on characteristic k. Finally, Eijmt 
is an individual and option-specific idiosyncratic component of preferences, assumed to be a mean 
zero Type I Extreme Value random variable independent from both the consumer attributes and the 
product characteristics.
The specification of the demand system is completed with the introduction of an outside good, since 
some consumers decide not to  buy any server. The conditional indirect utility from the outside option 
is:
u i0  =  £ 0m  +  ° 0 v i  +  £ iO
33 Recall that pre-merger prices are observed in the data, so marginal costs would be the only unknowns in this system of equations.
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where £jo is a mean zero individual market and time specific idiosyncratic term and is an individual 
specific component reflecting heterogeneity in tastes.
MoTe generally34, the utility of consumer i when consuming product j  is given by
Uij =  u { x j j  =  0 ,1 ,..., J
where xj  is a vector of observable (by the econometrician) produt characteristics, pj  is the price 
of product j  (kept separate from the other ones given its endogeneity), V{ represents consumer-level 
heterogeneity, J  is the number of available products and 6 is the parameter vector of interest, measuring 
the im pact of preferences on the utility of consumers. The subset of preferences leading to the choice 
of product j  is given by
Aj{9)  = {vi : > Uik, for all i, and for k ^  j }
and ties are assumed to have zero probability.
Intuitively, once Aj (6)  is determined for every product j  =  1,..., J,  one has to count the probability 
th a t a product is chosen, so that the market shares can be computed. Letting f ( v ) be the distribution 
of preferences in the population, the choice probabilities, which coincide with the model-generated 
market shares (assuming /( .)  is correctly specified) are given by
sj ( x ,P',0) = f  f(v)d(v)
J  v € A j  (0)
where the integral is typically computed using simulation, after computing the vector of model­
generated market shares, one has to solve a system relating model-generated and observed market 
shares, sobs = s(£, ...;0). In general, this system has no closed-form solution, so numerical methods 
have to be deployed. Fortunately, the solution has been shown to exist and is a unique — this is the 
famous contraction mapping result, see Berry (1994) and BLP (1995).
The reader will note th a t this is a demand specification which (i) treats each individual server 
acquisition as a separate choice (see, for example, Hendel, 1999) and (ii) abstracts away from explicitly 
modeling inter-temporal substitution (see, for example, Nevo and Hendel (2006) and Gowrisankaran 
and Rysman (2005) for an alternative approach). On the first point, I do note th a t many servers are 
purchased by businesses and this may therefore potentially be a strong assumption. However, since I 
have no information about the numbers of servers purchased by purchaser, and little indication tha t
34I now follow BLP (1995) closely.
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such effects ultimately make the aggregate sales of servers ‘lumpy’ in the way tha t might concern us, 
I do mot think the approach unreasonable. On the second issue of intertemporal substitution, again 
the approach seems not unreasonable in light of the relatively short lives of computers, although 
abstracting in this way clearly represents a pragmatic modeling approximation to actual consumer 
choice behaviour in the industry. More general demand specifications could certainly be possible in 
future work and may even, in fact, have im portant implications for the incentives faced by oligopolists.
3.5.2 Identification Strategy
Following the literature I treat price as endogenous in the demand specification and this section 
describes the identification strategy for demand. First, I note that there is considerable variation in 
prices in the dataset. Sales prices have fallen rapidly for servers (at about 15% per annum) and quality 
has improved dramatically. To estimate my model, besides the exogenous characteristics, I use four 
classes of instruments, for a given product in a given regional market (US, Japan and Western Europe). 
The first class were the so called "Hausman instruments", proposed by Hausman, Leonard and Zona 
(1994) and consisting of prices of a product in other regions instrumenting its price in a given region.
The second was the class of "Distance instruments", where one uses the price of the closest product 
with respect to  a certain characteristic as the instrument of the price of a given product; within this 
category, I consider the prices of (i) upper neighbours; (ii) lower neighbours; and (iii) the average 
between upper and lower neighbours considering characteristics such as CPU capacities and number 
of CPUs. Their justification comes from the fact that, when setting the price of a given product, firms 
takes into account the characteristics of the competing products in the market — for instance, firms 
spend considerable amounts on market research, surveys and conjoint analysis studies. For illustration, 
consider a server characteristic such as memory: when setting the price of a (new) product, the firm 
looks at the products in the market and sets its price taking into account the prices of products 
with memory capacities similar to the one of the product it is launching ie. its product’s immediate 
neighbours. In particular, it looks at the memory capacities of its lower quality and higher quality 
neighbours, from which the product is expected to suffer more intense competition.
The third was the class of "BLP instruments" (following BLP, 1995), a set of polynomial basis 
functions of exogenous variables exploiting the three-way panel structure of the data, consisting of the 
number of firms operating in the market, the number of other products of the same firm and the sum 
of characteristics of products produced by rival firms, firms; for the other two regional markets, this 
class consists of the number of other products of the same firm and the sum of characteristics of rival 
firms.
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Finally, I also consider a class of instruments also used in Ivaldi and Lorincz (2005), following 
Bresnahan, Stern and Trajtenberg (1997) in their study of the PC market and which can be seen as a 
generalization of the BLP instruments. Besides using the exogenous characteristics of the products, I 
use a set of polynomial basis functions of exogenous variables within a group and/or subgroup.35 For 
the same market, I calculate the number of other products of the same firm and the number of firms 
in tthe same group; and the number of other products of the same producer in the same group and 
sam e subgroup. From the other two regional markets, I calculate the number of rival firms producing 
products in the same group; and the number of rivals producing products in the same group and same 
subgroup. BST instruments implicitly assume a form of localized competition among products, and 
th is  seems consistent with anecdotal evidence from the server industry, characterized by a number of 
m arket niches and highly heterogeneous products.
3.5.3 Estimating Discount Factors
In th is section I detail how to compute the discount factors used to calculate the net present value of 
th e  profits of a firm:
*>(<*/) =  *7 +  <5/71-/ +  s h f  +  ••• =
In  an antitrust case, the discount factor could be taken from internal documents specifying the 
firms’ discount rate. An alternative way of treating discount factors, which most close parallels the 
theoretical literature, is to calculate the range of discount factors for which collusion could be sustained 
under any given industry structure. Here, however, I make use of the fact tha t the firms of interest 
are listed and rely on asset pricing models to infer an appropriate discount rate for payoffs. In the 
empirical implementation of the model I also compare the ’collusion threshold’ of the discount rate to 
the ones obtained using stock market data.
Our object of interest will be the cost of capital (or discount rate) r f  of firm / ,  related to the 
discount factor in the following way:
If a firm faces no risk and has free access to the financial markets, the discount rate corresponds to 
the market interest rate. In practice, however, firms are risky and issue sock and debt to finance their 
projects, so the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) takes the cost of equity and the (after-tax)
35 Group refers to processor architecture and can take on the following: UP, SMP and MPP, for uni-processor, symmetric multi­
processor, and massively parallel processing, respectively. Sub-group refers to operating system s used; these are Linux, Netware, 
W indows N T , IBM OS400, IBM OS 390, VMS, Unix, Other.
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cost of debt into account, weighted by the proportion of debt and equity in the value of the firm:
r )  =  v (1 -  T)r / +  f 'r s
where D / V  and E j V  are, respectively, the ratio of debt and equity to the value of the firm, r‘j  is the 
cost of debt, r^ is the cost of equity and r  is the marginal corporate tax rate. In practice, D  is the 
book-value of debt, E  is the market value of equity (number of shares outstanding times share price), 
and V  = E  +  D.
The cost of debt r^ is obtained as the ratio between interest expenses over debt for a given firm, 
whereas the cost of equity is obtained from an asset pricing model . The CAPM is an asset pricing 
model according to which a stock’s systematic risk is measured by its beta, the slope of the regression 
of excess stock returns on excess market returns:
E (r f  -  r) =  p f  x E {rM -  r)
where r f  is the return of the stock of firm / ,  r is the risk-free rate and tm  is the return of the market 
portfolio. Asset pricing models such as the CAPM provide the expected rate of return of the firms’ 
stocks. If investors expect a given rate of return from the stock of a firm, the cost of capital rule says 
tha t the firm should have been using the same discount rate to compute the net present value of its 
projects36. The corresponding discount rate of asset /  is then given by
ref  := E( r f ) = r +  /3f  x E (rM ~  r)
The CAPM does not, however, price other relevant risk factors. In other terms, there are empirical 
regularities in asset returns which the CAPM is unable to capture, such as the fact tha t stocks
from small companies tend to outperform stocks of large ones. Fama and French (1993) propose to
incorporate factors associated with size and book-to-market, resulting in asset pricing models with 
superior performance when compared to the CAPM. Their model reads:
E (r f  -  r) = fif E (rM -  r) +  s f r S M B  +  h f rHML
where r $ M B  and t h m l  are returns to, respectively, the S M B  (Small-Minus-Big) and the H M L  (High- 
Minus-Low) factors. Carhart (1997) extends the Fama-French model by adding a fourth factor tha t
36 See Berk and DeMarzo (2007) for an introduction to capital budgeting.
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captures the Jegadeesh and Titm an (1993) momentum anomaly. The resulting model (referred to as 
FFM , for Fama-French plus Momentum) has four risk factors and reads
E (r f  — r) — (3f E (rM -  r) +  s f r S M B  +  h f r H M L  +  rnf r MOM 
The cost of equity obtained from the general FFM model then reads:
r ef  := E( r f ) = r +  (3f E (rM ~  r) +  sf r SMB +  hf r HML +  rnf r MOM
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Demand Estimation
3.6.1.1 Market Segments
Although market research companies and regulators consider different market segments, these are 
defined in an informal way, typically involving price thresholds. IDC, for instance, defines the volume 
market segment as the one constituted of servers priced below $25,000, the mid-range segment as the 
one with servers priced between $25,000 and $500,000, and the high-end segment as the one with 
servers priced above $500,000. In a number of rulings, including the Compaq-DEC, Fujitsu-Siemens 
and the HP-Compaq ones, the DG Competition delineated the server markets on the basis of price 
bands into separate markets for entry-level servers (below $100,000), medium level servers ($100,000 
-  $999,999) and large servers (above $1,000,000).
Recently, however, Ivaldi and Lorincz (2005) investigated the server market and found evidence 
of many sub-segments within the volume segment using both the traditional SSNIP test and their 
alternative FERM one. Based on their analysis, I focus on two market segments, namely tha t consisting 
of servers priced below $4,000 and the one consisting of servers priced between $4,001 and $10,000, 
with 5,537 and 8,799 observations, respectively.37
Only four players — Compaq, Dell, HP and IBM — have market shares above 1% in all three 
regions in the 0-4 market segment (all of them happen to have more than 5%), and the associated 
C4 concentration ratios are 51%, 69%, and 61.5% for US, EU and Japan, respectively. In the 4-10
37Ivaldi and Lorincz (2006) studied the US, European and Japanese markets separately conducting two versions of the SSNIP 
test (5% and 10%) and their FERM test (10% and 15%). The 10% SSNIP and 15% FERM tests suggested the same first price 
threshold at USD 4,000 (the 5% SSNIP test suggested USD 3,000 for Japan and the 10% FERM test suggested USD 3,000 for the 
US). The 10% SSNIP test also suggested a second price threshold of USD 10,000 for both the US and Europe, and USD 9,000 for 
Japan. W hen it comes to the following price thresholds, the methods disagree markedly: the 10% SSNIP test suggests a threshold 
at USD lm n for all three regions, but the 15% FERM test suggests a total of 5 market segments for the US and 6 for both the EU 
and Japan, but the threshold are markedly different. We thus decided to consider a market segment with servers priced below USD 
4,000 and another with servers priced between USD 4,000 and USD 10,000. (We refer to these market segments as 0-4 and 4-10, 
respectively, in the text.)
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segment, only five players — the ones above plus Sun — have market shares above 1 % in all three 
regions, but only three of them command more than 5% of market share in all three regions (Compaq, 
Dell and IBM). The associated C4 and C5 concentration ratios are, respectively, 8 8 %, 82%, 39% and 
94%, 8 6 %, 46% for US, EU and Japan, suggesting a much higher concentration than in the 0-4 segment.
3.6.1.2 Demand Estimates
O ther than price, I consider characteristics such as CPU capacity ("C PU _C A P"), number of CPUs 
( "CPU_COUNT"), the number of extra racks available in the server ("UR", an im portant measure of 
scalability), and a dummy indicating whether the server is rack-optimized ("RACK"). I also consider 
the interaction of (i) the number of extra racks available in the server, CPU architecture fixed-effects 
(CISC, RISC or IA32, for Intel 32-bit architecture), and operating system fixed-effects (Linux, Netware, 
Windows NT, Openvms, OS/400, Unix, Other) with (ii) processor architecture (UP for uniprocessor, 
SMP for symmetric multi-processor, M PP for massive multi-parallel processor), region (US, EU, JP), 
and time fixed-effects. Finally, I also interact firms and regions with time fixed-effects. The variety 
of interaction terms allow flexibility enough to distinguish, for instance, the effects of the number of 
extra racks (also CPU architecture and operating system) over time for uni-processors and symmetric 
multi-processors separately; and how the penetration of different firms in different regions evolves over 
time eg. the evolution of the Japanese players in Japan (or Fujitsu in Japan and Fujitsu-Siemens 
in Europe) given the advances of Dell. Although I considered variables such as number of CPUs and 
their capacities in early specifications, they were found to be either insignificant or collinear with other 
characteristics, thus dropped from the estimation.
I consider four classes of instruments to account for price endogeneity. These were Hausman instru­
ments, distance instruments, BLP instruments and BST instruments. The Hausman, BLP and BST 
instruments for the 0-4 segment are compared in Table 3.3, which shows the sensitivity of the results 
to the choice of instruments. The BLP instruments are the only to perform well, delivering a negative 
and significant price coefficient (/3price) and highly elastic own price effects. For the 4-10 segment, 
however, the only to perform well are the BST ones, tha t also deliver highly elastic own price affects, 
albeit of smaller magnitude than those of the 0-4 segment — see Table 3.3. The intuition for having 
different instruments working for different price intervals has to do with the increased complexity and 
differentiation of servers as their prices increase: low-end servers are fairly standardized, undifferenti­
ated, products, since there are less options of processor type, architecture, number of processors, OS 
etc a vendor can use when designing and building such a model. In practice, this will make the BST 
instruments (also used by Ivaldi and Lorincz, 2005), which are based on interactions between variables
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such as processor type (dummies for uni-processor, symmetric multi processing and multi-parallel 
processing, for instance) tend to collapse and become collinear with the intercept.
Based on the findings for the standard logit specifications, I estimate a number of random coefficients 
logit models. For each of the price segments considered, I estimate demand models using BLP and 
BST instruments for the 0-4 and 4-10 price segments, respectively, and random draws generated by a 
Lognormal distribution, which has positive support and generates only negative own price elasticities. 
In all cases reported, first-stage regression of price on the instruments were found to have F-statistics 
significant at the one percent level.
For the 0-4 price segment, as reported in the last column of Table 3.3, the price coefficients are 
negative and significant, but not the price dispersion coefficient (crprice), which makes the random- 
coefficients logit collapse into the standard logit model, a finding tha t suggests tha t consumers care 
equally about price for products within this segment. The own price elasticities for the BLP-LN 
specification, with BLP instruments and lognormal random draws, are within the range between -11 
and -40 (-13 to -40 in the US, -17 to -40 in the EU and -11 and -40 in Japan), whereas average ones 
are around -30 and median ones around -31.
As in the results for the 0-4 segment, the dispersion coefficient for price was not significant for the 
4-10 segment — see Table 3.3. The elasticities obtained for this market segment were somewhat lower, 
with medians between -21 and -23, but still extremely high.
For the 0-4 segment, for instance, the results show the downward time trend for UP (uni-processor) 
motherboards, whereas for the 4-10 segment one can observe an overall positive time effect of SMP 
and especially M PP motherboards coupled with the CISC architecture in contrast with the negative 
effects of the RISC architecture when interacted to the same variables. The impact of both UP and 
SMP motherboards over time turns from positive to negative during the sample for the 4-10 market 
segment, but this change not only occurs first, but is also more dramatic for the former.
3.6.2 Discount Factors
I calculated the discount factors using balance sheet and asset return data. Whenever the calculations 
returned discount factors greater than one, I inputed discount factors using the firm country’s term 
structure of interest rates and the one-year holding period as benchmarks.
Generally speaking, larger firms are expected to have lower betas, thus higher discount factors, due 
to smaller cost of capital and, by-and-large, this is what happens for US companies, as reported in 
Table 3.4. IBM, for instance, has a lower cost of capital than Dell, resulting in discount factors of 0.970 
and 0.950, respectively.
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TABLE 3.3. Results for Alternative Demand Specifications for the 0-4 Price Segment -  World Market
P a n e l A : 0 -4  S e g m e n t O LS
S ta n d a r d  L ogit 
H a u sm a n  B L P B S T
R C  L o g it  
B L P -L N
M ea n  p r ice 0.539
(3.158)
***
22.138
(3.543)
***
-1 3 .1 6 8
(-2 .2 6 2 )
**
5.547
(3.216)
***
-1 2 .1 8 9
(-2 .1 5 0 )
**
P r ice  D isp e r s io n 0.155
(0.010)
J -s ta t is t ic  p -v a lu e NA - - - -
100%  e la s t ic  o w n  p r ice  e ffec ts?  
M ed ia n  ow n  p r ice  e ffec ts  
E U  
U S  
J P
No No Yes
-3 1 .2 9 0
-3 0 .1 6 3
-3 2 .2 8 4
No Yes
-3 0 .9 1 7
-2 9 .8 0 4
-31 .9 2 1
P a n e l B : 4 -1 0  S e g m e n t O LS
S ta n d a r d  L og it 
H a u sm a n  B L P B S T
R C  L o g it  
B S T -L N
M ea n  p r ice -0 .0 7 9
(-1 .3 9 8 )
-0 .1 3 5
(0.233)
-1 .6 3 1
(-1 .4 3 4 )
-1 .8 7 7
(-2 .0 2 9 )
**
-3 .9 7 9
(-2 .8 7 2 )
***
P r ic e  D isp er s io n 0.978
(1.600)
J -s ta t is t ic  p -v a lu e NA - - - -
100%  e la s t ic  o w n  p r ice  e ffec ts? No No No Yes Yes
M ed ia n  o w n  p r ice  e ffe c ts  
E U  
U S  
J P
-1 0 .6 0 2
-9 .8 0 8
-1 1 .1 5 9
-2 2 .7 2 7
-2 1 .1 4 5
-2 3 .7 9 6
N o te :  The Table reports estim ates of the (mean) price coefficient of logit model, t-statistics (reported within brackets) and the 
p-value of the price coefficient and the J-statistic of overidentifying restrictions, whenever applicable. The last column displays 
results for a random-coefficients logit with BST instruments and Lognormal random draws. The symbols — (resp. *, **, ***) denote 
not-significant (resp. significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% significance level). It also reports whether 100% of the own price elasticities 
were elastic and, whenever this is the case, reports the median own price elasticity.
The results reported in Table 3.4 also show tha t American companies are those with the smallest 
discount factors, which corresponds to a higher cost of capital. The findings for Japan can be un­
derstood as a consequence of the years of economic stagnation in the Japanese economy during the 
1990s and early 2000s, when interest rates were kept at impressive low levels and market returns were 
consistently negative.
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TABLE 3.4. Discount Factors for Firms in the Server Industry
F irm D isc o u n t F actor
C o m p a q 0.967
D e ll 0.957
G a tew a y 0.962
H P 0.967
IB M 0.972
M icro n 0.963
N C R 0.971
S G I 0.976
S u n 0.959
U n isy s 0.971
F u jitsu 0.989
H ita c h i 0.989
M itsu b ish i 0.990
N E C 0.988
T o sh ib a 0.989
N o te :  The calculation of discount factors was performed as described in Section 5.3. The Appendix describes the calculations in 
detail.
3.6.3 Evaluating the Incentives to Collude
I now investigate whether there are incentives to collusion in the network server industry and whether 
they increase as a result of the HP-Compaq merger. Schematically, there are two cases to consider, 
depending on whether there was collusion before the merger. If there is no collusion prior to the merger, 
the question is whether the merger creates the incentives to collude. If, however, there is collusion prior 
to the merger, the question is whether the merger enhances the incentives to collude, following the 
decrease in the number of firms interacting in the market.
A typical structural merger analysis would detect little market power in both the 0-4 and 4-10 
price segments, as already hinted by the high elasticities obtained in the demand model. As Table 3.5 
reports, price-cost margins are less than, respectively, 0.05 and 0.10, so tha t the argument for blocking 
a meiger on the grounds of unilateral effects would be weak. Indeed, as reported in Table 3.6, even 
the piice changes resulting from a pre-merger Nash-Bertrand equilibrium to a post-merger collusive 
equilibrium would be at least weak, less than one and four percent for the 0-4 and 4-10 price segments, 
respectively, regardless of the geographical market.
The profit functions of the stage game for each region and market segment, reported in Table 3.7 
and 38 for the 0-4 and 4-10 segments, respectively, confirm the coexistence of a handful of big players 
interacting in several (regional and niche) markets as well as a number of small players, often operating 
in only one market. The static gains from defecting are extremely small — for instance, IBM and Dell 
woulc gain less than $20,000 in a quarter by defecting in each of the markets in the 0-4 segment.
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Moreover, the profit increases following the merger are modest, in tha t they increase about seven 
percent in the US from a pre-merger Nash equilibrium to a post-merger collusive equilibrium, and less 
than tha t for the remaining geographical markets — see Table 3.7.
Defecting does indeed become more attractive in the 4-10 price segment — now the static gains faced 
by IBM and Dell in the US and EU markets would be short of $lm n in a given quarter. Moreover, 
profit increases from a pre-merger Nash equilibrium to a post-merger collusive equilibrium are in the 
range 9-159o in the US, about 13% in the EU, and in the range 20-23% in Japan for the non-merging 
parties — see Table 3.8.
The abo\e analysis lacks the study of the incentives to colluding vis-a-vis defecting for each firm 
operating in a given market. In what follows, I empirically examine both the existence of incentives 
to collude and how they change following the HP-Compaq merger. In other terms, I investigate the 
sustainability of collusive equilibria by estimating a set of incentive-compatibility constraints and 
comparing, for each of the market participants, how the value function to colluding compares to  the 
one of defecting.
In my standard model, I evaluate the incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints to collusion considering 
price segments (0-4 and 4-10) and geographic markets (US, EU and Japan) separately. The next step is 
to assume tie  existence of a handful dominant firms coexisting with a competitive fringe; in what I call 
the CF model, the number of IC constraints in a given market equals the number of dominant firms. 
Finally, I cunsider the setting whereby every firm operating in the market has some market power, 
but only a small subset of them takes part in a cartel. For each case, I aggregate the IC constraints 
across geographic markets and also across both geographic markets and price segments in what I call 
the multimarket (MM) versions of the model.
3.6.3.1 Incentive Compatibility Constraints: The Benchmark Model
In what folbws, I investigate the sustainability of collusive equilibria by examining my estimated set of 
incentive-compatibility constraints and comparing, for each of the market participants, how the value 
function to colluding compares to tha t associated with the option of defecting. In this sub-section I 
examine tie benchmark model, while in later sections I examine how my benchmark results change as 
a result of (i) a competitive fringe, (ii) multi-market contact and (iii) coalitions of players.
In my benchmark model, I evaluate the incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints to collusion consid­
ering pricesegments (0-4 and 4-10) and geographic markets (US, EU and Japan) separately. Notably, 
I find tha t at discount factors calculated using each firms’ WACC, the net present value (NPV) from 
collusion it always greater than the NPV of defection. This result, tha t the returns to collusion are
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TABLE 3.5. Price-Cost Margins by Firm and Geographical Market
0-4  M a rk et S e g m e n t 4 -1 0  M a rk et S e g m e n t
F irm C o ll N a sh C o ll N a sh
P ane l  A: US
C o m p a q 0.039 0.035 0.077 0.050
H P 0.029 0.025 0.085 0.051
N E C 0.037 0.032 0.051 0.026
IB M 0.032 0.028 0.076 0.046
A S T 0.024 0.020 - -
D a ta  G en era l - - 0.047 0.024
D e ll 0.034 0.030 0.083 0.062
G a tew a y 0.049 0.042 - -
H ita ch i 0.038 0.032 - -
M icro n 0.045 0.039 - -
N C R - - 0.055 0.029
S G I 0.026 0.022 - -
Su n 0.032 0.027 0.063 0.035
T o sh ib a 0.034 0.029 0.085 0.049
U n isy s 0.026 0.022 - -
V A  L in u x 0.033 0.028 - -
Panel  B: E U
C o m p a q 0.040 0.036 0.064 0.045
H P 0.029 0.025 0.069 0.041
F u jitsu 0.026 0.022 0.069 0.041
N E C 0.037 0.031 0.084 0.050
IB M 0.041 0.035 0.068 0.042
A S T - - 0 . 0 9 0 0 . 0 5 4
D a ta  G en era l 0.027 0.022 - -
D e ll 0.033 0.028 0.079 0.050
G a tew a y 0.031 0.026 0.093 0.056
SG I 0.029 0.024 - -
Su n - 0.064 0.036
T o sh ib a 0.030 0.025 0.081 0.047
U n isy s 0.062 0.034
V A  L in u x 0.031 0.028 0.081 0.048
P ane l  C: J P
C o m p a q 0.040 0.034 0.073 0.042
H P 0.058 0.048 0.070 0.038
F u jitsu 0.029 0.024 0.075 0.045
N E C 0.026 0.022 0.072 0.043
IB M 0.036 0.031 0.073 0.040
A S T - - 0.092 0.053
D e ll 0.039 0.033 0.080 0.046
G a tew a y 0.035 0.029 0.084 0.046
H ita ch i 0.027 0.022 0.069 0.037
M itsu b ish i 0.031 0.025 0.079 0.044
N C R - - 0.080 0.044
Su n - - 0.068 0.036
T o sh ib a 0.034 0.027 0.068 0.037
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TABLE 3.6. Model-Implied Average Percentual Price Changes Following HP-Compaq Merger
F irm s
0-4  M a rk et S e g m e n t
nNE <Coll nNE . „NE 
F p r e  r p o s t  r p r e  r p o s t
4-1 0  M a rk et S e g m e n t
nNE _> n C ° l l  r>NE _> nNE 
r p r e  r p o s t  r p r e  r p o s t
P a n e l  A :  US  
C o m p a q 0.439 0.051 3.008 0.116
H P 0.423 0.128 3.808 0.663
N E C 0.581 0 2.623 0
IB M 0.456 0 3.243 0.004
A S T 0.379 0 - -
D a ta  G en - - 2.455 0
D e ll 0.432 0 2.270 0.013
G a tew a y 0.741 0 - -
H ita c h i 0.595 0 - -
M icro n 0.699 0 - -
N C R - - 2.752 0
S G I 0.421 0 - -
S u n 0.504 0 2.933 0.002
T o sh ib a 0.532 0 3.926 0.001
U  n isy s 0.419 0 - -
V A  L in u x 0.513 0 - -
P a n e l  B: E U  
C o m p a q 0.500 0.137 1.982 0.242
H P 0.434 0.165 3.013 1.142
F u jitsu 0.427 0 3.022 0.011
N E C 0.666 0 3.702 0.005
IB M 0.628 0.001 2.796 0.018
A S T - - 3.926 0.004
D a ta  G en 0.496 0 - -
D e ll 0.522 0 3.149 0.017
G a tew a y 0.568 0 4.042 0.004
S G I 0.53 0 - -
Su n - - 2.953 0.005
T o sh ib a 0.555 0 3.652 0.003
U  n isy s - - 2.981 0.001
V A  L in u x 0.621 0 3.674 0.003
P a n e l  C: J P  
C o m p a q 0.728 0.048 3.340 0.195
H P 1.053 0.111 3.411 0.341
F u jitsu 0.533 0 3.256 0.007
N E C 0.472 0 3.084 0.007
IB M 0.549 0 3.512 0.003
A S T - - 4.308 0.001
D e ll 0.636 0 3.739 0.003
G a tew a y 0.706 0 4.081 0.001
H ita ch i 0.528 0 3.455 0.002
M itsu b ish i 0.614 0 3.869 0.001
N C R - - 3.942 0.001
Su n - - 3.378 0.002
T o sh ib a 0.651 0 3.339 0.002
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TABLE 3.7. Pre- and Post-Merger Static Profits -  0-4 Price Segment
P re -M e rg e r P o st-M e r g e r % C h ange
F irm C o ll D e f N a sh C o ll D e f N a s h N E  _  C o l l  N E  _ " p r e  " p o s t  " p r e -> ttne p o s t
P a n e l  A:  US
C o m p a q 3527 3553 3293
H P 1053 1067 984 4580 4606 4278 7.1 0.0
N E C 73 74 68 73 74 68 6.9 0.2
IB M 1313 1329 1227 1313 1329 1229 7.0 0.2
A S T 147 150 137 147 150 138 7.1 0.2
D e ll 2431 2455 2269 2431 2455 2273 7.1 0.2
G a tew a y 387 393 363 387 393 363 6.8 0.2
H ita c h i 4 4 4 4 4 4 6.9 0.2
M ic ro n 93 94 87 93 94 87 6.8 0.2
S G I 2 2 2 2 2 2 7.0 0.2
S u n 124 126 116 124 126 116 6.9 0.2
T o sh ib a 111 112 104 111 112 104 6.9 0.2
U n is y s 45 46 42 45 46 42 7.0 0.2
V A  L in u x 283 287 264 283 287 264 7.0 0.2
P a n e l  B: E U
C o m p a q 2328 2350 2238
H P 1409 1429 1357 3737 3755 3600 4.0 0.1
F u jitsu 813 827 783 813 827 787 3.8 0.5
N E C 83 85 80 83 85 81 3.7 0.5
IB M 1068 1084 1029 1068 1084 1034 3.7 0.5
D a ta  G en 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 3.8 0.5
D e ll 923 938 889 923 938 893 3.8 0.5
G a tew a y 49 50 47 49 50 47 3.7 0.5
S G I 14 15 14 14 15 14 3.8 0.5
T o sh ib a 13 13 13 13 13 13 3.7 0.5
V A  L in u x 4 4 4 4 4 4 3.7 0.5
P a n e l  C: J P
C o m p a q 434 443 425
H P 272 278 267 706 718 692 2.0 0.1
F u jitsu 495 506 485 495 506 486 2.0 0.1
N E C 568 580 556 568 580 557 2.0 0.1
IB M 1079 1095 1056 1079 1095 1057 2.1 0.1
D e ll 840 855 823 840 855 824 2.0 0.1
G a tew a y 59 60 58 59 60 58 1.9 0.1
H ita c h i 215 221 211 215 221 211 1.9 0.1
M its u b ish i 89 91 87 89 91 87 1.9 0.1
T o sh ib a 192 197 189 192 197 189 1.9 0.1
N ote: Figures are in thousands 1996 US dollars per quarter, rounded to the nearest thousandth. The last two columns report the 
percentage changes in profits following a merger between HP and Compaq in two situations: (i) from a pre-merger Nash equilibrium 
to apost-merger collusive equilibrium; and (ii) from a pre-merger to a post-merger Nash equilibrium. The post-merger values for HP 
repcrt the percentage change of the post-merger values of the merged entity, HP-Compaq, with respect to the combined pre-merger 
values of HP and Compaq.
positive and non-negligible both pre- and post-merger, appears to be robust across all three geographic 
regons and both market segments.
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TABLE 3.8. Pre- and Post-Merger Static Profits -  4-10 Price Segment
P re -M e rg e r P o s t-M e r g e r % C h a n g e
F irm C o ll D e f N a sh C o ll D e f N a sh - N E  . —C o l l  -N E  ' p r e  p o s t  p r e -»  n NE p o s t
Panel A: US
C o m p a q 7816 8776 7026
H P 1388 1686 1258 9204 10219 8304 11.1 0.2
N E C 1 1 1 1 1 1 9.1 0.9
IB M 4383 5141 3964 4383 5142 3992 10.5 0.7
D a ta  G en 2 3 2 2 3 2 8.9 0.9
D e ll 19221 20015 16702 19221 20015 16806 15.0 0.6
N C R 305 405 279 305 405 281 9.3 0.8
Su n 1843 2299 1677 1843 2299 1690 9.8 0.8
T o sh ib a 31 38 28 31 38 28 10.3 0.7
Panel B: E U
C o m p a q 19097 20276 16390
H P 3878 4633 3440 22976 23946 20002 15.9 0.9
F u jitsu 3220 3964 2868 3220 3964 2964 12.2 3.4
N E C 672 812 596 672 812 613 12.6 2.9
IB M 6571 7689 5814 6571 7689 5999 13.0 3.2
A S T 352 418 312 352 418 321 12.6 2.7
D ell 6718 7662 5944 6718 7662 6110 13.0 2.8
G a tew a y 1 2 1 1 2 1 12.6 2.6
Sun 1261 1597 1124 1261 1597 1162 12.2 3.4
T osh ib a 62 75 55 62 75 57 12.6 2.8
U n isy s 25 33 23 25 33 23 12.2 3.3
VA L in u x 52 62 46 52 62 47 12.6 2.8
Panel C: JP
C o m p aq 2390 2870 1962
H P 1246 1578 1022 3636 4235 2992 21.9 0.3
H ijitsu 3163 3769 2579 3163 3769 2603 22.6 0.9
N E C 3748 4384 3043 3748 4384 3071 23.1 0.9
IB M 1220 1551 1001 1220 1551 1010 21.8 0.9
A S T 24 30 20 24 30 20 20.5 0.8
D ell 1272 1548 1052 1272 1548 1060 20.9 0.8
G a tew a y 1 1 1 1 1 1 21.0 0.8
H itach i 667 872 547 667 872 552 21.8 0.9
M itsu b ish i 414 523 341 414 523 344 21.2 0.8
N C R 13 16 11 13 16 11 20.6 0.8
Sun 1047 1353 858 1047 1358 866 22.0 0.9
T osh iba 976 1242 804 976 1242 811 21.4 0.9
N o te :  Figures are in thousands 1996 US dollars per quarter, rounded to the nearest thousandth. The last two columns report the 
percentage changes in profits following a merger between HP and Compaq in two situations: (i) from a pre-merger Nash equilibrium 
to a post-merger collusive equilibrium; and (ii) from a pre-merger to a post-merger Nash equilibrium. The post-merger values for HP 
report t ie  percentage change of the post-merger values of the merged entity, HP-Compaq, with respect to the combined pre-merger 
values of HP and Compaq.
For example, in the low-end server market segment, the results presented in Table 3.9 show that 
the nei gains from colluding are significant in all geographic markets. Prior to the merger, a firm such 
as Del would obtain gains of $4.7m pre-merger in the US and almost $lm  and $0.5m in Europe and 
Japan, respectively, whereas the gains of IBM in the three markets would be about $2.5m, $ l.lm  and
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$0.7m. On the other hand, by acquiring Compaq, the net gains perceived by HP as a result of collusion 
increase from $2m to $8.8m. Similar results are presented for the $4-10,000 market segment in Table 
3.10.
However, strikingly, the merger is predicted to make the net gains from colluding smaller in each 
market area for every firm. In fact, the reason is intuitive -  the merger (absent efficiencies) increases 
Nash equilibrium profits for all players in the market and thus reduces the incentive to collude.38 
This result is a general one to the extent that optimally collusive prices do not change with market 
structure, neither will each non-merging firms’ defection payoffs, and so fairly generically unilateral 
effects of a merger will tend to narrow the incentive to coordinate. The only potential exceptions to 
this can appear through the merging firms’ incentives to collude. I capture this result in Proposition 
1.
38 In the present setting, (cost) efficiencies are materialized as reductions in marginal costs. Thus, "10% efficiencies" means that 
a pre-merger marginal cost of c will, as the result of the merger, become 0.9c.
3.6. Results 141
P ro p o s itio n  1 In the benchmark model with tacit collusion, if  S f , f  G ^snon- rner9^g  ^ are fixe^  
merger does not generate efficiencies and the firms produce weakly substitutable good^9, then for any 
ownership structure before and after the merger, Apre and Apost:
L  y  collusion ^ pre^  _  y  collusion ^ post^ j Qr n 0 n -m erg in g  firms f  e  3 non-merging.
2. v f efeCtian(Apre) < ydefection^postj ^  nonmVnerging  firms f  e  Ognon—merging.
3. The incentive for all n o n -m erg in g  firms to tacitly collude always (weakly) narrows post-merger
ycollusion^^pre^ ydefection^^pre^ ^  y  collusion ^ ^post^ ydefection^^post^ j; ^  cyion—merging,
4 . I f  6pf e >  Spost for all f  6 Qmer9 n^g^  ^ en aggregate returns to the m erg in g  f ir m s  tacitly 
colluding pre-merger are no smaller than the returns post-merger:
^   ^ ycollusion^^pre^j ^  ^ ycollusion^^post^
f  ^ c^ merging f^Cgmerging
I f  5pre = Spfost = 5 for all f  <E %™er9 ing^  then for the m erg in g  f ir m s
^   ^ ycollusion^^pre^   ^   ^ ycollusion^^post^
j^Qmerging j^Qzmerging
That is the returns to tacit collusion for the merging parties are greater pre-merger than post­
merger provided the cost of capital does not decrease following a merger;
5. For the m ergin g  firms, aggregate static defection payoffs
Y vff{^ °st)> y  rff(&pre)
j  {zCgmerging j^cgmerging
are (weakly) greater post-merger than pre-merger, as are aggregate post-merger Nash equilibrium 
profits,
Y nfE{&po’‘) > Y *fE(Apr‘)-
j  ^ C^ mer gin g j?£^ m.erging
39 Two products are weakly substitutes if the effect of a change in the price of one product on the sales volume of the other 
product is non-negative.
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I f  8pre — 8post =  S for all f  E Qrner9in9^  then for the m erg ing  f i r m s
^ 2  v p f  (A post) >  ^ 2  V f e f (A pre).
j  ^ zCgmerging j  ^ Cpmerging
Proof.
1. Since the vector of the industry profit maximizing tacitly collusive prices are independent of 
market structure and V f °n := we have immediately tha t V foll(A pre) = VJoll(Apost) for 
all non merging firms /  E  ^ non- rner9^ n9? provided the discount factors <5/,/ =  1 ,.. .,F  remain 
unchanged post-merger;
2. Turning to the defection payoff, for any non-merging firm 7 r ^ ( A pre) = (Apost) while if
a merger occurs between firms producing substitutes then absent efficiencies, all non-merging
firms are (weakly) better off so tha t 7rJE (A post) > 7r^E (ApTe) for all non-merging firms, /  E 
^ n o n - m e r g i n g ^  g i n c e  y d e f  ^ d e f +  we can therefore write y d e f e c t i a n ^ A p r e ^  <  y d e f e c t i o n ^ p o s t j
for all non-merging firms, /  E  ^ n o n - m e r g in g .
3. Follows directly from (1) and (2);
4. Next notice tha t for, any /  E  since VJo11 :=  ^ ^ - S f   ^ anc  ^ 5 Z / e cjmerflin9 /^ If E { ^ p o s t) >
V  /KIf E (Apre) we can write . ycollusion(Apre) >  y '  ycollusion (Aposi)
/  -Jj ^ ^ m e r g i n g  J  K '  Z— J f ^ ^ m e r g m g  J  '  '  m e r g i n g  J
provided 6 f ‘ > S f st for all /  €
5. Finally notice that aggregate static defection payoffs (Apost) > y  7Tdfe^ (A pre)o o  o  i  /  j  j  ^ c ^ m e r g i n g  J N '  —  /  -j j { z C f m e r g i n g  J '  '
are (weakly) greater post-merger than pre-merger, since the enlarged firm has greater flexibility 
to cheat by undercutting, so cannot be made worse off in so doing than the sum of its constituent 
parts solving their analogous problems. Similarly, aggregate post-merger Nash equilibrium prof­
its will be higher for the merged firm since any merger will (weakly) increase Nash equilibrium 
prices towards collusive levels. Finally we note that, if 8pre = 8post = 5 for all /  € Gmer9m5, 
then A -  ^  'KIf E (A post) >  A -  ir1f E (Apre) and soI — O f  /  > j ^ z Q m e r g t n g  J  '  '  I —O f  j ^ Q m e r g z n g  J  '  '
5 2  * f f (A po3t) + Y z Lg -* ,f E(ATOSt) > 5 2  r f 'f (A?re) +
j^Cgmerging f^Qmerging
which is analogous to (Apost) > V f e^ (A pre). QED
°  /  > f ^ C f m e r g m g  J v '  Z — S f ^ C ^ r n e r g i n g  J  x '
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Finally note tha t there is a general result available for the impact of a merger on the incen­
tive to collude versus defect for the merging parties in my particular special case, since the cost 
of capital estimates found tha t Sh p  = 8Compaq = 0.967.40 It follows from part 4 of Proposition 1 
tha t for the merging parties the aggregate payoff to collusion does not change following the merger,
^  y c o l lu s io n ^ p r e \  _  y collusion f /± p o s t \  a n (j  r e s u ^  c a n  b e  s e e n  jn  T a b le s
/  -J j  (z C fm e r g in g  J '  '  /  v  j^ C g m e r g m g  J '  '
9 and 10. Similarly, it follows from part 5 of Proposition 1 tha t the aggregate payoff to defection 
increases following the merger v f e^ (A post) > y ^  V?ef ( A pre). Again, this re-/  -v j  Corner g m g  J v '  /  j  Corner g m  g J  v w
suit can be seen in each of the panels in Tables 9 and 10. As a result, it follows immediately tha t 
in this case the net incentive to collude decreases post merger: v j olluslon(Apre) — yd£f ectl™ (£jyre) > 
V^oiiusion(Apost) — yd ef ectlon(/±post^' Although the magnitude of the decrease depends on the estimates 
on the demand side of the model, this result establishes tha t the direction of the change does not, 
rather it relies on the empirical finding tha t Sh p  = 8 Compaq-
Next I compare the critical discount factors of the firms operating in a given market. The critical 
discount factor of a firm, 8*f, is the minimum discount factor sustaining collusion and is obtained be
^ D e f ^ C o l l
equating the value to colluding to the value to defecting ie. 8} = h ef  N^E . As reported in Table 3.11
7Tf  - 7 Tf
and discussed below, the critical discount factors, above which collusion is incentive-compatible, are 
substantially lower than those coming from asset pricing, especially for the 0-4 price segment. I also 
establish a theoretical result for the critical discount factors.
40 Any small differences in the results below stem from the fact that the discount factors differ in the fourth decimal place.
3.6. Results 144
P ro p o s itio n  2 C ritic a l D isc o u n t F acto rs. Define the critical discount factor of firm  f  for a given
/  *  *  *  A  7 r f e / ( A ) - 7 r ^ ° a ( A )market structure A  as o f =
J ttJ  1 ( A ) - tv {A)
1. I f  we consider perfect collusion both before and after the merger and the merger generates no ef­
ficiencies, then 7r^o/z =  7rEoll(A pre) = 'K<f ° 11 (A post) for all n o n -m erg in g  firms f  E £ynon- meT'9OT0} 
7r^e  ^ =  (A pre) = ir^ef  (A post) for all n o n -m erg in g  firms f  € <^ non- mer0ms an^  provided 
the products in the market are weak substitutes, 7rJE (A pre) < 7rJE (A post) for all n o n -m erg in g  
firms f  6 5 non_merflm3. Jn that case, critical discount factors for non-merging firms weakly 
increase following a concentration:
n D e f  _  n Col l  n D e f  _  ^ C o l l
6 *pre  =  _ _ J ---------------/ ------------ < --_ f ---------------/ ------------- =  f p o s t  f Q r  a U  j  e  c ^ n o n —m e r g i n g
f  7rfef -  n ^ E (A pre) n f ef -  7rJE (A post) f
«  r ,  l r* p re  7T?e / (A p re ) - ^ ° " ( A pT'e )2. lo r  the m erq in q  parties, we have o f  =  V .*------— Lrrrr,   and
»  »  r  ’ f  i V f 1 (A'Pr e ) -TTIf E {APr e )
V  7rfe/ (Apost) -  V  7r^oll(Apost)
£ * p o s t  f  ^ m e r g i n g  J  '  /  Z — * f ( : Q r n e r g in g  J  '  >
I y  7rfe /(Apost) -  Y  'KIf E(Apost)
j ^ Q m e r g i n g  J  '  '  f ^ Q m e r g i n g  J v 7
fo r  f  E ^sm e r9in 9 .
As reported in Table 3.11 and discussed below, the critical discount factors, above which collusion is 
incentive-compatible, are substantially lower than those coming from the asset pricing model, especially 
for the 0-4 price segment. Applying the results in Proposition 2, part (1), notice tha t the critical 
discount factor for non-merging firms always increases from pre-merger to post-merger levels. This 
move is consistent with the merger making it harder for non-merging firms to tacitly coordinate. 
There is no analogous general result for the merging firms, and indeed, one interesting feature of Table
3.11 is tha t the critical discount factors for the merging parties fall post-merger. T hat is, they move 
in the opposite direction to the critical discount factors of the non-merging parties.
However, when evaluating such moves it is im portant to keep in mind tha t all the critical discount 
factors I estimated using the benchmark models are substantially below those which finance methods 
suggest would be appropriate. The two are closest in the $4-10,000 segment where threshold values 
are above 0.8 in the US and slightly below tha t in the other markets. In each segment, I note that 
the merging firm (HP-Compaq) tends to have a low critical post-merger discount factor compared 
to rivals, with the exception of Dell, a fast growing firm with above-average margins in the industry, 
attributed by many to its distinctive business model.
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3.6.3.2 Incentive Compatibility Constraints: The Benchmark Model w ith Multimarket Contact
The effect of multimarket contact essentially amplifies the results of the standard model. Given non­
binding incentive-compatibility constraints, their aggregation across geographical markets puts an 
increased wedge between the value of tacitly colluding when compared to the value of defecting. Table
3.12 shows th a t for the 0-4 market the pre-merger gains to tacitly colluding are in excess of $9.6m in 
present value terms for Compaq, S3.6m for HP (making a total of $13.3m), $6m for Dell and $4.2m for 
IBM, wliereas the corresponding post-merger values are marginally lower at $13.2m for HP-Compaq 
while Dell and IBM ’s incentives similarly decrease by fairly small amounts. For the same reasons as 
in the Benchmark case, the gains from colluding decreased for all non-merging parties.
In th e  4-10 market segment, the gains from collusion both pre- and post-merger are more substantial 
in both absolute and relative terms. For example, the results suggest tha t a player such as Dell would 
gain almost $93m post-merger by sustaining the collusive outcome. The gains from Fujitsu and NEC 
are also noticeable, especially when compared to IBM’s post-merger $32m, and come mostly from their 
strong position in the Japanese market. However, as in the benchmark case, all non-merging firms see 
a decrease in their relative incentive to collude post merger relative to the situation pre-merger. In 
my example, the merging parties also see a decrease in their relative payoff to collusion following the 
merger.
An analysis of the critical discount factors, reported in Table 3.13, shows tha t collusion across the 
three geographical regions is sustained provided discount factors are above 0.6 in the 0-4 segment, 
whereas a higher value (above 0.8) is would suffice in the 4-10 price segment. Qualitatively therefore 
these results are the same as for the single market contact case (see Table 3.11.) In particular, the 
merging parties do find tha t collusion is ‘easier’ to sustain post-merger than pre-merger in the sense 
th a t their critical discount factor falls post-merger. This movement stands in contrast to the non­
merging parties who each find tha t their critical discount factors increase as a result of the merger. As 
in the benchmark case, the reason for the latter effect is th a t non-merging firms static collusive and 
defection payoffs do not change pre- and post-merger, while their Nash equilibrium payoffs -  now in 
each market - unambiguously rise.
Finally, and for completeness, Table 3.14 reports the results of aggregating across both geographical 
markets and market niches and shows similar results both in terms of value functions and discount 
factors.
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3.6.3.3 Incentive Compatibility Constraints: The Competitive Fringe Model
So far I have assumed all firms operating in the market have a non-negligible degree of market power. 
As the server industry is characterized by a number of fringe competitors, I also report results of such 
a market configuration. In this model, to collude means to maximize the dominant firms’ profits with 
the competitive firms choosing prices at marginal cost. I estimate alternative versions of the model, 
with four (Compaq, HP, Dell, IBM), five (plus Sun) and six (plus Fujitsu-Siemens) dominant firms 
and obtained very similar results, so I only report results for the competitive fringe (CF hereafter) 
model w ith four dominant firms.
By and large, the qualitative results for the CF model were close to those of the standard one, 
as reported in Table 3.15.41 The slight increases in both collusive and defective static profits result 
in increased values to colluding and defecting, but the former dominate the latter. As a result, the 
incentives to collude for the non-merging parties reduce following the simulated HP-Compaq merger, 
but are still positive and sizeable. When compared to the standard model, the pre-merger incentives 
to collude in the CF model are larger, and their reduction following the HP-Compaq merger also 
decrease, bu t to a lesser extent. As before, the figures in the 4-10 segment are substantially larger than 
those in the 0-4 one.
Finally, Table 3.16 reports the critical discount factors in the CF model. Comparing the results 
in Table 3.11 and Table 3.16, critical discount factors are, unsurprisingly, significantly larger than in 
the standard case. Larger critical discount factors reflect the fact tha t the presence of a competitive 
fringe makes coordination harder to sustain (in this particular sense emphasized by the theoretical 
literature.).
Accounting for multi-market contact in the competitive fringe model, involves incorporating two 
forces acting, generally, in different directions. In the main, multi-market contact helps cooperation 
while a competitive fringe generally makes it more different. In my empirical example, the net impact 
is tha t firms retain the ability to coordinate both pre- and post-merger (see Table 3.17). The bottom 
panel of Table 3.17 reports critical discount factors which, in comparison with those reported in 
Table 3.11, clearly indicate tha t multi-market contact does not fully offset the disadvantages of the 
competitive fringe so tha t critical discount factors remain substantially above those for the benchmark 
model in Table 3.11. Table 3.18 reports the results of allowing for multi-market contact across the 
price segments as well as across regions.
41 The price changes from (i) a pre-merger Nash equilibrium to a post-merger collusive equilibrium; and (ii) a pre-merger to a 
post-merger Nash equilibrium, are only slightly larger than those reported for the standard model, so are not reported.
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3.6.3.4 Incentive Compatibility Constraints: Partial Coalitions
So far, I have studied what happens (i) when all firms have market power and might collude (the 
standard model); and (ii) there are only a few firms with market power which might collude plus a 
competitive fringe. In either case, collusion is incentive-compatible both pre- and post-merger, despite 
decreasing slightly following a simulation of the HP-Compaq merger. One might, however, argue that 
there might be a small number of firms colluding and a number firms not colluding yet with market 
power. In such a case, the colluding firms will form a cartel facing strategic outsiders. W hat I do is 
to consider a number of arrangements of the cartel to  investigate which arrangements form a stable 
coalition among the firms. The starting point is the standard model, which implicitly assumes that 
all firms are members of the cartel. As the cartel configuration becomes more selective the value to 
colluding, albeit still positive and showing the same pattern as in the standard model, decreases. 
The value to colluding is still positive when the firms in the cartel (pre-merger) are the ‘big four’ ie. 
Compaq, HP, Dell and IBM. However, when the number of firms is as small as three, the results start 
to change.
I first consider a cartel formed by Compaq, HP and IBM, followed by a cartel formed by Compaq, 
HP and Dell. The first thing to notice when investigating the cartel formed by Compaq, HP and 
IBM, as reported in Table 3.19, is tha t collusion is not incentive-compatible in the US and EU when 
considering the 0-4 price segment -  prior to the merger, the gains to colluding are still positive, but 
they become negative following the merger. Alternatively, the critical discount factors for IBM are 
greater than one. For the 4-10 price segment, collusion is not incentive-compatible in the EU and 
Japanese markets instead, and once again the critical discount factors for IBM are greater than one. 
When aggregating across geographical markets within either the 0-4 or the 4-10 price segments, the 
value to colluding turns from positive to negative. As a result, multimarket contact is not enough to 
soften competition in this case.
The cartel formed by Compaq, HP and Dell has a similar behaviour, in tha t collusion is not incentive- 
compatible in the EU for the 0-4 price segment following the simulation of the HP-Compaq merger 
— see Table 3.20. For the 4-10 segment, this is true for both EU and Japan. When aggregating 
across geographical markets, collusion is incentive-compatible for the 0-4 price segment both prior and 
following the HP-Compaq merger, but is incentive-compatible both before and after the merger in 
the 4-10 price segment. When aggregating across price segments, the larger 4-10 segment prevails and 
collusion is incentive-compatible.
As a result, I obtain a suggestion tha t a coalition formed by the big four players is stable both 
before and after the simulation of the HP-Compaq merger. This is not necessarily the case when the
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coalition includes only three of those big players. When IBM is assumed to be the third member of the 
coalition, collusion is not incentive-compatible and breaks down; if the third member of the coalition 
is assumed to be Dell, collusion is still incentive-compatible at the aggregate level, despite breaking 
down in individual markets -  a consequence of multimarket contact softening competition.
3.6.3.5 Incentive Compatibility Constraints: Side Payments
I then investigate what happens if I allow for side payments, tha t means to say, if the firm(s) which 
benefit (s) from the collusive outcome can make transfers to the other members of the cartel so as 
to make collusion more easily sustainable. I focus on the case where the payments are such that the 
discount factors are equalized across firms. This is the ‘Balanced tem ptations equilibrium’ proposed in 
Friedman (1971), who introduced this equilibrium as a mechanism for achieving a cooperative outcome 
in a non-cooperative setting. The idea is that all firms would, in a particular sense, be equally tempted 
to defect from the tacitly cooperating group of firms, specifically, th a t they would have the same 
discount factor. He argued tha t this was the lowest discount factor capable of sustaining cooperation 
on the Pareto frontier of the set of feasible profits of the industry. He argued tha t this was a less 
extreme solution than tha t suggested by the maximization of industry profits.
One simple way to implement this equilibrium is by allowing for side payments across firms up 
to the point tha t discount factors are uniform, so tha t firms which benefit from a collusive solution 
are allowed to make transfers to others and in so doing will generate incentives for other firms to 
take part in the collusive agreement. In particular, side payments may make cooperation incentive- 
compatible for every player, thus making the collusive agreement more stable. Specifically, for any 
given J =  £i =  ... =  <SJp I  can calculate, the net side payments A/, /  =  1,.., F  required for each firm to 
sustain cooperation:
1 e / (A) -  i r f E ( A)
Since side-payments must add to zero, i =  ^ can determine both 8 and the set of A’s. As
always, I can consider both full coalitions and partial coalitions.
Table 3.21 reports the results and shows that the side payments required are generally quite small, 
less than $300,000 per quarter in each of the markets and market segments I considered (less than 5% 
of the static profits). Mechanisms, such as purchases of goods from rival companies, could potentially 
be used to  achieve side payments of this kind of magnitude. The form of the transfers required are 
themselves interesting. In Panel A, transfers are each from Compaq to its smaller rivals (pre-merger;
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and from HP-Compaq post merger) as the small firms must be induced to cooperate. The one inter­
esting exception to this pattern is in Japan in the 4-10 market segment, where Dell is found to need 
to compensate HP and HP-Compaq.
3.6.3.6 Comparing Discount Factors
One natural question that arises regards the closeness between the critical discount factors and the ones 
estim ated using finance data for a given firm. I address this question by comparing betas instead of 
discount factors — I back out the betas implied by the critical discount factors and examine whether 
they are within the 99% confidence interval of the corresponding asset pricing beta. For the great 
majority of the firms for which I estimate the cost of capital, it is very well approximated by the cost 
of equity, since firms finance themselves using mostly equity (the only firms financed less than 90% by 
equity are SGI and Unisys).
The results are reported in Table 3.22 and indicate, in the main, that critical discount factors from 
my models are, in the main, significantly smaller than the estimated discount factors reflecting the 
firms cost of capital. In the benchmark model, where are all firms are assumed to have market power 
and might participate in the collusive scheme, no more than three have an implied beta which falls 
within the 99% confidence interval for the CAPM beta. By and large, this result is unaffected by 
multi-market contact and suggests tha t coordination would appear to be sustainable if the benchmark 
model is a reasonable approximation to reality -  although importantly for any merger assessment that 
is true both pre- and post-merger. In the main, although critical discount factors rise once I allow for a 
competitive fringe, indicating tha t coordination appears harder to sustain in tha t model, I continue to 
find tha t in most instances the critical discount factors lie significantly below the estimated discount 
factors.
Conclusion
This paper attempts to take the coordination literature following Friedman (1971) seriously and to 
use it to understand the incentives to tacitly coordinate in a particular differentiated product market, 
the server market. In doing so, I build on both the literature on repeated games and the literature on 
unilateral effects merger simulation.
I find that in the benchmark tacitly collusive model (Friedman, 1971) the incentives to collude are 
substantial, even without assuming sophisticated punishment mechanisms. Although I find tha t such 
incentives are affected by the merger between HP and Compaq, and the incentive to cooperate remains
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substantial, while the merger actively decreases the incentives to tacitly cooperate of non-merging firms 
in the industry. I show that for non-merging firms, mergers generally reduce the incentive to cooperate 
in the benchmark model and tha t this result is not sensitive to the estimates of the differentiated 
product demand model. Intuitively, the result emerges because the unilateral effects of a merger will 
mean tha t Nash equilibrium payoffs will increase following the merger. In so doing, the return to 
cooperation falls.
I considered a number of generalizations to my benchmark model. First, I considered multi-market 
contact, following Bernheim and Whinston (1990). In the case of the network server market, accounting 
for multi-market contact amplifies the incentives to cooperate compared to the benchmark model. 
However, as before and according to my model, the HP-Compaq merger actively reduces the incentive 
to cooperate although coordination remains attractive both before and after the merger.
Second, I considered the effect of a competitive fringe. I modeled the presence of a competitive fringe 
in two ways. First, I considered a set of rival fringe firms who priced at marginal cost both before and 
after the merger. Second I considered outcomes when tacit coordination between a partial coalition of 
firms involved setting the Nash prices th a t would have resulted had those tacitly coordinating firms 
undertaken a merger. Intuitively, I found tha t models incorporating a competitive fringe constrained 
the coordinating firms’ ability to raise prices compared to a fully tacitly coordinating industry. How­
ever, I showed tha t individual players can be either better or worse off when only a subset of firms 
tacitly coordinate. A smaller number of firms following the objective of maximizing total profits of 
the cooperative group may be able to improve the rewards paid to individual members of the smaller 
group since the objective of the group and its members are more closely aligned. On the other hand, 
I found that with a competitive fringe, individual players may be disproportionately affected by the 
competitive constraint and the partial coalition may choose to sacrifice tha t firms’ profitability for the 
overall benefit of the group. When simulating the effect of a partial coalition between HP, Compaq, 
IBM and Dell, I found tha t Dell was worse off compared to a coalition of all the firms in the industry 
while each of the others were actually better off. Clearly, such results rely heavily on the definition of
Finally, I note tha t in modeling tacit coordination by following Friedman (1971) I continue to make 
a number of very strong assumptions. In particular, my model is silent about entry and exit by firms, 
or indeed about the entry or exit of products. In addition, I do not account for uncertainty that, 
for instance, means it may be difficult to detect whether rival firms are tacitly cooperating or not, 
following authors such as Green and Porter (1984). As is appropriate for a first piece of empirical 
work in an area, I recognize tha t these are strong assumptions and expect that future work simulating 
the coordinated effects of mergers will attem pt to address each of these concerns. I also recognize the
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importance of performance statistical inference, but this is left for further research — in the current 
version, the theoretical results grouped in Propositions 1 and 2 provide guidance on the changes in 
profits, value functions and discount factors one should expect.
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TABLE 3.9. Pre- and Post-Merger Value Functions -  0-4 Price Segment
P re -M e rg e r P o s t-M e r g e r
F ir m V .C o ll V .D e f  V .(C -D ) V .C o ll V .D e f  V .(C -D ) % V .(C -D )
P a n e l  A :  US
C o m p a q 106869 100043 6826
H P 31912 29898 2014 138781 129977 8804 -0.4
N E C 2199 2063 136 2199 2066 133 -2.2
IB M 39790 37295 2495 39790 37350 2439 -2.2
A S T 4458 4174 285 4458 4180 278 -2.2
D e ll 73654 68946 4708 73654 69050 4603 -2.2
G a te w a y 11738 11017 722 11738 11033 706 -2.2
H ita c h i 120 112 8 120 113 7 -2.2
M icro n 2813 2639 173 2813 2643 170 -2.2
S G I 60 56 4 60 56 4 -2.2
Su n 3765 3529 236 3765 3534 231 -2.2
T o sh ib a 3356 3148 208 3356 3152 204 -2.2
U n is y s 1368 1281 87 1368 1283 85 -2.2
V A  L in u x 8563 8023 540 8563 8035 528 -2.2
P a n e l  B: E U
C o m p a q 70533 67937 2597
H P 42705 41184 1521 113238 109239 3999 -2.9
F u jitsu 24634 23765 870 24634 23890 744 -14.4
N E C 2522 2435 87 2522 2448 74 -14.3
IB M 32362 31235 1127 32362 31393 969 -14.0
D a ta  G en 2 2 0 2 2 0 -14.6
D e ll 27958 26973 985 27958 27114 844 -14.3
G a tew a y 1473 1423 51 1473 1430 44 -14.4
S G I 434 419 15 434 422 13 -14.6
T o sh ib a 393 379 14 393 381 12 -14.5
V A  L in u x 111 108 4 111 108 3 -14.4
P a n e l  C: J P
C o m p a q 13137 12896 241
H P 8242 8092 150 21379 20988 391 -0.3
F u jitsu 15001 14725 276 15001 14735 266 -3.7
N E C 17199 16881 318 17199 16893 307 -3.7
IB M 32689 32035 654 32689 32057 632 -3.3
D e ll 25466 24976 491 25466 24993 474 -3.4
G a tew a y 1779 1748 32 1779 1749 31 -3.7
H ita c h i 6514 6397 117 6514 6402 112 -3.8
M its u b ish i 2681 2634 48 2681 2635 46 -3.8
T o sh ib a 5828 5723 105 5828 5727 101 -3.7
N o te :  Figures are in thousands 1996 US dollars, rounded to the nearest thousandth. The post-merger values for HP report the
percentage change of the post-merger values of the merged entity, HP-Compaq, with respect to the combined pre-merger values of
HP and Compaq.
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TABLE 3.10. Pre- and Post-Merger Value Functions -  4-10 Price Segment
P re -M e rg e r P o s t-M e r g e r
F ir m V .C o ll V .D e f  V .(C -D ) V .C o ll V .D e f  V .(C -D ) % V .(C -D )
P a n e l  A :  US
C o m p a q 236851 214658 22193
H P 42057 38555 3502 278908 253537 25371 -1.3
N E C 16 15 1 16 15 1 -10.8
IB M 132809 121300 11508 132809 122126 10683 -7.1
D a ta  G e n 63 59 4 63 59 4 -11.4
D e ll 582458 509446 73011 582458 512476 69982 -4.1
N C R 9238 8577 661 9238 8646 592 -10.4
S u n 55843 51442 4402 55843 51827 4016 -8.7
T o sh ib a 943 865 78 943 871 73 -7.3
P a n e l  B: E U
C o m p a q 578699 500550 78149
H P 117528 105432 12095 696227 610075 86152 -4.5
F u jitsu 97581 88005 9576 97581 90822 6758 -29.4
N E C 20357 18288 2069 20357 18787 1570 -24.1
IB M 199119 178054 21065 199119 183484 15634 -25.7
A S T 10661 9569 1092 10661 9814 847 -22.4
D e ll 203585 181848 21737 203585 186697 16888 -22.3
G a tew a y 39 35 4 39 36 3 -21.9
S u n 38224 34538 3686 38224 35643 2582 -29.9
T o sh ib a 1889 1696 193 1889 1741 148 -23.4
U n isy s 771 697 74 771 719 52 -29.7
V A  L in u x 1560 1401 159 1560 1438 122 -23.3
P a n e l  C: J P
C o m p a q 72434 60362 12072
H P 37760 31538 6222 110194 91919 18275 -0.1
F u jitsu 95836 79348 16489 95836 80032 15805 -4.1
N E C 113564 93563 20001 113564 94364 19200 -4.0
IB M 36953 30871 6082 36953 31138 5815 -4.4
A S T 740 624 116 740 628 112 -3.8
D e ll 38548 32370 6179 38548 32615 5934 -3.9
G a tew a y 27 23 4 27 23 4 -4.0
H ita c h i 20209 16906 3303 20209 17055 3155 -4.5
M itsu b ish i 12536 10520 2017 12536 10603 1934 -4.1
N C R 388 327 61 388 329 59 -3.8
Su n 31720 26493 5227 31720 26729 4991 -4.5
T o sh ib a 29577 24793 4785 29577 25000 4577 -4.3
N o te :  Figures are in thousands 1996 US dollars, rounded to the nearest thousandth. The post-merger values for HP report the
percentage change of the post-merger values of the merged entity, HP-Compaq, with respect to the combined pre-merger values of
HP and Compaq.
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TABLE 3.11. Pre- and Post-Merger Critical Discount Factors -  0-4 and 4-10 Price Segments
F irm
0-4  P r ic e  S e g m e n t  
P re - P o s t-  % C h a n g e
4 -1 0  P r ic e  S e g m e n t  
P re - P o s t  % C h ange
Panel A: US
C o m p a q
H P
0.102
0.166 0.080 -52.1
0.549
0.697 0.530 -23.9
N E C 0.189 0.193 1.8 0.807 0.821 1.8
IB M 0.158 0.161 1.9 0.644 0.660 2.4
A S T 0.196 0.199 1.8 - - -
D a ta  G en - - - 0.817 0.832 1.8
D e ll 0.130 0.132 1.9 0.240 0.247 3.2
G a tew a y 0.179 0.182 1.8 - - -
H ita c h i 0.192 0.196 1.8 - - -
M icro n 0.187 0.191 1.8 - - -
N C R - - - 0.795 0.810 1.8
S G I 0.198 0.202 1.8 - - -
S u n 0.191 0.195 1.8 0.733 0.749 2.1
T o sh ib a 0.189 0.192 1.8 0.711 0.725 1.9
U n isy s 0.197 0.201 1.8 - - -
V A  L inu x 0.189 0.1.92 1.8 - - -
Panel B: EU
C o m p a q
H P
0.198
0.270 0.114 -57.6
0.303
0.632 0.246 -61.1
F u jitsu 0.320 0.354 10.6 0.679 0.744 9.6
N E C 0.364 0.399 9.8 0.650 0.706 8.5
IB M 0.291 0.322 10.8 0.596 0.662 10.9
A S T - - 0.626 0.680 8.5
D a ta  G en 0.380 0.417 9.7 - - -
D e ll 0.310 0.343 10.7 0.549 0.608 10.6
G a tew a y 0.371 0.408 9.7 0.623 0.676 8.4
S G I 0.379 0.415 9.7 - - -
S u n - - 0.710 0.771 8.6
T o sh ib a 0.375 0.411 9.7 0.646 0.701 8.4
U n isy s - - - 0.724 0.782 8.0
V A  L in u x 0.372 0.408 9.7 0.646 0.700 8.4
Panel C: JP
C o m p a q
H P
0.522
0.530 0.481 -9.2
0.528
0.597 0.482 -19.3
F u jitsu 0.527 0.536 1.7 0.510 0.520 2.0
N E C 0.519 0.528 1.7 0.475 0.484 2.0
IB M 0.408 0.416 1.9 0.602 0.612 1.6
A S T - - 0.578 0.587 1.5
D e ll 0.455 0.464 1.8 0.556 0.565 1.7
G a tew a y 0.581 0.589 1.5 0.607 0.616 1.5
H ita c h i 0.573 0.582 1.5 0.632 0.642 1.5
M itsu b ish i 0.590 0.599 1.5 0.601 0.610 1.5
N C R - - - 0.586 0.595 1.5
S u n - - - 0.618 0.629 1.6
T o sh ib a 0.563 0.572 1.5 0.606 0.616 1.6
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TABLE 3.12. Multimarket Value Functions
P re -M e rg e r P o st-M e r g e r
F irm V .C o ll  V .D e f  V .(C -D ) V .C o ll  V .D e f  V .(C -D ) % V .(C -D )
Panel A: 0-4 Price Segment
C o m p a q 190539 180875 9664
H P 82859 79173 3685 273398 260204 13193 -1.2
F u jitsu 39635 38490 1145 39635 38625 1009 -11.8
N E C 21920 21379 541 21920 21407 514 -5.0
IB M 104840 100565 4276 104840 100800 4040 -5.5
A S T 4458 4174 284 4458 4180 278 -2.2
D a ta  G en 2 2 0 2 2 0 -14.6
D eU 127078 120894 6184 127078 121157 5921 -4.2
G a te w a y 14991 14187 805 14991 14211 780 -3.0
H ita c h i 6634 6510 124 6634 6514 119 -3.7
M icro n 2813 2639 173 2813 2643 170 -2.2
M its u b ish i 2681 2634 48 2681 2635 46 -3.8
S G I 494 476 19 494 478 17 -12.1
S u n 3765 3529 236 3765 3534 231 -2.2
T o sh ib a 9576 9250 327 9576 9260 316 -3.2
U n isy s 1368 1281 87 1368 1283 85 -2.2
V A  L in u x 8674 8130 544 8674 8143 532 -2.3
Panel B: 4-10 Price Segment
C o m p a q 887984 775570 112414
H P 197344 175525 21820 1085328 955530 129798 -3.3
F u jitsu 193417 167352 26065 193417 170854 22563 -13.4
N E C 133937 111866 22072 133937 113166 20771 -5.8
IB M 368880 330225 38655 368880 336748 32132 -16.8
A S T 11401 10193 1208 11401 10442 959 -20.6
D a ta  G en 63 59 4 63 59 4 -11.4
D e ll 824591 723664 100927 824591 731787 92803 -8.0
G a tew a y 66 57 9 66 58 8 -12.6
H ita c h i 20209 16906 3303 20209 17055 3155 -4.4
M itsu b ish i 12536 10520 2017 12536 10603 1934 -4.1
N C R 9626 8904 722 9626 8975 650 -9.8
S u n 125787 112472 13314 125787 114198 11589 -12.9
T o sh ib a 32409 27354 5056 32409 27612 4797 -5.1
U n isy s 771 697 74 771 719 52 -29.7
V A  L inux 1560 1401 159 1560 1438 122 -23.3
N o te :  Figures are in thousands 1996 US dollars, rounded to the nearest thousandth. The post-merger values for HP report the
percentage change of the post-merger values of the merged entity, HP-Compaq, with respect to the combined pre-merger values of
HP and Compaq.
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TABLE 3.13. M ultimarket Critical Discount Factors
F irm P re -M e rg e r P o s t-M e r g e r % C h an ge
Panel A: 0-4 Price Segm.ent
C o m p a q 0.149
H P 0.236 0.111 -52.9
F u jitsu 0.386 0.415 7.6
N E C 0.441 0.454 2.8
IB M 0.245 0.255 4.2
A S T 0.196 0.199 1.8
D a ta  G en 0.38 0.417 9.7
D e ll 0.202 0.209 3.4
G a tew a y 0.224 0.230 2.4
H ita c h i 0.561 0.570 1.6
M icro n 0.187 0.191 1.8
M itsu b ish i 0.59 0.599 1.5
S G I 0.349 0.379 8.3
S u n 0.191 0.195 1.8
T o sh ib a 0.373 0.381 2.0
U n isy s 0.197 0.201 1.8
V A  L in u x 0.19 0.194 1.9
Panel B: 4~10 Price Segment
C o m p a q 0.400
H P 0.636 0.364 -42.8
F u jitsu 0.591 0.623 5.5
N E C 0.499 0.514 2.9
IB M 0.613 0.653 6.5
A S T 0.622 0.672 7.9
D a ta  G en era l 0.817 0.832 1.8
D e ll 0.364 0.384 5.2
G a tew a y 0.615 0.645 4.8
H ita c h i 0.632 0.642 1.5
M itsu b ish i 0.601 0.61 1.5
N C R 0.786 0.801 1.8
Su n 0.691 0.717 3.8
T o sh ib a 0.61 0.622 1.9
U n isy s 0.724 0.782 8.0
V A  L in u x 0.646 0.700 8.4
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TABLE 3.14. Multimarket Value Functions and Critical Discount Factors -  Aggregation Across Regions and 
Price Segments_________________________________________________________________________________
P re -M e rg e r P o st-M e r g e r
F irm V .C o ll V .D e f  V .(C -D ) V .C o ll  V .D e f  V .(C -D ) % V .(C -D )
U S /E U /J P  Markets
C o m p a q 1078523 956446 122077
H P 280203 254698 25505 1358726 1215735 142991 -3.1
F u jitsu 233052 205842 27210 233052 209479 23572 -13.3
N E C 155858 133245 22613 155858 134573 21285 -5.8
IB M 473721 430790 42931 473721 437549 36172 -15.7
A S T 15859 14366 1493 15859 14622 1237 -17.1
D a ta  G en 65 61 4 65 61 4 -11.4
D e ll 951669 844558 107111 951669 852944 98725 -7.8
G a tew a y 15057 14244 813 15057 14270 787 -3.1
H ita c h i 26843 23416 3427 26843 23569 3274 -4.4
M ic ro n 2813 2639 174 2813 2643 170 -2.2
M itsu b ish i 15218 13153 2064 15217 13237 1980 -4.1
N C R 9626 8904 722 9626 8976 650 -9.8
S G I 494 476 18 494 478 17 -12.1
S u n 129551 116001 13551 129551 117732 11820 -12.7
T o sh ib a 41985 36603 5383 41985 36872 5114 -4.9
U n is y s 2138 1977 161 2138 2001 137 -14.9
V A  L inu x 10235 9531 703 10235 9581 653 -7.1
C r itic a l D isc o u n t F actors
P r e -M e rg e r P o st-M e r g e r % C h a n g e
U S /E U /J P  Markets
C o m p a q 0.386
H P 0.608 0.347 -42.9
F u jitsu 0.585 0.618 5.5
N E C 0.498 0.512 2.9
IB M 0.594 0.632 6.4
A S T 0.582 0.624 7.3
D a ta  G en 0.816 0.831 1.8
D e ll 0.357 0.375 5.1
G a tew a y 0.233 0.238 2.4
H ita c h i 0.629 0.639 1.5
M ic ro n 0.187 0.191 1.8
M itsu b ish i 0.601 0.610 1.5
N C R 0.786 0.801 1.8
S G I 0.349 0.378 8.3
S u n 0.687 0.714 3.8
T o sh ib a 0.601 0.613 1.9
U n isy s 0.582 0.619 6.3
V A  L inux 0.379 0.396 4.5
N o te : Value function figures are in thousands 1996 US dollars, rounded to the nearest thousandth. The post-merger values for HP 
report the percentage change of the post-merger values of the merged entity, HP-Compaq, with respect to the combined pre-merger 
values of HP and Compaq.
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TABLE 3.15. Competitive Fringe Model Value Functions -  0-4 and 4-10 Price Segments
P re -M e rg e r P o st-M e r g e r
F irm V .C o ll V .D e f  V .(C -D ) V .C o ll  V .D e f  V .(C -D ) % V .(C -D )
Panel A: 0-4 Price Segment
Region: US
C o m p a q 108031 100078 7954
H P 32263 29908 2355 140294 130022 10272 -0.4
D e ll 74469 68970 5500 74469 69074 5395 -1.9
IB M 40222 37307 2915 40222 37363 2859 -1.9
Region: EU
C o m p a q 71686 67970 3716
H P 43414 41204 2210 115100 109295 5805 -2.0
D e ll 28429 26986 1443 28429 27127 1302 -9.8
IB M 32882 31250 1632 32882 31408 1474 -9.7
Region: JP
C o m p a q 13840 12915 924
H P 8663 8104 559 22502 21020 1482 -0.1
D e ll 26834 25015 1819 26834 25032 1802 -0.9
IB M 34430 32085 2345 34430 32107 2323 -0.9
Panel B: 4-10 Price Segment
Region: US
C o m p a q 241314 214765 26549
H P 42904 38576 4328 284218 253658 30560 -1.0
D e ll 593518 509721 83797 593518 512740 80777 -3.6
IB M 135572 121368 14204 135572 122190 13382 -5.8
Region: EU
C o m p a q 603682 501159 102523
H P 122599 105558 17041 726281 610710 115572 -3.3
D e ll 211209 182034 29174 211209 186847 24361 -16.5
IB M 208246 178274 29972 208246 183663 24583 -18.0
Region: JP
C o m p a q 92046 60842 31205
H P 48837 31817 17020 140883 92611 48272 0.1
D e ll 47938 32607 15331 47938 32837 15101 -1.5
IB M 47941 31148 16793 47941 31399 16542 -1.5
N o te :  Figures are in thousands 1996 US dollars, rounded to the nearest thousandth. The post-merger values for HP report the
percentage change of the post-merger values of the merged entity, HP-Compaq, with respect to the combined pre-merger values of
HP and Compaq.
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TABLE 3.16. Competitive Fringe Model Critical Discount Factors -  0-4 and 4-10 Price Segments
F irm P re -M e rg e r P o st-M e r g e r % C h a n g e
Panel A: 0-4 Price Segment
Region: US
C o m p a q 0.076
H P 0.132 0.057 -56.5
D e ll 0.100 0.102 1.7
IB M 0.125 0.127 1.6
Region: EU
C o m p a q 0.122
H P 0.177 0.059 -66.5
D e ll 0.209 0.226 8.3
IB M 0.196 0.212 8.3
Region: JP
C o m p a q 0.157
H P 0.170 0.131 -23.0
D e ll 0.118 0.119 0.8
IB M 0.096 0.097 0.8
Panel B: 4-10 Price Segment
Region: US
C o m p a q 0.495
H P 0.649 0.473 -27.1
D e ll 0.196 0.202 2.9
IB M 0.590 0.604 2.3
Region: EU
C o m p a q 0.214
H P 0.541 0.156 -71.1
D e ll 0.461 0.505 9.4
IB M 0.495 0.543 9.6
Region: JP
C o m p a q 0.225
H P 0.294 0.163 -44.4
D e ll 0.277 0.280 1.0
IB M 0.297 0.300 1.0
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TABLE 3.17. M ultimarket Value Functions and Critical Discount Factors in the Competitive Fringe Model 
0-4 and 4-10 Price Segments _________________________________
P re -M e rg e r P o st-M e r g e r
F irm  V .C o ll V .D e f V .(C -D ) V .C o ll V .D e f V .(C -D ) % V .(C -D )
Panel A: 0-4 Price Segment
C o m p a q  193557 180963 12594
H P  84339 79216 5124 277896 260337 17559 -0.9
D e ll 129732 120970 8762 129732 121233 8499 -2.9
IB M  107534 100642 6892 107534 100878 6656 -3.4
Panel B: 4-10 Price Segment
C o m p a q  937043 776766 160277
H P 214339 175951 38389 1151382 956979 194404 -2.2
D e ll 852664 724363 128302 852664 732425 120239 -6.2
IB M 391760 330790 60970 391760 337252 54507 -10.5
F irm
C r itic a l D isc o u n t F a cto rs  
P re -M e rg e r  P o st-M e r g e r % C h a n g e
Panel C: 0-4 Price Segment
C o m p a q
H P
D e ll
IB M
0.097
0.156
0.124
0.134
0.065
0.127
0.138
- 2.0
2.6
3.0
Panel D: 4-10 Price Segment
C o m p a q
H P
D e ll
IB M
0.284
0.480
0.287
0.484
0.232
0.300
0.511
-51.7
4.6
5.5
N o te :  Value function figures are in thousands 1996 US dollars, rounded to the nearest thousandth. The post-merger values for HP 
report the percentage change of the post-merger values of the merged entity, HP-Compaq, with respect to the combined pre-merger 
values of HP and Compaq.
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TABLE 3.18. M ultimarket Value Functions and Critical Discount Factors in the Competitive Fringe Model -  
Aggregated Across Price Segments and Regions__________________________________________________
F irm V .C o ll
P re -M e rg e r
V .D e f V .(C -D ) V .C o ll
P o s t-M e r g e r
V .D e f V .(C -D ) % V .(C -D )
C o m p a q 1130600 957729 172871
H P 298679 255166 43512 1429278 1217316 211962 387.1
D e ll 982396 845333 137064 982396 853658 128739 -6.1
IB M 499294 431432 67861 499294 438130 61164 -9.9
C r itic a l D isc o u n t F a cto rs
F irm P re -M e rg e r P o s t-M e r g e r % C h ange
C o m p a q 0.273
H P 0.456 0.220 -51.7
D e ll 0.278 0.291 4.5
IB M 0.463 0.488 5.4
N o te :  Value function figures are in thousands 1996 US dollars, rounded to the nearest thousandth. The post-merger values for HP 
report the percentage change of the post-merger values of the merged entity, HP-Compaq, with respect to the combined pre-merger 
values of HP and Compaq.
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TABLE 3.19. Value Functions for the Compaq-HP-IBM Cartel
P re -M e r g e r P o s t-M e r g e r
F irm V .C o ll V .D e f V .(C -D ) V .C o ll V .D e f V .(C -D ) % V .(C -D )
Panel A: 0-4 M arkets  egment
Region: US
C o m p a q 99956.5 99790.6 166.0
H P 29831.1 29817.9 13.2 129787.6 129654.5 133.1 -25.7
IB M 37216.5 37196.3 20.1 37216.5 37252.0 -35.6
Region: EU
C o m p a q 68137.2 67840.8 296.4
H P 41242.9 41122.3 120.6 109380.0 109095.9 284.1 -31.9
IB M 31271.1 31188.7 82.4 31271.1 31346.7 -75.7
Region: JP
C o m p a q 12887.4 12879.1 8.2
H P 8085.8 8081.4 4.4 20973.2 20963.3 9.8 -22.1
IB M 32067.8 31999.6 68.3 32067.8 32021.3 46.6 -31.8
U S /E U /J P Markets
C o m p a q 180981.1 180510.4 470.6
H P 79159.7 79021.5 138.2 260140.8 259713.7 427.1 -29.9
IB M 100555.4 100384.6 170.8 100555.4 100620.0 -64.6
Panel B: 4~10 Market Segment
Region: US
C o m p a q 216201.9 213049.6 3152.3
H P 38398.4 38162.9 235.5 254600.3 251742.8 2857.5 -15.7
IB M 121300.5 120210.1 1090.4 121300.5 121035.5 265.1 -75.7
Region: EU
C o m p a q 519135.5 497590.5 21545.0
H P 105410.7 104515.1 895.6 624546.1 606829.3 17716.8 -21.1
IB M 178429.6 176582.1 1847.5 178429.6 182012.7 -3583.2
Region: JP
C o m p aq 60042.2 59481.8 560.4
H P 31202.7 30998.9 203.8 91244.9 90697.8 547.1 -28.4
IB M 30533.9 30337.5 196.4 30533.9 30604.8 -70.9
U S /E U /J P Markets
C o m p aq 795379.6 770121.9 25257.7
H P 175011.8 173676.9 1334.9 970391.4 949270.0 21121.4 -20.6
IB M 330264.0 327129.7 3134.3 330264.0 333653.0 -3389.0
Panel C: Multimarket Contact Across Geographical Markets and Price Segments
C o m p aq 976360.7 950632.3 25728.4
H P 254171.5 252698.4 1473.2 1230532.2 1208983.7 21548.5 -20.8
IB M 430819.4 427514.3 3305.1 430819.4 434273.0 -3453.6
N o te : Figures are in thousands 1996 US dollars, rounded to the nearest thousandth. The post-merger values for HP report the
percentage change of the post-merger values of the merged entity, HP-Compaq, with respect to the combined pre-merger values of
HP and Compaq.
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TABLE 3.20. Value Functions for the Compaq-HP-Dell Cartel
P r e -M e r g e r P o s t-M e r g e r
F ir m V .C o ll V .D e f V .(C -D ) V .C o ll V .D e f V .(C -D ) % V .(C -D )
Panel A: 0-4 Market Segment
Region: US
C o m p a q 100022.2 99794.9 227.3
H P 29850.4 29819.8 30.7 129872.7 129659.2 213.5 -17.2
D e ll 68877.7 68769.0 108.7 68877.7 68873.6 4.1 -96.2
Region: E U
C o m p a q 68126.9 67839.9 286.9
H P 41236.6 41121.7 115.0 109363.5 109095.1 268.5 -33.2
D e ll 26990.4 26930.4 60.0 26990.4 27071.6 -81.2
Region: JP
C o m p a q 12890.0 12878.9 11.1
H P 8087.2 8081.2 6.0 20977.2 20963.0 14.2 -17.2
D e ll 24987.9 24946.1 41.8 24987.9 24963.1 24.8 -40.7
U S /E U /J P Markets
C o m p a q 181039.1 180513.8 525.4
H P 79174.3 79022.6 151.7 260213.4 259717.2 496.2 -26.7
D e ll 120856.0 120645.6 210.5 120856.0 120908.4 -52.4
Panel B: 4~10 Market Segment
Region: US
C o m p a q 214256.2 213304.4 951.9
H P 37977.0 38241.8 -264.8 252233.3 252000.9 232.3 -66.2
D e ll 526838.0 506984.0 19854.0 526838.0 510013.5 16824.5 -15.3
Region: EU
C o m p a q 516128.5 497464.0 18664.6
H P 104796.7 104476.6 320.1 620925.2 606690.4 14234.7 -25.0
D e ll 182301.2 180463.6 1837.6 182301.2 185312.4 -3011.1
Region: JP
C o m p a q 59973.7 59478.9 494.8
H P 31167.1 30997.1 170.0 91140.9 90693.9 446.9 -32.8
D e ll 32074.9 31888.2 186.7 32074.9 32133.0 -58.1
U S /E U /J P Markets
C o m p a q 790358.5 770247.2 20111.2
H P 173940.8 173715.5 225.4 964299.3 949385.3 14914.0 -26.7
D e ll 741214.1 719335.8 21878.3 741214.1 727458.9 13755.3 -37.1
Panel C: Multimarket Contact Across Geographical Markets and Price Segments
C o m p a q 971397.6 950761.0 20636.6
H P 253115.1 252738.1 377.0 1224512.7 1209102.5 15410.2 -26.7
D e ll 862070.2 839981.4 22088.8 862070.2 848367.3 13702.9 -38.0
N o te : Figures are in thousands 1996 US dollars, rounded to the nearest thousandth. The post-merger values for HP report the
percentage change of the post-merger values of the merged entity, HP-Compaq, with respect to the combined pre-merger values of
HP and Compaq.
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TABLE 3.21. Side Payments to Sustain Uniform Critical Discount Factors Across Firms
0-4  M a rk et S e g m e n t 4 -1 0  M a rk et S e g m e n t
F irm P r e -M e r g e r P o st-M e r g e r P r e -M e r g e r  P o s t-M e r g e r
Panel A: Compaq-HP-IBM  Cartel
Region: US
C o m p a q -1.9 -25.0
H P 0.9 -1.9 12.5 -25.0
IB M 0.9 1.9 12.5 25.0
Region: EU
C o m p a q -2.4 -248.6
H P 1.0 -4.0 108.1 -229.4
IB M 1.3 4.0 140.5 229.4
Region: JP
C o m p a q 0.4 -4.1 0.0
H P 0.3 0.4 2.0 -6.3
IB M -0.8 -0.4 2.1 6.3
U S /E U /J P  Markets
C o m p a q -3.8 -277.1
H P 2.3 -5.5 123.0 -259.8
IB M 1.5 5.5 154.1 259.8
Panel B: Compaq-HP-Dell Cartel
Region: US
C o m p a q -1.8 165.9
H P 1.3 -2.3 66.1 181.8
D e ll 0.6 2.3 -232.0 -181.8
Region: EU
C o m p a q -2.4 -214.8
H P 0.9 -3.9 108.4 -184.8
D e ll 1.5 3.9 106.4 184.8
Region: JP
C o m p a q 0.2 -3.5
H P 0.2 0.1 2.2 -5.2
D e ll -0.4 -0.1 1.4 5.2
U S /E U /J P  Markets
C o m p a q -4.1 -53.2
H P 2.4 -6.1 176.3 -10.2
D e ll 1.7 6.1 -123.1 10.2
N o te : Figures are in thousands 1996 US dollars per quarter.
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TABLE 3.22. Rejections of the Null Hypothesis of Equality Between Model-Implied and CAPM Betas Against 
the Two-Sided Alternative
0 -4  P r ic e  S e g m e n t  
P r e -M e r g e r  P o st-M e r g e r
4 -1 0  P r ic e  S e g m e n t  
P r e -M e r g e r  P o s t-M e r g e r
Panel A: Std  model 
U S 12/12 11/11 7/9
Compaq, Toshiba
6/8 
HP, Toshiba
E U 8/9 6/8 
SGI Gateway, SGI
10/10 7/9
Fujitsu, NEC
J P 8/10 7/9 
Compaq, Dell HP, Dell
10/12 
Compaq, NCR
9/11 
HP, NCR
Panel B: M M  model 
A ll R e g io n s 14/14 12/13 
SGI
11/13 
Compaq, Dell
11/12
Dell
Panel C: CF model 
U S 4 /4  3/3 3/4
Compaq
2/3
HP
E U 4 /4  3/3 2/4 
Dell, IBM
3/3
J P 4 /4  3/3 4/4 3/3
Panel D: CF-MM model 
A ll R e g io n s 4/4  4/3 2/4
HP
IBM
2/3
IBM
AH R e g io n s  & P r ic e  S e g m e n ts
P re -M e rg e r
13/15 
Dell, Unisys
P o st-M e r g e r
11/14 
Dell, SGI, , Dell
Panel F: CF-MM model 
A 1 R e g io n s  & P r ic e  S e g m e n ts 2/4 
HP, IBM
2/3
IBM
N o te : The Table reports the number of rejections at the 1% significance level of the null hypothesis of equality between the model- 
implifd and CAPM betas against the two-sided alternative. For a given combination of rows and columns, the first number is the  
numbtr of rejections, whereas the second number is the number of firms which operate in the market and for which the CAPM  was 
estim ited. Whenever the null was not rejected, the name of the firm is reported.
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